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ABSTRACT
In 1899, Atlantans saw their city streets as multi-purpose open spaces, freely available to all
persons and transit modes. By 1929, that understanding had changed. Streets became automobile
conduits to rapidly and efficiently move motor vehicles around town. Other modes of
transportation had disappeared or been marginalized. New government regulations tightly
controlled or banished other street users and uses. Vast amounts of municipal space became the
domain of automobiles, losing the democratic values which public roads formerly represented.
This study will demonstrate that during the 1920s, Atlanta’s powerful elites brought about this
transformation of society’s comprehension of the meaning and function of a city street. Seeing
the automobile as the essential tool for city expansion, this pro-growth coalition directly
intervened in state and municipal government to enact laws favoring motor vehicles. They
sought and won the allocation of public funds to build the physical infrastructure and legislative
superstructure to facilitate the presence of cars on city streets. The print media marketed the
changed definition of street space, and promoted the automobile as a status symbol and a way to
escape the always-contentious, multi-racial streetcars. Realtors and investors urged better roads
for automobile access to their burgeoning suburban developments. While the transformative
process took root and sprouted between 1900 and 1919, the twenties witnessed the bulk of the
efforts of the growth alliance to remake Atlanta’s city streets. No longer a luxury vehicle for the
very rich, by 1920, the car had emerged as a necessity for all but the poorest citizens. Utilizing
modern marketing methods and innovative business strategies, automakers helped emplace a
national culture of consumption. Advertisements urged Atlantans to go into debt to purchase the
latest models, while the local government struggled to cope with traffic gridlock and outrageous
numbers of auto-related fatalities. Blaming streetcars for the congestion, business and civic

leaders also increasingly faulted pedestrians and children for their own injuries and deaths—they
should not have strayed onto streets which no longer belonged to everyone. By 1929, Atlanta’s
leadership had surrendered the city streets to the automobile; the car had “won” the road.
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1

INTRODUCTION

In 1899, the citizens of Atlanta, Georgia experienced their city streets as multi-purpose
spaces open to the free exercise of various transportation modes, social functions, and
commercial activities. By 1929, that understanding had changed: streets now served as
automobile conduits with the major purpose of rapidly and efficiently moving motor vehicles
around the metropolitan area. The heavier, faster, free-ranging machines had marginalized or
eliminated horses, mules, bicycles, and even pedestrians. New municipal ordinances banished or
tightly circumscribed all non-automotive street users and uses. Motorized traffic took over vast
amounts of once-shared, free-to-all public space, running roughshod over the democratic values
which city roadways formerly represented.
How did this happen? How did the car “win” the road? Academics have offered
numerous explanations, and certainly multiple factors made possible and assisted the
automobile’s rise to dominate the nation’s streets during the early twentieth century. A highly
popular conception insists that Americans simply loved their cars. This narrative maintains that
the preeminence of the car over all other forms of ground transportation occurred in a free,
capitalist marketplace. Citizens voted with their dollars, right feet planted firmly on accelerator
pedals. The automobile was the people’s choice, a triumph of democracy. Devotees of this view
consider any suggestion to the contrary unpatriotic, even un-American.
This study suggests an alternate explanation. It will demonstrate that, between 1920 and
1929, a group of powerful, elite Atlantans transformed the meaning and function of their city’s
streets. This coterie of influential whites, mostly men, comprised what Harvey Molotch terms a
growth-machine coalition: a group of business leaders who viewed urban property as a market
commodity capable of providing great wealth and power. These individuals had the most to gain
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or lose in urban land-use decisions, and the automobile supplied the essential transportation
component for successful property development. As such, cars needed accommodation in the
forms of good roads and traffic laws to enable the mobility required for municipal spread.1
For the coalition, increased automobility and city expansion intertwined as codependents; one could not occur without the other. A new “motor age geography” had become
necessary. Consequently, group members worked to ensure that local government enacted
policies and distributed resources favorable to both. Their initial efforts took place in the first
two decades of the twentieth century, but they got serious in the 1920s. During those ten years,
they re-made the common understanding of a road’s purpose—conveying automobiles. In so
doing, they reconstructed city streets, installing the physical infrastructure and legislative
superstructure requisite for cars to function unobstructed by poor pavement and unhindered by
slower, more vulnerable street users.2
On the list of explanations for how the car won the road, the growth-machine thesis with
its coalition of powerful influencers ranks as one variant within the “elite-imposition” school.
Adherents generally maintain that businessmen, professionals, the automobile industry, and city
planners deliberately promoted the motor vehicle. Some see dirty-dealing conspiracies; others
find less nefarious hookups between pro-car forces. Peter Norton, in his groundbreaking book,
Fighting Traffic: The Dawn of the Motor Age in the American City, dismisses the eliteimposition theory as inadequate because none of its versions explain why elites fought so hard to
privilege the automobile.3

1
Harvey Molotch, “The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place,” American
Journal of Sociology 82, no. 2 (1976): 309-14.
2
For an overview of the nationwide construction of the new geography in the 1920s, see Christopher W.
Wells, Car Country: An Environmental History (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2012), 125-39.
3
Peter D. Norton, Fighting Traffic: The Dawn of the Motor Age in the American City (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 2008), 9-10, 13-14.

3
This study supplies that missing “why.” The growth-machine thesis offers a cogent,
rational, and believable explanation of the motivating factors of the placed-based urban elite
alliance and their view of city expansion as a way to greater personal wealth. One of the
important contributions of this narrative to the existing literature is that it fills the lacuna
identified by Norton in elite-imposition theory. This study concentrates on the changing physical
configuration of city streets and evolving legislation of street uses and users, largely directed by
the pro-growth coalition to privilege the automobile.
Through long experience, the association of influential decision-makers and policysetters understood the transportation as an essential component of development. Between 1899
and 1929, these power elites gradually embraced the automobile as the latest, most promising
transit mode. Themselves wealthy men and owners of multiple cars, they early saw the potential
of the new-fangled horseless carriage, and adopted it as the modern cog in their vision of the
urban growth machine. In order to increase the utility of the automobile to achieve their
expansionist goals, in the 1920s they re-made Atlanta’s streets and laws to facilitate motor
vehicle travel. At the same time, the coalition promoted car use, deploying the latest marketing
strategies and advertising techniques to convince city dwellers that they too needed to possess
one of these marvelous inventions. Before the stock market crashed, the group had succeeded in
both endeavors: nearly half of local households owned a car, and city streets existed primarily to
move them.
A hundred years later, Atlanta still strives to build its way out of its notorious traffic
gridlock while the greater metropolitan area continues to grow, extending in 2020 to include 29
counties with a population approaching six million. But the pattern began a hundred years ago
with a group of local place entrepreneurs who held the power to direct financing, plans, and
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policies. They enacted their vision of urban growth via automobile, enthusiastically endorsed
motor vehicle use, and set into place the legal and physical structures necessary to establish
motordom’s autocracy, under which we all exist today. In Atlanta, the car did not “win” the road;
instead, the pro-growth coalition literally paved the way as they surrendered city streets to the
automobile.
1.1

Molotch’s Growth Machine Thesis
A closer look at Molotch’s growth machine thesis helps explain Atlanta’s own

association of powerful elites and how they operated. His empirical theory rests on the
assumption that land is a market commodity and therefore is of great importance to “place
entrepreneurs”—those individuals and entities interested and invested in property. Owning,
developing, and selling land can generate significant wealth.
However, the process requires constant activity to maintain or swell the revenue stream.
A variety of strategies can be employed to keep the money flowing, such as acquiring
undeveloped territory outside the city, or replacing small, outdated intown structures with larger,
modern buildings capable of generating higher rents. Another popular technique, raising property
values can be achieved either by increasing accessibility so that different sections of town
become more attractive to investors, or by legislating exclusivity for wealthy residents in select
neighborhoods.
The growth imperative forms the political and economic essence of virtually any
municipality, and drives decisions about property, services, and finances. The city effectively
serves as a machine to stimulate wealth and generate economic growth, an “areal expression” of
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the business affairs and concerns of the place-based elites. As urban borders swell, so do their
personal fortunes.4
According to Molotch, the desire for expansion motivates those with property interests to
unite and form a coalition. The clearest indicators of their success are the continuous extension
of city boundaries and rising population counts. To achieve both, the group works to influence
local, and when possible, state and national governments, seeking favorable legislation.
Decisions about land use, transportation, tax rates, labor relations, law enforcement, public
utilities—each has the power to affect the business climate, attracting or repelling new industries,
enhancing or curtailing growth. Should the real estate market fill completely, expanding
development encroaches into surrounding communities. Ensuring that municipal policies will
promote growth is a key function of the association, and often group members have government
positions. But in or out of office, the place entrepreneurs hold considerable power at the local
level.5
A pro-growth coalition usually consists of three types of individuals or organizations.
The majority are property owners, business proprietors, and local investors—people with land or
land-based interests who depend on city government to enable their everyday commercial
activities. Financiers, lawyers, realtors, and syndicators make up another subset; they provide
various forms of assistance or services to those in the first group. Also active in the association
are those who may not have direct place-based concerns, but whose financial fortunes depend on
city growth.6

Molotch, “The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place,” 309-10.
Ibid., 310, 312-13, 317-18.
6
Ibid., 314.
4
5
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Coalition members work not only through government, but also make strenuous efforts to
promote the metropolis. They are the city boosters who generate community spirit, what Molotch
calls the “we feeling,” which can greatly influence local politics. But boosterism can also reach
beyond the city limits and spread the word about urban amenities and a commerce-friendly
reputation throughout the region or even nationally. Often a function of the local Chamber of
Commerce, it encompasses an array of activities aimed at a variety of audiences, including
expositions, parades, public school curricula, professional sports teams, essay-writing contests,
conventions, and advertisements in business and travel publications. All contribute to unite
citizens, foster “civic jingoism,” and promote the pro-development agenda.7
Essential to the growth-machine efforts are the local media, especially, in the early
twentieth century, the newspapers. An ever-expanding metropolitan region benefits their revenue
streams with increased subscriptions from a growing population and a wider area of affect for
their many advertisements. A paper’s financial status depends on the size of its customer base;
not only will it sell more lines of advertising, but it can charge higher rates per line. The
transition of print media from being subscription-dependent to relying primarily on advertising
for the bulk of their revenues had occurred by 1900, but increased exponentially during the
1920s (see Table 16 in Chapter 7).
The newspaper is an active member of the pro-growth coalition on its own behalf. But it
also acts as the group’s major mouthpiece, championing all the boosterish activities to unify the
citizenry, burnish the city’s reputation, and promote the growth agenda. It generally does not
care which direction urban expansion takes (a newspaper can be delivered to any doorstep), and
therefore acts as a fair and disinterested observer, or at least maintains that perception. Although

7

Ibid., 314-15.

7
viewed as the voice of the community, in reality the newspaper does more than merely describe
public events and activities. By its coverage, editorials, political slant, racial and religious biases,
and even the advertising it accepts, it can also shape or direct public opinion. The media then is a
valued and necessary member of the growth group, endorsing specific municipal policies to
expand the local economy and attract wealth into the region.8
Scholars of the growth-machine thesis have described it as an urban phenomenon limited
almost exclusively to the United States. That regional tendency could arguably be tied to Sam
Bass Warner’s American value system of “privatism,” providing a foundation for the successful
operation of U.S.-based growth-machine coalitions. Warner defines privatism as the insistence
that the purpose of life is primarily to engage in a personal struggle for wealth, that “the
individual should see his first loyalty as his immediate family, and that a community should be a
union of such money-making, accumulating families.” He asserts that widespread adoption of
such attitudes has impacted the physical forms of American urban areas, whose “lots, houses,
factories, and streets have been the outcome of a real estate market of profit-seeking builders,
land speculators, and large investors.” While not essential to an understanding of the city as a
growth machine, Warner’s economic framing of American individualism supports the place
entrepreneurs’ focus on space commodification as essential to growth, and on its subsequent
effects on urban structure.9
Any study of the genesis of America’s automobile age must consider Norton’s Fighting
Traffic. He argues that before city streets could be reconfigured to privilege automobiles, the

8
Molotch, “The City as Growth Machine,” 315-16; Andrew E. G. Jonas, and David Wilson, eds., The
Urban Growth Machine: Critical Perspectives Two Decades Later (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1999), 3.
9
Sam Bass Warner, Jr., The Private City: Philadelphia in Three Periods of Its Growth (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania, 1968), 3-4; Rick Beard, “From Suburb to Defended Neighborhood: Change in Atlanta's
Inman Park and Ansley Park, 1890-1980” (Ph.D. diss., Emory University, 1981), 377-78.
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streets themselves had to be reconstituted as places where society agreed that cars belonged. He
studies this social reconstruction through the lens of the various groups fighting over who had
the right to the public roadways. The pro-automobile interests, collectively referred to as
motordom, ultimately prevailed. This study contends instead that the reconstitution of society’s
street views happened while the physical reconfiguration took place. At least in Atlanta, no strict
temporal divide between the two occurred. However, his delineations of the combatants and
winner fit the narrative presented here.10
Norton convincingly describes how motordom effectively utilized rhetoric borrowed
from the American ideals of individual liberty and free markets to persuade the country that
motorists had a right to street space. But beyond highly-resonant oratory, the pro-car alliance had
additional weapons in the form of national associations with local chapters in every city; a probusiness Republican political climate; substantial wealth to promote their agenda; and the
sympathy of increasing numbers of motorists. The disparate and disorganized combatants
(streetcar companies, parents of young children, police, independent traffic engineers not
employed by the auto industry) lost, and by 1930, motordom had redefined urban streets. Again,
similar actors and activities appear within the growth coalition narrative presented here. 11
This dissertation strives to put a face on the forces of motordom as it evolved in the early
twentieth century. It falls into the elite-imposition category of explanations of how the car won
the road, which Norton faults for not explaining why elites strove for automotive dominance. He
never analyzes the motivations of the pro-car constituents, beyond undefined allusions to
expanding capitalism. In contrast, the growth-machine theory offers a reasonable explanation of
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precisely why the urban elite alliance promoted the car. The group sought financial gains from
city expansion, which required the mobility and accessibility provided by the automobile. Norton
takes a broad, generalized view, focusing on the goals and strategies of the entities comprising
U.S. motordom. This study is more granular, scrutinizing the identities and actions of the local
individuals and organizations leading the fight for the redefinition of one city’s streets.12
1.2

Studies of Atlanta’s Decision-Makers
That Atlanta has long possessed a group of well-to-do decision-makers who controlled

local policies and directed city growth can be found in the writings of an array of scholars.
Several studies specifically about the city assert that a group or association of groups have
dominated urban politics and influenced the plans and ordinances enacted by elected officials.
Floyd Hunter’s 1953 Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers led the way,
documenting Atlanta’s leaders and the system of power relations operative in the early 1950s.
Businessmen, financiers, government officials, professionals, the newspapers, and others with
civic interests made up his consortium, although a much smaller insider subset at the heart of the
group held veto power. These men set the municipal agenda, making use of “propaganda media”
to establish and maintain policies beneficial to their concerns. Hunter’s was truly a path-breaking
study, dismaying social scientists, especially those of the pluralist persuasion, and arguably
inaugurating the field of power structure research. His empirical study of Atlanta’s power base
preceded Molotch by more than twenty years but fits well in the growth-coalition theory of local
power.13
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Later came Regime Politics, in which political scientist Clarence Stone investigated how
Atlanta’s urban government collaborated with business interests to shape the city’s policy
agenda. While his regime theory differs from the growth machine thesis in approach, it
fundamentally describes the identical government-private sector dynamic. Stone agrees with
Hunter that, in Atlanta at least, the growth elites dominated. His chosen period of study (194688) enables him to address in detail the African American leadership’s incorporation into and
eventual control of the governing coalition. The present study also looks at the decision-makers
of the Black community, who comprised a pro-growth alliance operating parallel to the ruling
white coalition during a time when Jim Crow reigned supreme. For the most part ignored, Blacks
on occasion held a singular power at the ballot box, which they would strategically employ to
influence the municipal program to their advantage in the 1920s.14
Scholars across a variety of disciplines continue to utilize growth machine theory in their
studies of numerous U.S. cities, including Atlanta. For the most part, however, they have
investigated more recent history, and for a time, many believed that urban growth machines
existed only after the second World War. Writing two decades after his initial thesis, Molotch
acknowledged that his idea could also apply to pre-Fordist periods. The core growth-machine
concept holds, though the details change over time. Coalitions continue to make use of the
available technologies, marketing techniques, fiscal instruments, and trending industries.15
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This study joins the stream of more recent scholarship documenting earlier growthcoalition manifestations.16 It demonstrates how, between 1920 and 1929, Atlanta’s place
entrepreneurs championed the new automotive technology, promoted motor vehicle use, and
invited car manufacturing and related industries to locate in the area. The group employed
innovative as well as traditional financing schemes, and went even further, deploying legislative
tools to reconfigure the city streets to establish automobile dominance.
Outside of the growth machine school, others have studied Atlanta’s power elites during
the general time frame of this study. Lyon writes about building trends in Atlanta from
Reconstruction to 1930, and asserts that pressure from local elites steered development in the
central business district during the early twentieth century. Lands discusses the civic and
business elites operating between 1880 and 1950, and how this “white, propertied power”
divided the city by race and class, privileging exclusive park-neighborhoods. Amsterdam, who
also focuses on the 1920s, describes how the “well-off bankers, manufacturers, merchants, and
high-end lawyers who made up the city’s white commercial and industrial elite” comprised “a
group deeply committed to attracting new businesses to the city.” They sought to “further the
goals of urban reform and urban boosterism to prepare citizens for work and democracy while
helping to lure new firms to their hometowns.” Each of these different authors focus on disparate
municipal elements and policies, but all chronicle the same set of influential Atlantans that
comprise the pro-growth coalition of this dissertation.17
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Doyle’s comparative study of New South cities between 1860 and 1910 pushes back
specifically against the growth-machine theory. His complaint focuses on what he calls its
mechanistic view of urbanization, which portrays cities “simply as large, impersonal growth
machines that respond reflexively to opportunities for economic expansion and to the dictates of
geographic advantage.” Such a view does not allow for human agency in the city-building
process, and also omits government’s essential role. Some cities like Atlanta flourished while
others like Charleston languished. He attributes the difference to the men acting (or not) within
their specific settings and capitalizing (or not) on locational advantages and amenities.18
A close reading of Molotch, however, reveals that powerful urban individuals and their
organizations comprise the essential actors. They, in conjunction with government at multiple
levels, utilize their city as a mechanism for expanding money-making capabilities. Setting aside
an argument over the machine metaphor, this writer agrees completely with Doyle’s description
of the men who created the New South paradigm, and maintains that it perfectly encapsulates a
group of prominent growth leaders.
At the head of each local enterprise were the leading businessmen, who may be
likened to the major stockholders and board of directors. Not only did their
individual businesses hinge on the success of their cities, their investment in local
real estate rose or fell with their city’s fortunes. They enlisted the aid of local and
state governments, whose leaders often came from their own ranks, and engaged
newspaper editors as propagandists, but the main energy and much of the capital
that fueled the city-building process flowed from the business elite.19
Beyond Doyle, yet another study of southern urban areas effectively documented an
Atlanta expansionist alliance a year before Molotch published his growth machine thesis. For
five cities in the 1920s, Blaine Brownell catalogs the “urban ethos”— a defining conception of
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the city encompassing the desirability and necessity of both urban growth and social order. His
“commercial-civic elite” realized those two mutually reinforcing goals by focusing attention
primarily on the downtown business district, and utilizing print sources to promote their projects.
For Brownell, Atlanta exemplified the new metropolitan South as its elite men, acting through
the local Chamber of Commerce, dominated urban affairs in the early decades of the twentieth
century.20
Brownell’s narrative of the city’s leadership describes a typical pro-growth coalition: the
close relationship between prominent businessmen and government officials, their concern with
media and presentation, their occasional disagreements but general unanimity on the direction of
municipal policies. He also takes care to underscore the fundamental inequities of such an
alliance and its inherent biases favoring both commerce and whiteness. While the decisionmakers at times had to factor in labor interests, they had no concern whatsoever for the Black
citizens, and only did the minimum to maintain law and order and to enforce the existing racial
status quo. The findings of this dissertation comport closely with his analysis of Atlanta’s
leaders, their concerns, methods of operation, prejudices, and exclusivities. Brownell effectively
describes a growth-machine association before Molotch named the phenomenon.21
Finally, Preston’s Automobile Age Atlanta: The Making of a Southern Metropolis, 19001935 greatly informed this study. Asserting that the car played a leading role in producing the
modern South, Preston focuses on Atlanta between 1900 and 1930, with occasional comparisons
to other U.S. cities. During that period, radical changes occurred in the city’s size, financial
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structures, and physical characteristics, aided by the automobile which provided not only
convenient transportation but also a wealth-producing industry. By 1930, the car had become the
prevailing means of urban transportation.22
Preston and this dissertation investigate the same city, people, topic, and nearly the same
time period. Both arrive at the identical conclusion, that “Atlanta was transformed from a city
built to serve the railroad to a metropolis adjusted to accommodate the automobile,” begging the
question, why this study? A major difference is this paper’s utilization of the growth-machine
thesis to explain when, how, and why a coterie of influential white men adopted the automobile
as a tool for municipal expansion. Citing Paul Gaston, Preston does maintain that boosterish
spokesmen did deploy the car to bring prosperity and recognition to the South. However, his
primary focus is on the fiscal advantages of having auto dealerships and assembly plants in town,
not how cars increased accessibility to developing properties. While generally acknowledging
the fiscal motivations of prominent individuals and city officials, he does not reference the
existence of the informally organized body of policy-makers. Neither does he investigate, as this
study does, precisely how that group’s influence changed the local laws and city streets.23
Preston’s is more a top-down look at the effects of automobility on Atlanta and its pivotal
role in transforming the city into a progressive metropolis. This bottom-up study specifically
explores how the pro-growth elites created new systems—both physical and legislative—to
privilege cars as their primary tool for municipal expansion. Their efforts resulted in a
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reconfiguration of the streets specifically for automobile mobility, accompanied by a radically
different understanding of what and who constituted acceptable street uses and users.
1.3

Methodology and Organization
This study was sparked by a desire to discover the origins of Atlanta’s auto-centric ethos

with its sadly inadequate mass transit system. By understanding how the city arrived at this
transportation imbroglio, perhaps those of us who live here could find a way out of it. From the
very beginning, and long before encountering either Molotch or Hunter, this writer decided that
an investigation of the people empowered to create car-dominant roadways would comprise a
critical part of the study.
Consequently, a database of over 200 white leaders (including four women) was
compiled and eventually narrowed to 114 persons who had an impact on Atlanta’s city streets in
the early twentieth century. Another database identifies 21 African American leaders (including
one woman). Certainly the city had many more Black leaders and prominent business owners
than those selected here. During the Jim Crow era, however, very few had the power to bring any
alteration to the city streets, and those who did had only indirect influence. The bulk of the
physical and legislative changes to Atlanta’s roadways occurred in the chambers of the all-white
city council at the behest of the white business leadership. Throughout this dissertation, nonspecific mentions of such entities as the pro-growth coalition, power elites, and city officials
refer to the whites who held significant authority over their fellow African American citizens.24
As even brief sketches of 135 lives would make tedious reading, the general approach of
this study will be to discuss the most important individuals as they enter the narrative within the
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context of their transportation-related activities. Chapter 2 examines both of Atlanta’s
associations of place entrepreneurs, their members, their relationships, and the power
differentials within as well as between the two racially-segregated groups. It will demonstrate
how closely the city’s elites mirror textbook examples of pro-growth coalitions in composition
and function, and in their strategies for persuading government officials and fellow citizens to
embrace policies advantageous to the groups’ interests.
Seeing the car as the essential transit cog, the growth forces directly intervened with
government bodies to write, enact, and enforce pro-automobile laws and limiting other street
uses. Before most urban families even owned a car, coalition members initiated the allocation of
public funds to construct a massive two-tiered system to facilitate motor vehicle movement. One
tier consisted of the physical overhaul of city streets by grading, paving, and re-sizing roads and
sidewalks. It also included building car-carrying viaducts above the city’s original life line, the
railroad network running through the heart of downtown.
The second tier comprised legislation to create a blanketing “web of regulation,”25
defining and enforcing who could use city streets, and how and when and where. The expansion
advocates’ ultimate goal remained constant throughout: growing Atlanta for economic gain.
They succeeded admirably: the city by 1929 had expanded in area, population, and reputation as
the financial nucleus, central distribution point, and automotive center of the southeastern United
States.
Atlanta entered the Automobile Age on in 1899, when a motor car first drove on city
streets, causing much wonder and excitement. Over the next twenty years, policymakers slowly
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came to approve and tentatively advance motor vehicle use. But the substantial work occurred
during the decade of the twenties, culminating in December 1929’s publication of the city’s first
comprehensive traffic survey. That document enshrined motor vehicle supremacy for the Greater
Atlanta metropolitan area. Atlanta adopted automobility gradually over thirty years, with the
decades characterized by the familiar trope of crawl, walk, run. The ten-year periods are loosely
defined as follows:
1900-09 Co-existence—shared streets
1910-19 Conflict—contested streets
1920-29 Consolidation—exclusive streets
Neither the dates nor their descriptions are hard-and-fast delimiters, but do outline the
general trajectory of the changing understandings of the city’s streets. The first two decades saw
the tentative beginnings of Atlanta’s automobility, but the most striking alterations took effect
and motordom achieved supremacy during the Roaring Twenties. Chapter 3 introduces that
tumultuous decade of the consolidation of urban streets as nearly exclusive car conduits.
Four chapters describe the 1920s, the decade when the elite businessmen and
professionals implemented the majority of the infrastructural changes to Atlanta’s streets in
pursuit of their goal of car-enabled urban expansion. Chapter 4 discusses the creation of the first
official planning commission, and chronicles in detail how it, the growth alliance, and the city
government united to pass bond issues for the construction of the three major viaducts. Chapter 5
documents the city’s traffic problems and solutions: gridlock, fatalities, pedestrian control,
children in the streets, the creation of a traffic regulation system, and removing or limiting once
acceptable uses of the public roadways—including the streetcars.
Chapter 6 examines segregated Atlanta, the 1922 zoning ordinance and its claim to
protect property values by racially-dividing residential areas. It considers Black Atlanta, semi-
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segregated streetcars, and the race-based policing of city streets. Chapter 7 recounts two
entrepreneurial tales: selling the city and selling cars. It first traces how the growth coalition used
modern marketing techniques to establish Atlanta as the nation’s southern business headquarters.
It then describes the rescue of the flailing auto industry by saturation advertising and innovative
business strategies. Chapter 8 wraps up the decade with a detailed look at the city’s 1929 traffic
survey, which ensured the streetcar’s demise and deliberately kicked the twin cans of Atlanta’s
on-street parking and one-way streets dilemmas down the gridlocked roads, still unresolved
today. More importantly, the study established automobile domination and the cemented the
understanding of city streets primarily as channels for cars and trucks.26
Chapter 9 presents some conclusions of the study. It examines the great liability of the
growth-machine coalition: its massive inequities which left the majority of Atlanta’s citizens
voiceless in the policy-making process. Motivated by narrow self-interests, the power elites had
little understanding of or concern for many of the important issues confronting all of the African
Americans and most of the rest of Atlanta’s citizens. Their policy of city expansion via
automobile took years, cost millions of taxpayer dollars, and required copious amounts of
legislation to restructure and regulate the streets. To undo any of it, or make meaningful changes
to reduce its harmful effects will require similar investments of time, money, and political will.
The major goal of this dissertation is to detail why and how the “shared roads” of 1899
changed, primarily between 1920 and 1929, into virtual car conduits. It studies the alliance of top
influencers in one city, Atlanta, Georgia, adopting the local view of the place where a growthmachine coalition operates. This street-level (in every way) perspective best elucidates the
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relationships between individuals and groups, actions and spaces. Doyle and Barrett both
advocate the close study of specific urban settings and the individual business leaders operating
within them; only through such detailed scrutiny can early twentieth-century transportation
policy be understood.27
Youthful Atlanta did not possess much of the cultural baggage of some older southern
cities. From its unconventional railroad beginnings, it was an upstart, a brash commercial town
where business, and a reputation for busyness, reigned supreme. The 1864 conflagration forced
locals to rebuild much of downtown, further enhancing the sense of newness and vitality. The
rapidity of its literal reconstruction during and beyond the Reconstruction years gave civic
boosters ample opportunities to boast of Atlanta’s progressive and industrious attitudes and its
eager embrace of modernity.28
Yet the city was not entirely atypical. Similarly-motivated and enthusiastic businessmen
led their cities into the New South, embracing different industries, residents, forms of
government, and cultural mores well into the twentieth century. What happened in Atlanta—the
ceding of the streets to the automobile—happened everywhere else in the nation. But in
addressing U.S. urban transportation issues of the early twentieth century, Barrett summarizes it
best: “Common problems and common factors . . . all helped shape transportation policy in every
city, but policy itself remained embedded in local history.” The individuals mattered; different
actors in a particular time and place may have as much impact on city building and transportation
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decisions than the external forces operating more generally. Atlanta then serves as illustrative
though not archetypal.29
This dissertation utilizes the Atlanta Constitution, the city’s only daily morning paper, as
its most essential primary source, in no small part due to its availability in a full-text searchable
format. The dual descriptive/prescriptive nature of any paper makes it suspect as a reliable
document, but as Ryan observes, the newspaper “may be as close as historians can get to the
voice of the public” simply because so many diverse entities reported their activities to it. As the
city’s paper of record, and therefore critical to this study, the Constitution published official
accounts of municipal actions, and printed verbatim texts of newly-enacted legislation, debates,
and mayoral speeches. Its standard fare of articles, op-eds, automobile advertising, and detailed
obituaries of prominent personages proved very helpful. Perhaps most importantly, the owners
and publishers of the three local dailies were valued members of the pro-growth coalition,
sharing the group’s expansionist goals, but also functioning as essential spokesmen to promote
its policies and positions.30
This dissertation investigates one domain, the city streets, focusing specifically on those
located within the “central business district” (CBD), or “downtown.” The two terms are used
interchangeably here, something Americans began to do in the early twentieth century. During
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that time period, Five Points, where five major thoroughfares converged, constituted the center
of the CBD.
As a town that grew up around rail lines, Atlanta has no midpoint commons area, no
central park or plaza. The heart of the city, its earliest center point, was an intersection of
roads—a fitting symbol for a transportation-focused entity with railroads, interstates, and one of
the world’s busiest airports. This space once called “the center of town life” has served as a
navigational landmark, a community assembly area, an essential water source, the primary
transportation locus, a tourist destination, and the dividing point between city quadrants where
street numbers began at 1. It was once the busiest intersection in the city.31
Downtown has always laid claim to some distinctive territory—not only in municipal
layout and functionality, but also within the imaginations of local citizens. It constituted the
center of the transportation network as well as the major commercial area, but also dwelt as a
“civic symbol” in the urban zeitgeist, the site of intersections and interactions. It performed as
the city’s impromptu stage, a place of theatricalities and spectacles, a venue for communications
of all types, open to everyone. This uniquely North American term first came into sporadic use in
the late eighteenth century. Newspaper readers in 1890s Atlanta encountered occasional
mentions of “downtown,” but usage increased more than forty-fold during the 1920s. The focal
decade in this study matches this evolving understanding of the urban center and its streets at the
time when America first became a nation of city dwellers.32
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Downtown, a compact and walkable area, served as a natural gathering place. As the
nexus of the transportation network of railroads, streetcars, and automobiles, it was the most
congested area of the city in the early twentieth century. Naturally, it hosted the greatest number
of pedestrians, not only during the three workday “rush hours,” but also for the noteworthy civic
occasions. Every parade passed through the intersection where reviewing stands for visiting
dignitaries stood. Atlantans in 1848 cast the town’s first ballots inside a grocery store at Five
Points. By the early 1900s, tens of thousands congregated in front of the same location to watch
election results projected by stereopticon onto the side of the nine-story Silvey Building just
across Peachtree Street.33
Businesses advertised their downtown addresses proudly, noting how close they stood to
Five Points. The location was ideal; a trolley to anywhere in the city could be caught at the
intersection. Shoppers and workers alike rode in daily, even on the weekends to attend services
at the many religious assemblies situated nearby. After the arrival of the automobile, the two
outer lanes of many downtown streets stayed continuously full of cars parking curbside for free,
as shown in the1929 map of the CBD, which indicates the number of legal curbside parking
spaces in each block (Figure 1 below). New automobile hotels throughout the “congested area,”
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officially defined by the city in 1924, provided covered parking and garage services to paying
customers.
The commercial
success of downtown
drove real estate prices
sky high, forcing many
small business owners
by the late 1920s to
relocate to the suburbs.
Burgess discussed the
importance of mobility
to municipal growth,
maintaining that land
values served as very
accurate indices of
mobility. Writing in
1925, he asserted that
the highest land values
in the city occurred at
the point of greatest

Figure 1. Map of Atlanta’s Central Business District; 1929 Traffic
Survey, pg. 38.

mobility. In Atlanta, that point was Five Points, the heart of the city.34
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Although the transportation network brought a unifying focus to downtown life, the
throngs jostling on the public streets and sidewalks often found more conflict and division than
harmony. Every streetcar had its own contested interior where the races mixed, touched,
bumped, and sometimes fought in the crowded space. The often-celebrated democracy of
downtown proved more democratic for some than others. Black Atlantans dared not linger long
on street corners, as police made quick arrests for the nuisance infractions of idling and loitering,
disorderly conduct, and the very useful, purposefully ill-defined charge of “suspicion.” The city
center hosted labor strikes and experienced the nadir of the city’s overt racist actions. During the
1906 race riot, streetcars played a deadly role, delivering unsuspecting homeward-bound
working African Americans into the hands of the white mob raging at Five Points.35
Another reason for this study to focus on Atlanta’s downtown is that politics and business
resided primarily in the CBD. Major government buildings had downtown addresses, including
the state capitol, city hall, main post office, the federal reserve bank, and all the courts. The
prime retail, service, financial, hospitality, and entertainment facilities clustered in downtown;
land-devouring entities like warehouses, factories, and sports fields of necessity located farther
out where property cost less. Fogelson notes that the study of downtown is a study of power and
those who wielded it. Logically, the pro-growth coalition focused most of its attention there,
usually at the expense of other sectors of the city.36
Innovations and technological advances first appeared in downtowns; Atlanta was no
exception. Installment of essential services (water, sewer, gas, electricity, telegraph and
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telephone lines) occurred earliest in the city center. Gas-lit streetlamps shone first in the CBD,
replaced in 1910 by dazzling electric lights, giving the district a new nickname, the “White
Way.”
The roadways of the central business district also witnessed a series of “firsts” involving
city regulations of street surfacing, usage, and traffic. These included such novelties as solidsurface paving, curbs and gutters, speed limits, traffic cops, illegal jaywalkers, stop signs, traffic
towers, signal lights, loading zones, “non-parking” areas, one-way streets, and gridlock. The
city’s earliest instance of vehicles banned entirely from a roadway occurred on Peachtree Street,
on which heavily-loaded wagons and trucks could not travel as they tore up the asphalt road
surface.
Finally, the heart of downtown was the location where the first automobile appeared on
city streets. That momentous occasion took place on October 14, 1899, just outside the Kimball
House, the finest hotel in town. A steam-powered Locomobile, fresh off the train, stood parked
at the corner of Decatur and Peachtree streets, just steps from the middle of Five Points.
Atlanta’s automobile age had begun.
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2

ATLANTA’S PRO-GROWTH COALITIONS

Beginning in the late 1970s, Professor Clifford M. Kuhn (1952-2015) and colleagues
conducted a series of interviews with Atlantans about their lives and experiences in the city
between the years 1914 and 1948. Two of the interviewees were retired businessmen who
recounted their remembrances about the 1920s Forward Atlanta campaign, and gave a
remarkable account of the men they called “real leaders of Atlanta.” A small, select group of
prominent, close-knit, civic-minded white businessmen, they “wielded tremendous influence
over municipal affairs.” They created Atlanta Spirit and promoted city growth. The Chamber of
Commerce, elected officials, and this group of commercial and financial leaders caucused
together to get things done in the city. Whatever they got behind or chose to sponsor, the rest of
the city went right along with them. One of the interviewees said, “They were the leaders of the
city, and they might meet at the various clubs, or maybe at somebody’s house. I know they used
to meet a lot—I’ve been present at the Capital City Club, Driving Club. They used to have
meetings at those places.” These “real leaders” constituted the inner circle of Atlanta’s progrowth coalition.37
Many cities across the South have long possessed a coterie of wealthy white men
enormously influential in civic business, society, and governance. By the latter nineteenth
century, the merchants, financiers, industrialists, developers, and newspaper men in many urban
centers had supplanted the former slave-owners of the old order. In Atlanta especially, this elite
group emerged as the driven and determined urban architects of Henry Grady’s New South.
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They toiled together, embracing modern methods and technologies, constantly seeking
progress—by which they meant growth. They wanted their town to lead, not just their state, but
the entire southeastern United States. No city embodied the boldness, enterprise, and dynamism
of the new order more, and none had more vocal or enthusiastic boosters than Atlanta.
The city grew tremendously both in area and population in the early twentieth century,
and by 1929, Atlanta had emerged as the commercial, financial, and transportation headquarters
of the region. The pro-expansion alliance had succeeded. To understand how, one must consider
the group’s members: who they were; where they lived, worked, and socialized; what
commonalities drew them together; what circumstances divided them. Equally important to
determine are what strategies they employed to persuade lawmakers and fellow citizens alike
that the interests of the alliance were those of everyone else. As a group, they possessed the same
attitude reflected in the popular mis-quote of General Motors president, Charles E. Wilson, who
in 1953 did not famously say, “What’s good for General Motors is good for the country.” The
powerful elites felt that what was good for them was in fact good for Atlanta, and did not hesitate
to say so.38
This sense of entitled superiority led the leaders to neglect the concerns of many, if not
most of their fellow citizens. Entire sectors of the city, especially the neighborhoods of the
working classes and African Americans, had sub-standard everything: housing, streets, water,
sanitation, schools, heating, lighting, transportation access. Unless such deficiencies began to
seriously impact Atlanta’s reputation, or until the policymakers needed their votes, these
John Kay, “The Concept of the Corporation,” Business History 61, no. 7 (January 15, 2019): 1131;
Fogelson, Downtown: Its Rise and Fall, 1880-1950, 36. What Charles Erwin Wilson (1890-1961) actually said at his
Secretary of Defense Senate confirmation hearing in 1953 was, “I thought that what was good for America was good
for General Motors, and vice versa.” But as Kay notes, it did not really matter, as the popular distorted version
exemplified the central role which large corporations had come to play in modern economic life. In the same way,
either statement (accurate or not) exemplifies the attitude of the pro-growth coalition toward their fiscal goals vis-àvis what might benefit the rest of Atlanta.
38
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constituencies received little attention from business or civic authorities. The vast majority of
city dwellers had little or no voice in municipal decisions. This glaringly undemocratic,
oligarchic inequity is the great fault of the typical growth-machine alliance; Atlanta’s was no
exception.39
This chapter explores the men and women of the two, racially-segregated pro-growth
coalitions. Throughout this paper, references to the elite decision-makers, policy setters, growth
alliance, and other such terms designate the white leaders, without any racial descriptor. During
the Jim Crow era of extreme segregation, the reality was that the African American leaders in
Atlanta had little to no influence on municipal policies of any kind. When they did, they had
much greater concerns that expanding automobility; their communities faced fundamental
survival issues like lynchings, lack of healthcare, unlivable wages. Given the disparate sizes and
spheres of influence of the two different leadership groups, and the fact that they seldom
interacted in any meaningful way, they are discussed separately below.
2.1

The White Pro-Growth Coalition
Atlanta’s pro-growth coalition did not suddenly appear full-fledged in 1899. Official

business groups had formed early in the city, but disbanded during the Civil War. Merchants
revived the Atlanta Board of Trade in 1866, but soon replaced it with a new organization more
responsive to the city’s growth, the Chamber of Commerce (COC). A group of top businessmen
were the ones behind the formation of that highly-influential body, dedicated to “enlarging and
extending the commercial influence and growth of the city.”40
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As informal associations, growth alliances keep no official records, but the establishment
of the COC may signal the beginnings of the coalition in Atlanta. Certainly well before the turn
of the century, the city’s elite business leaders had joined together in a variety of business,
professional, and social organizations, using their influence to lower tax rates and railroad freight
charges, provide greater accessibility to downtown, and enthusiastically promote the city.
Over the time period of this study, the composition of this group naturally changed. Some
born before or during the Civil War would gain great wealth and prominence late in the
nineteenth century, especially Asa Griggs Candler, Sr. (1851-1929) of Coca-Cola fame, Joel S.
Hurt, Jr. (1850-1926) whose electric streetcars enabled his Inman Park development, and Henry
Morrell Atkinson (1862-1939), the forceful head of the streetcar and electric company that
eventually became Georgia Power. All three would still possess enormous influence well into the
twentieth century, though two would be dead before the endpoint of this dissertation, and the
third would die within ten years. As these leaders aged and diminished in activity, younger men
stepped up to take their places. Some, such as Robert Winship Woodruff (1889-1985), president
of an automobile company as well as Coca-Cola, would go on to even greater fame beyond 1929.
Although losses in the coalition occurred, the vacuums filled quickly so the group maintained its
influence and authority. “The king is dead, long live the king!”-approach ensured continuity.
Although the term “elite” is used to refer to the coalition members in terms of their impact
on the city streets, not all of them achieved that level of status socially. Some father-to-son
legacy members inherited their advantages; others worked hard to achieve varying degrees of
rank and riches. Not everyone in the database was widely known—then or now. Names like
Candler, Hurt, and Woodruff live on in Atlanta on buildings, streets, parks, schools, and civic
institutions. The name Atkinson, despite Henry’s forty-year reign as a social, economic, and
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business powerhouse, survives only on an electric power plant and the road leading to it. Other
prominent or rising civic leaders do not appear in the database at all, e.g., future mayor and
airport expansionist William Berry Hartsfield (1890-1971), as their spheres of influence did not
extend to transportation and street infrastructure during the early decades of the twentieth
century.
The database, like the coalition itself, contains multiple tiers of individuals. An 1889
newspaper article provides a detailed view of civic fortunes, listing names, worth in dollars, and
the business entities of influential Atlantans. The reporter chiefly celebrates the industrious
nature of everyone who generated so much from the postbellum municipal ashes, and
underscores some defining characteristics of the commercial elite: busy, hard-working, thrifty,
public-spirited, with a great love of the city and high hopes for its greatness. Similar descriptors
apply to those in the growth-coalition of this study, along with similar gradations in wealth.
Some of the same last names appear in both lists. Atlanta Table 1. Primary Occupations of
White Growth-Coalition Members
early acquired a reputation for busyness and business
long before the industry and productivity of the 1920s—
the key decade of this study.41
Table 1 (at right) lists the chief occupations of the
111 white growth-coalition earners; three of the four
women in the database held no paying positions. The top
six in order included business owners, newspaper men
(owners, editors, reporters, production workers);

Primary Occupation
Business owner
Newspaper
Attorney
Banker
Real estate
Manufacturer
Other Professional
Streetcar/power company
Railroad
Police Chief
Chief of Fire Department
TOTAL

Count
25
15
14
14
12
11
8
5
4
2
1
111

attorneys, bankers, real estate entrepreneurs of various kinds (realtors, developers, building and

“With Our Millionairs [sic],” Atlanta Constitution, April 7, 1889; Garrett and Martin, Atlanta and
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loan officers, construction company owners), and manufacturers/industrialists. Most held
positions as presidents of companies, founders and proprietors of large enterprises, prestigious
professionals, or board chairpersons. A number would never reach such exalted levels, yet still
wielded some influence which those higher-up found useful. The list contains the city’s most
important enterprises, and the majority of the men in the database were documented members of
the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce (women could not join until 1921). As Hunter notes, “The
pattern of business dominance of civic affairs in Regional City [Atlanta] is a fact. No other
institution is as dominant in community life as the economic institution.”42
Many of the men also had significant secondary careers (see Table 2 below). When they
had succeeded in their primary field, they sought or
were sought out for other business options, often in real
estate, transit-related entities, and banking. Both the
primary and secondary occupations of Atlanta’s elite
represent all of the entities defined in the growth-

Table 2. Secondary Occupations of
White Growth-Coalition Members
Secondary Occupation
Banker
Real estate development
Business
Streetcar/power company
Railroads
TOTAL

Count
18
11
18
5
4
56

machine thesis.
Finally, a number of the group also held
elected positions (see Table 3 at right). Typical for a
pro-growth coalition, few of the members ran for
public office and the majority of those served on the
Atlanta city council. The list contains duplicates, as
most of those who achieved higher office had earlier

Table 3. White Growth-Coalition
Politicians
Politicians
Mayor
City council
County commission
State legislator
Governor
U.S. senator
TOTAL

Count

been councilmen or commissioners. They provided direct ties between the group and the
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9
17
8
3
2
3
42
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government, facilitating the adoption of beneficial policies and the blocking or indefinite stalling
of potentially harmful legislation. The association also exercised much of its influence through
less obvious channels. Seldom did the very top men run for office, preferring to publicly endorse
favored candidates and donate to political campaigns; they also made well-publicized and
generous contributions to community-wide endeavors.
Most of the men in the coalition database belonged to professional, business, and special
interest organizations. As Jackson notes, Atlanta had a reputation as a city of “joiners.” The
abbreviations list at the front of this study contains federations, unions, consortia, leagues, and
councils in which many in the growth coalition held memberships, with special emphasis on
transportation-based associations. These associations proved invaluable venues through which
businessmen could “collaborate” with city officials to ensure that advantageous legislation
passed.43
Licensed professionals like architects, realtors, and engineers had their own institutions.
Others represented specific types of business, such as advertisers, automakers, car dealers, hotel
owners, garage managers, builders, and streetcar executives. One example, the Atlanta
Manufacturers Association, exemplified the coalition mindset to grow the city and increase
personal wealth. All the prominent businessmen in town joined because its purpose was “to
stimulate the development of the material resources of Atlanta…, and also to advance the
pecuniary and other interests of those in the association.” A number of organizations—national,
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state, and local—existed for car owners and drivers. The Atlanta branches of these played
significant roles in the surveying, financing, paving, and regulating of city streets.44
In addition to their business and professional relationships, the members of the pro-growth
coalition had other close associational ties. Virtually all of the men participated in multiple
fraternal societies and orders, including but by no means limited to Masons, Shriners, Elks, Red
Men, Knights Templar, and clubs such as Kiwanis, Rotary, and Civitan. Many also took active
roles in their churches, temples, and synagogues.45
In 1923, Steiner wrote about his contemporary era as “an age of crowds,” and how the
then-current vogue for civic and fraternal organizations illustrated the prevalence of the
communal spirit. He noted that “skilled propagandists” could win support for welfare and
community drives by whipping up the public through carefully constructed campaigns with
speeches, publicity, banners, and slogans. In a similar fashion, the members of the clubs could be
manipulated to support already-decided policies and programs. The monthly meeting format,
usually including a meal, utilized rituals such as humor, speeches, songs, and boisterous play to
foster esprit de corps and secure enthusiasm for the group and its pre-arranged agendas.46
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Where the clubs held their meetings, the physical surroundings, the type of meal served,
the prominence of the speaker—all reflected the power, status, and social level of the members.
The top decision-makers met in private clubs; only select invitees attended those gatherings. In
contrast, professional associations and other organizations open to the general public gathered in
the less-expensive hotels and restaurants. The popular and well-known “luncheon circuit”
provided an arena for men to see and be seen on a regular basis. The frequency of such
encounters nurtured unanimity—a principle of guiding importance to the coalition.47
The clubs and other formal associations represented a “chain of command” necessary to
the functioning of the group. Rivalries of course occurred within the alliance and could present
significant problems. While members of the business elite held much in common, that did not
guarantee solidarity or eliminate arguments between competing enterprises and individuals. A
consistently unified front required careful cultivation, primarily through the mechanisms of the
professional associations and civic luncheon clubs. The head men at times might resort to
coercive measures to enforce the chosen party line, but sometimes even they disagreed. This
study’s best example occurred in the 1920s, when angry businessmen took opposing views of
Atlanta’s street parking policies. The resulting stalemate meant that the city council took no
action, to the detriment of the entire community.48
The very top men also held memberships in
more select, by-invitation-only entities (see Table 4 at
right). The Capital City Club, founded in 1883, billed
itself as “the oldest and most prestigious social club for

47
48

1910, 19.

Table 4. Exclusive White Men’s
Clubs
Club Name
Capital City Club
Piedmont Driving Club
Atlanta Athletic Club
Druid Hills Golf Club

Count
54
27
26
15
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gentlemen of finance, commerce, and industry,” and claimed, with some merit, its role as “a vital
force in shaping the destiny of Atlanta.” The Piedmont Driving Club began in 1887 as the
Gentlemen’s Driving Club for owners and breeders of fine horses, and grew into one of the city’s
greatest social clubs. Its large tract of land off Peachtree Street was eventually sub-divided, with
185 acres becoming present-day Piedmont Park.
The Atlanta Athletic Club organized in 1898 for the sports- and athletically-inclined. Its
East Lake Golf Course opened in 1905, expanded to 18 holes plus clubhouse in 1915, and was
the home course to amateur golf great Robert “Bobby” Tyre Jones, Jr. (1902-71). The Athletic
Club also opened in 1926 a Philip Shutze-designed, magnificently-appointed eleven-story
building on Carnegie Way, containing a main gymnasium with seating for 2,000 spectators.
Finally, the Druid Hills Golf Club debuted its course and clubhouse in 1912 on more than 100
acres in the exclusive Druid Hills
neighborhood east of the city. The club
persuaded Georgia Railway & Electric to
extend the streetcar line to pass in front of the
clubhouse, allowing businessmen members
convenient travel to their downtown offices.49
In these top clubs, Atlanta’s leading, allwhite decision-makers enjoyed privacy and
association with their own kind. Women and

Figure 2. 1928 Capital City Club banquet;
Atlanta History Center.
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children had limited access to designated areas. The men conducted a great deal of business
while socializing in clubrooms, exercising in the gyms, sporting on links and courts, cooling off
in pools and shower rooms, drinking beer and liquor from the club’s private lockers beyond the
reach of Georgia’s prohibition law, and feasting sumptuously in the exclusive dining halls (see
Figure 2 above). African Americans entered these exclusive clubs only as workers or wait staff.
The social clubs did not permit Jewish members. But well before the formation of the
Capital City Club, a group of German and Hungarian Jews in 1866 established the Concordia
Association to nurture their shared cultural heritage. They first met in the store of Morris Rich on
Whitehall Street, but in 1892, constructed Concordia Hall on Mitchell Street, designed by famed
architectural firm Bruce & Morgan. The association re-organized in 1904 as the Standard Club,
and the following year, moved to 142 Washington Street to better serve the Jewish community
centered in the Washington-Rawson district southeast of Five Points. By 1929, it had relocated to
400 Ponce de Leon Avenue, reflecting the influence of the automobile on the movement of the
population northward. Victor Hugo Kriegshaber (1859-1934) helped organize the Standard Club.
An engineer, builder, manufacturer, and financier, he presided over the Chamber of Commerce
and served on the city’s planning commission. A valued member of the power elites, he still
could never join the most exclusive clubs.50
Prominent individuals also sought admission to the Social Register, “that most prestigious
of American institutions.” Listing indicated not only considerable wealth but also approved
social position. Only individuals or couples recommended by other members could, after
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thorough vetting, be admitted. Fifty-six members of the coalition appeared in the 1922 Atlanta
Social Register.51
Besides associating professionally and socially, many of the white elites lived near each
other. Table 5 at right shows the most common streets and
neighborhoods where they resided, all of which would be
considered high-end. Some were exclusive: the preeminent
areas of Inman Park, Ansley Park, and Druid Hills all had
deed restrictions prior to any official city zoning, ensuring
that undesirables could not afford to purchase or build
within their borders. Ansley Park specifically excluded

Table 5. Home Locations of
White Elites
Street Name /
Neighborhood
Peachtree Street
Druid Hills
Ponce de Leon Avenue
Buckhead
Ansley Park
West Peachtree Street
Inman Park
TOTAL

Count
25
12
9
8
7
6
5
72

African Americans from the neighborhood, except to live in one of the servants’ halls.
Atlanta’s white elites met frequently in common spaces. They lived, worked, played,
prayed, and were buried in close proximity to each other. As Hunter notes, the locales in which
they predominantly existed separated them from the masses and isolated them from the problems
confronting ordinary citizens. The routes they drove (or were driven) to and from work lay
mostly along streets with “new store fronts, neon signs, and the gleaming chromium of the new
cars on display” in the Automobile Row section of Peachtree Street. Professionals and lowertiered members of the coalition might pass through industrial areas or depressing neighborhoods,
but they lived on pleasant streets in attractive sections of town.52
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One thing all coalition members had in common: membership in Atlanta’s Chamber of
Commerce. The city’s alliance of pro-growth advocates took its nascent form during
Reconstruction when they played a leading role in organizing the Chamber of Commerce on
August 7, 1871. The Chamber initially functioned as a way for merchants to band against a
common enemy: the railroads with their ever-climbing freight charges. The burgeoning national
economy of the late nineteenth century provided an impetus for businessmen to work together
for lower shipping costs, favorable tax rates, and a more attractive urban environment. Their
early efforts proved successful. In 1883, the COC incorporated; it constructed its own building
two years later. By 1890, it had added a noonday meal service (an early entry into the luncheon
circuit), and boasted a membership of nearly 600 men representing some 350 firms. By the end
of the century, a business-based community power structure had developed, exhibiting all the
characteristics of a controlling pro-growth coalition.53
Women could not join the Chamber of Commerce until 1921, when the Department of
Women’s Affairs was organized. Miss Laura Smith, one of the city’s leading business women
served as first chair, and as such, became an ex officio director on the COC’s board, the first
woman to join its deliberations. Smith, a former supervisor of the Atlanta school board, was
general supervisor for Traffic Instruction for Southern Bell Telephone Company, and trained
thousands of women as telephone operators. In 1922, the group was renamed the Women’s
Division, allowing self-supporting women to join, and soon after, Mrs. Samuel M. Inman was
elected outright to a position on the Board of Directors.54
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Even the name of the Atlanta Chamber’s magazine, The City Builder, underscored the
goal of the organization—to promote city expansion. Its articles and advertisements hammered
home the pro-growth, city-building message. A 1924 ad directly addressed the journal reader—
“a substantial business man”—this way: “You want to see Atlanta grow because it means bigger
and better business for you.” In other words, what was good for the city was good for their
bottom lines.55
Doyle notes that “It was largely by the process of city building that local business leaders
became a class, a social entity bound by a similar world view, by common interests, and by
associations and instruments of power that could advance those interests…. Upon such
platforms, a powerful business class formed.” His description accurately traces the formation of
Atlanta’s pro-growth alliance, which definitely contained men of power and influence.56
Hunter wrote about the power of Atlanta’s elite in 1953, but his account captures the
essence and scope of the authority of the decision-makers earlier in the twentieth century.
Most of the leaders are persons of power status. In some cases they have the
machinery of government at their bidding. In many cases they control large
industries in which they reign supreme in matters of decision affecting large
numbers of the citizenry. They are persons of dominance, prestige, and influence.
They are, in part, the decision-makers for the total community. They are able to
enforce their decisions by persuasion, intimidation, coercion, and, if necessary,
force.57
Hidden or overt, the power exerted by the coalition as a whole shaped the city in
countless ways between 1920 and 1929. This study investigates one particular sphere of their
influence. It shows how the group harnessed the motor vehicle as an agent to grow Atlanta and
build their personal wealth. In this place and during this time period, civic, commercial, and
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political power resided overwhelmingly in the hands of white men. The African American
community, largely spurned and shunned, had its own leaders who on occasion could exert some
indirect power of their own.
2.2

The Black Pro-Growth Coalition
A number of Atlanta’s most influential Black leaders also formed a growth-machine type

of alliance, consisting of the top businessmen, educators, and ministers. It was logically a smaller
group, as the city’s African American population in the early twentieth century comprised onethird of the total. Despite Jim Crow restrictions, the city presented economic and commercial
opportunities from which the members sought not only personal wealth, but also advancement
for the larger African American community. They were painfully aware of the pervasive crimes
(even if technically legal) of segregation, injustice, discrimination, and violence aimed against
them; yet they forcefully protested against lynching, poor schools, low wages, and the living
conditions of many of their fellow citizens. In Atlanta in the early twentieth century, the Black
elites exhibited an awareness of the needs of the poor in their communities lacking in the parallel
white coalition.58
But like the white pro-growth advocates, Black business leaders encouraged development
and sought to expand their commercial and real estate interests. However, the white group almost
totally ignored their African American counterparts—unless they were soliciting votes for or
donations to campaigns for purportedly citywide improvements. The Forward Atlanta movement
in the 1920s provides a striking, if stunningly short-sighted example of white leaders completely
overlooking a substantial sector of the municipal economy. As elite businessmen, many with
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substantial wealth, the Black coalition shared common features with the white group, yet
remained outside of the city’s dominant power structure.59
Before discussing the twenty-one leaders in Atlanta’s Black pro-growth coalition, it is
important to understand the circumstances under which they existed. Those conditions explain
why the power they possessed was limited almost exclusively to their own communities. The
failure of Reconstruction left many African Americans in conditions only marginally better off
than slavery as the new southern imperative of white supremacy dictated that all persons of color
be subservient to whites everywhere and all the time. Georgia enacted its first Jim Crow law—
separating the races on trains and trolleys—in 1891. From then on, its cities and towns continued
to expand restrictions on African Americans, keeping them, pre-birth to post-mortem, out of
white space.
Whites severely circumscribed the physical area available for African Americans,
utilizing a number of strategies to keep Blacks “in their place” within defined sectors of the city.
The comprehensiveness of the segregation was stunning. The policy of “in their place” meant
more than just regulating where Blacks lived; it restricted where they worked and what type of
work they could do. It limited the type of training they received. Black public schools were
grotesquely inferior in number, size, and amenities, and so severely overcrowded that they often
operated daily triple sessions at a time when even double sessions at white schools had been
eliminated. In 1913, the Board of Education tried to abolish seventh and eighth grades for black
students on the grounds that future manual laborers did not need that much schooling. African
Americans had to provide their own higher education, which they did with excellence,
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establishing in Atlanta a consortium of some of the best Black colleges and universities in the
nation.60
African American Atlantans did not have a public high school, park, swimming pool, or
library they could visit until the 1920s. “In their place” mandated separate restaurants, stores,
hotels, bars, clubs, playgrounds, shops, theaters, hospital wards, churches, golf courses, burial
grounds, and cells in the city stockade. Even chain-gangs were segregated. The only time the
races worked together was when the white bossed the Black. No African Americans sat on juries
(so much for “trial by jury of one’s peers”), served as police officers or firemen, drove
streetcars, or cast a ballot in the all-important Democratic “white” primary. Voting restrictions
and the political environment ensured that no Blacks held elected office. The dirtiest, most
denigrating, physically demanding, and low-paying jobs fell to them. Even when holding
identical positions as whites, e.g., public school teachers, they received two-thirds the pay of a
white person.61
The ironies and absurdities of the ubiquitous “in their place” system abounded. Blacks
could not sit down for a meal beside whites, but they could prepare and serve their food. They
could not live next door, but daily entered white neighborhoods to clean their houses, wash their
clothes, and raise their children. A black man could not ride in a car with whites, but could drive
them in a car anywhere. On Atlanta’s streetcars whites sat at the front and Blacks at the back,
except the Black nursemaids with their small white charges. No line physically delineated the
separate spaces, so contact and intermingling frequently occurred, often with tragic results.
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Georgia Railway and Power Company rejected as too expensive the demand by whites for their
own trolley cars, as profits took priority over purity.
Noted Atlanta scholar Dana F. White writes of the “two Atlantas.”62 Since
Reconstruction, two geographical factors generally dictated the settlement patterns for African
Americans in the city. Low-lying, unhealthy terrains, shunned by most, provided affordable real
estate for the poorest citizens. Housing in close proximity to industrial locations, despite noxious
noises, dirt, smoke, and odors, allowed walking to work. Meanwhile domestic help, maintenance
men, chauffeurs, and workers took trolleys to jobs at the city center or in distant white suburban
neighborhoods. Their reliance on streetcars would make them easy targets for the white mob
violence during Atlanta’s 1906 race riot.
Restrictive legislation hardened the boundaries of the city’s racial divisions as events
prompted migration both out of and within Atlanta. Boll weevil devastation and increasingly
mechanized farms forced numbers of Georgian agricultural workers to the city. Finding jobs
scarce and the environment hostile, many moved on northward. The 1906 riot had an enormous
impact on African American spaces. Violence and fear drove business owners and residents
away from downtown into established Black communities near Auburn Avenue to the east, and
the westside cluster of colleges and universities. The 1917 Great Fire of Atlanta devastated the
primarily-Black Fourth Ward. Former homeowners had to seek shelter in other already-crowded
African American neighborhoods. Some left the city altogether, joining the Great Migration to
the somewhat less restrictive urban North.
Black districts received far fewer of the services typically provided by municipal
government. Unpaved and unlighted streets, lack of water and sewage systems, and infrequent
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trash collection and street cleaning characterized the high-density, low-income, often diseaseridden neighborhoods. As the Atlanta Independent observed, “The color line is too often drawn
in the distribution of public services.” In Atlanta, the pro-growth policymakers oversaw the
distribution of city resources, determining who got what, where, and when. Concerned with the
direction of urban expansion, they made sure most city amenities went first to their properties
and developments.63
The one city service applied generously to African Americans was policing. That of
course meant policing of Blacks, not police assistance provided to them. Low-level crimes within
African American neighborhoods received little attention. Serious offenses involving high dollar
amounts or physical violence took higher priority, as well as every offense, large or small,
against a white person. The Atlanta Police Department arrested more Blacks than whites every
year from its founding in 1873 until the 1920s, when majority-white automobile-related
infractions reversed the trend. Especially after the 1906 riot, many African Americans stayed
close to home at night to avoid police harassment.64
Inside this confining atmosphere African Americans carved out their own spaces within
two miles of Atlanta’s center. They turned inward, as Du Bois observes, working with each
other, cultivating group self-reliance, and fostering a strong sense of community. They generally
patronized Black-owned businesses, ate in the restaurants of African American women, and
worshipped in churches with prominent ministers such as Joseph Simeon Flipper (1859-1944),
bishop of the A.M.E. Church of Atlanta and chancellor of Morris Brown College. They read the
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Atlanta Independent newspaper owned by activist editor Benjamin Jefferson Davis, Sr. (18701945) and produced in his offices at 250 Auburn Avenue, Atlanta’s Black Main Street. By 1928,
they could also read the weekly Atlanta World published by Morehouse College graduate
William Alexander Scott, II (1902-34). When sick or in need of legal advice, they sought out
African American physicians and lawyers—professionals whom many whites did not realize

Figure 3. Top insurance executives Pace, Perry, and Herndon, ca. 1913.
even existed. When purchasing property, they employed a Black “realtist,” as the title “realtor”
applied exclusively to white real estate agents.65
While many African Americans lived in poverty, by the 1920s, a large middle class
existed. A number of hard-working entrepreneurs achieved even greater success; an elite class
emerged and leading Black-owned banks and insurance companies constructed offices along
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Auburn Avenue (see photo above66). Alonzo Franklin Herndon (1858-1927) led the way,
becoming Atlanta’s first Black millionaire. Born into slavery, he worked in an Atlanta
barbershop post-Emancipation. By 1904, he owned three shops with the best barbers in the
South, including in his flagship at 66 Peachtree Street, outfitted with marble flooring, crystal
chandeliers, and gold fixtures.67 His whites-only clientele included the city’s leading lawyers,
judges, politicians, and businessmen, but that did not protect the store from the mob’s 1906
rampage. He purchased a failing insurance company in 1905, and began offering policies and
loans to African Americans at a time when white entities refused them service. By the 1920s, his
Atlanta Life Insurance Company had branches across the South and an imposing building still
standing at 148 Auburn Avenue. Herndon, the most prominent African American in the city, at
his death held controlling interest in numerous corporations and had extensive properties in
Atlanta and the orange groves of Lake County, Florida.
While none of the other leaders accumulated fortunes the size Herndon’s, many achieved
stature and wealth despite the obstacles to their advancement. Obviously, many more than the
twenty-one decision-makers in this study’s database existed; however, few had any impact on
traffic control or street regulation, though most militated for better conditions within African
American districts, including transportation opportunities. They organized into a pro-growth
association, and shared the concern of the white coalition to ensure legislation favorable to
commerce and expansion. Their power structure generally followed that of that of the whites,
with a few select business and financial men at the very top, and a larger group of lesser lights,
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important in the community, but serving more as assistants to carry out the decisions of the
principals.68
Given the crushing strictures of Jim Crow, they had little influence over citywide
policies, but they recognized and harnessed the collective force of the African American
community as a voting bloc. In this capacity they exercised power and contributed, deliberately
or inadvertently, to the redefinition of Atlanta’s streets into automobile conduits. After the
excruciating loss in the bond election of 1919, white power elites worked hard in the 1920s to
win the Black vote on the critical viaduct bond issues. In return, Black leaders demanded, and
received concessions in the form of municipal expenditures for increased services within their
communities—running water, sewer lines, more schools, paved roadways, and healthcare
facilities.69
The sole woman in the database, Lugenia D. Burns Hope (1871-1947), played the pivotal
role in this defining accomplishment. Born in Missouri, but raised in Chicago, Lugenia attended
the Chicago Art Institute from 1890-93, then quit school to support her mother and siblings.
Employment at several charitable societies brought her into contact with the settlement house
movement. The experience defined all of her subsequent work as a social reformer, community
organizer, and life-long social gospel activist.70
She met Augusta, Georgia native John Hope (1868-1936) in Chicago at the World’s
Columbian Exposition. Shortly after their marriage in 1897, he accepted a position at the Atlanta
Baptist College, later renamed Morehouse College. He became its first African American
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president in 1906, and in 1929, he was also named president of the Atlanta University
Consortium—the newly-formed alliance of the historically Black schools of Morehouse College,
Spelman College, and Atlanta University.
This burgeoning westside community contained some of the city’s most influential
African Americans, including Alonzo Herndon, W. E. B. Du Bois (1868-1963), and David Toby
Howard (1849-1935). The Hopes socialized with them, with faculty members and their wives,
and with the Reverend Doctor Henry Hugh Proctor (1868-1933), first Black pastor of Atlanta’s
First Congregational Church. From the college campus, they could watch the leased Black
convicts working at the Chattahoochee Brick Company, owned by former Atlanta mayor James
Warren English, Sr. (1837-1925), a prominent member of the white pro-growth coalition.71
Lugenia Hope launched the Neighborhood Union from her living room in 1908. The
group of ten women worked to meet the spiritual and physical needs of westside Black
Atlantans. By 1914, the organization had branches in African American neighborhoods across
the city. They offered literacy and domestic science classes; held health clinics; provided
daycare; lobbied for anti-lynching laws; and petitioned for better schools and sanitation facilities.
But Hope’s crowning achievement in relation to Atlanta’s streets, for which she has
received virtually no recognition, was her work as chair of a women’s registration committee for
the local chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).
Originally working in 1918 to increase the Association’s membership, under her leadership, the
group also urged Black men to pay their poll taxes so they could vote in the upcoming 1919 city
bond election. Her committee registered enough men to vote, enabling the stunning (to the
whites) defeat of the bond issue—twice! It had repercussions for every subsequent bond vote in
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Atlanta, forcing white elites to make concessions to win Black voters in order to pass their allimportant viaduct financing bonds.72
This signature accomplishment places Lugenia Burns Hope at the head of the black progrowth association in terms of lasting, if unintentional, impact on the configuration of Atlanta’s
city streets. The achievements by another African American elite had great impact on the city’s
racial topography. Heman Perry (1873-1929) intentionally crossed the city’s westside color line,
bringing new residential areas, the first public high school, and the first city park to Black
residents.
Of the twenty-one Black pro-growth leaders in this study, eight were businessmen and
professionals, each of whom eventually added banking and/or real estate development to their
resumes as secondary occupations. Two others held positions as newspaper publishers-editors,
and another four, university educators. Unlike the white coalition, which had no clergy members,
three served as ministers of large congregations—two of whom were also university leaders.
Two members of the group were noted building contractors; another served as a government
railroad postal employee. The latter, John Wesley Dobbs (1882-1961), during the time frame of
this study, was just starting out in the coalition, but would, by the 1950s, become one of the top
decision-makers. The eastside road he lived on, Houston Street, now bears his name: John
Wesley Dobbs Avenue.
Of the group, Lugenia Hope was the sole community organizer, although many of the
others were activists, working to improve the lives of African Americans both within and beyond
their official occupations. Herndon, Du Bois, and John Hope took part in the Niagara movement;
the latter two went on to hold leadership positions in the NAACP and the National Urban
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League. Lugenia Hope helped establish the Atlanta branch of the National Association of
Colored Women’s Clubs, and in 1932, became first vice president of the Atlanta NAACP,
creating “citizenship schools” for African Americans to learn about government and voting.
Herndon and Howard made substantial financial contributions to and in other ways
supported a variety of Black churches, schools, organizations, and causes. Rev. Dr. Procter, with
white lawyer Charles T. Hopkins, formed the Interracial Committee of Atlanta after the 1906
riot. Davis and Scott utilized their newspapers to promote the good of the Black community and
redress social injustices. They also provided much-needed advertising space for Black-owned
businesses catering primarily to African Americans.
Many in the group socialized together, and like the white coalition, they lived in
proximity to each other—although split between the eastside Auburn Avenue district and the
westside University Center area. The top men could not live entirely separated from middleclass Blacks as the white elites could and did; there simply was not the square footage in their
segregated spaces for the construction of an exclusively-elite Black neighborhood along the lines
of a Druid Hills or Ansley Park. In 1910, Alonzo Herndon constructed his fifteen-room Beaux
Arts mansion at 587 University Place near Morris Brown College, close to faculty and students.
Coalition members belonged to a variety of business organizations. In 1900, Herndon
helped found the National Negro Business League (NNBL); Davis served on its Executive
Committee. Intent on furthering the economic development of African American businesses, the
League embraced the “separate economy” concept, that Black businesses understood their
clientele better than whites, and supplied much-needed services and products to the perpetually
underserved community. They also provided employment for Blacks, offering jobs and positions
to which they could not aspire in white enterprises. The League held annual conferences at which
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Atlantan growth proponents spoke, including A. D. Hamilton on “Contracting and Building,” D.
T. Howard on “Undertaking and Embalming,” and B. J. Davis on “Negro Newspaper
Publishing.” Atlanta hosted the League’s seventh annual convention on August 29-31, 1906—
just weeks before the city erupted with white racial violence.73
African Americans business owners could not join the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce,
and it would be 1932 before the Negro Chamber of Commerce was formed. For retail business
owners, the Atlanta Colored Merchants Association, a member of the national association,
worked diligently to improve business conditions within the community. Black Atlantans also
held memberships in national professional groups.74
Several coalition members belonged to the Knights of Pythias, Knights of Tabor, and a
number identified as Masons. John Wesley Dobbs, eventual Grand Master, oversaw construction
of the Prince Hall Masons’ building at 330 Auburn Avenue in 1937. William L. “Bill” Calloway,
a pro-growth elite from a later era, remarked that “everybody who was anybody in Black
America was a Mason.” Almost certainly all the men group members belonged to the Grand
United Order of Odd Fellows in America, which claimed in 1909 to be the largest secret Black
order in the world. As membership was not divulged, definitively identifying any individual as a
Fellow is difficult; however, many of the Fellows were known to be businessmen and
developers, which included several of the men in the database.75
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The African American pro-growth coalition functioned as a power structure as did the
whites, but only within Black Atlanta. It utilized luncheon clubs and societies to initiate and
carry out community-wide campaigns while the white group had broader city and regional
influence. Blacks furnished the labor which kept much of the city’s commerce and industry
moving, and provided services demanded by all Atlantans. However, those facts did not ensure
that the white business leaders gave consideration to the living or working conditions of African
Americans.
Interaction between the two coalitions, as far as this writer could discover, arose
exclusively from some larger policy or program which the whites wanted implemented. Key
examples include the two 1920 viaduct bond issues and the Forward Atlanta campaign; all three
are considered in detail later in this study. In none of those instances did Blacks serve on any
committees or assist in administering the projects. Whites sought only their dollars, their votes,
and their ability to rally public support within their communities. Only when racial violence, like
the white riot of 1906, threatened Atlanta’s reputation did some whites reach out to Black
leaders.76
Hunter, who personally interviewed his subjects, notes that in the 1950s, white leaders
privately mocked the Black sub-community and its leaders, even while soliciting their money for
some program. Certainly the same occurred in the early decades of the twentieth century. One
condition absolutely did maintain throughout both time periods: “On the basic issues revolving
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around segregation, the top leaders in the larger [i.e., white] community are adamant in
maintaining the present alignment of relationships.” Whites dominated, and scrupulously
maintained that position; Blacks had to be kept in their place.77
2.3

Boosterism and the Growth Coalition
A successful Molotch growth-machine alliance must employ strategies to generate good

will toward its policies and to draw positive attention to its city. These efforts include working to
generate a “we feeling” among local residents, as well as publicizing the municipality across the
region and even nationally. A long-standing tradition in Atlanta, the city’s enthusiastic
boosterism had its own name, the “Atlanta Spirit.” Defined as “the impulse which prompts a
citizen of Atlanta to let the world know what a great city is his,” the relentlessly upbeat attitude
outshone the promotional efforts of other southern cities and came to express the ultimate in
civic patriotism. Victor Kriegshaber, the COC president in 1916, wrote that the loyalty-inspiring
moniker denoted a commitment to ideological and material city building with the single purpose
of making Atlanta a worthwhile place to live.78
While many dismiss boosterism as just over-the-top salesmanship, Brownell credits the
activity as more complex and substantive than most historians believe. While always zealous and
often excessive, the rhetoric reflected the social views of the participants, and served to justify
their policies and maintain their power. J. R. Short describes it as a serious strategy to develop
the local economy, and an important way to create cohesion within the business community. He
cites post-Civil War boosterism as critical to southern cities trying to attract northern investment,

77
Hunter, Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers, 138; Mixon, The Atlanta Riot: Race,
Class, and Violence in a New South City, 124-27.
78
Molotch, “The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place,” 314; John R. Hornady,
Atlanta: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow (Atlanta: American Cities Book/Index Printing, 1922), 4-5; Brownell, The
Urban Ethos in the South, 1920-1930, 137; Victor H. Kriegshaber, “What Is the Atlanta Spirit,” City Builder 1, no. 1
(March 1916): 8.

54
and credits Atlanta with having one of the most sustained urban booster campaigns of the
twentieth century.79
Atlanta’s growth boosters aimed to garner positive attention for the city, promoting its
pro-business atmosphere (e.g., low tax rates, efficient transportation, abundant labor), as well as
local natural and recreational attractions, like Stone Mountain and the many golf courses. They
remained mute other topics, certain groups, and events, such as racial strife, African Americans,
and lynchings. As much as possible, they pushed the city’s progressive label in an effort to
counter the prevailing view of southern towns as small, backward, and poor.80
Pro-growth elites also made what use they could out of Atlanta’s scanty cultural
offerings, never failing to mention the city’s springtime hosting of the Metropolitan Opera. This
annual event created regional buzz as Atlanta was the only place outside of New York City
visited by the full opera company. Frederick J. Paxon (1865-1939), CEO of one of the city’s
largest department stores, an executive in the Retail Merchants Association, and former president
of the Chamber of Commerce, wrote an article in the COC’s City Builder about what the opera
season signified to city merchants—which was, in a word, “everything.” It meant “actual money
brought into the city and spent.” From a promotional standpoint, it was an invaluable asset. “The
press all over the country…carry the story of the Opera here and the wonderful success, musical
and financial, it is each year.” Opera week brought recognition to Atlanta once a year, but
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boosters utilized it year-round in promotional pieces—effectively “capitalizing Culture,” as T.
Cholmondley Frink advocated in Sinclair Lewis’s Babbitt. In the eyes of some, the major value
of civic aesthetic events lay in their advertising potential.81
The growth coalition succeeded in merging its own private interests with those of the
larger public. It both fostered and benefited from boosterish activities that promoted city
expansion and raised Atlanta’s national profile. The power leaders succeeded to a large degree in
mobilizing local government to achieve their financial goals while pushing the cost of their
activities onto the wider community. As the role of business in government increased, the city
itself came to function more and more like a corporation—which many applauded. Councilman
and retail executive Robert A. Gordon, despairing of certain government inefficiencies, spoke in
favor of more businesslike productivity, remarking that, “After awhile the city of Atlanta will
learn that a city is nothing other than a big corporation, and that its affairs must be managed by
men who are acquainted with at least the rudimentary elements of business.”82
The largest and most influential organization of businessmen in most American cities in
the early twentieth century was the local Chamber of Commerce. Virtually every man in the
coalition database compiled for this study belonged to the COC, and thirteen served as president.
Between the years 1908 and 1925, every president of the Atlanta COC was a member of the
power elites who impacted city transportation policy. Place promotion in the United States has
always been dominated by the business community, and the Chamber was the organization
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through which the pro-growth group principally acted in order to sell their agenda to the public
and advertise the city to the world.83
The Atlanta COC welcomed all resident white retailers, merchants, manufacturers,
bankers, professionals, or business men of any type. Its goals were to advise and assist business
owners, extend commerce and trade, enhance the business environment, and grow the city.
While the primary focus remained commercial, the Chamber supported multiple causes and took
active part in community programs, even those with more obviously humanitarian, social, or
moral goals. As Deaton observes, businessmen endorsed these endeavors in the hopes of directly
or indirectly improving the local business climate. Even in the most principled of civic welfare
campaigns, “the practicality of businessmen necessitated that the economic value be added” to
the cultural or religious arguments. Throughout the early twentieth century, the COC maintained
a sterling reputation as the most reliable, principled, pro-active, and enthusiastic civic supporter,
holding the title of “trailblazer of progress for Atlanta.”84
Constant city expansion functioned as the chief index of that progress, signifying the
health and character of the city. Brownell asserts that no indicator of the disposition of urban
development was as compelling as population
size; by that measure, Atlanta in the early
twentieth century certainly succeeded (see Table
6 at right). This “worship of growth” extended to
all citizens, not just the elites. African Americans

Table 6. Atlanta Population Growth,
1890-1930
Census
Year
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930

Population
65,533
89,872
154,839
200,616
270,366

Increase
Number Percent
28,124
75.2
24,339
37.1
64,967
72.3
45,777
29.6
69,750
34.8

likewise embraced it; they enthusiastically joined
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the 1920 campaign to grow the city’s population to half a million by 1930. Everyone would
benefit from a more populous city—at least, that was the message, and most people believed it.85
But for the pro-growth coalition, wider borders and more people were just means to an
end; their ultimate goal remained financial accumulation, which they derived chiefly from
selling, developing, or renting out their properties. Cox argues that in order to flourish, they
needed a friendly regulatory environment and nurturing public policies. A frequent ploy to
achieve both involved broadly framing real estate issues as “for the common good,” claiming
that the trickle-down effects from some new development (more tax revenues, new jobs, rising
home values, better schools) would benefit everyone in the community. Fortunately for the
group, residents were “all too willing to fall into this sort of trap.” It would happen time and
again in Atlanta in the 1920s, especially with the construction of the cars-only viaducts.86
City growth—that key indicator of success—depended on two essential elements: a
smoothly-running transportation network, and plenty of unoccupied land where newcomers
could settle and land speculators could prosper. Atlanta has always had open space into which to
expand, hindered in no direction by geological features or regional boundaries. But people had to
be able to get there quickly and easily, and policymakers determined that the automobile was the
best travel mode for suburban as well as urban dwellers—as long as the city built the roads to
accommodate them.87
2.4

Transportation as the Key to Growth
The majority of the members of a Molotch growth coalition are place entrepreneurs, that

is, individuals interested or invested in land, or who supported real estate development. These
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can include property owners, business proprietors, investors, financiers, lawyers, realtors. Other
members may not have direct place-based concerns, but depend on city growth for their financial
fortunes.
In Atlanta, real estate investing has long rated among the top ways to make money. In the
late 1890s, newspaper accounts touted the property markets as responsible for the fortunes of the
city’s wealthiest citizens. One article presciently observed that “Some periods of depression
come, but as a rule Atlanta real estate moves steadily upward, and other fortunes will be made
out of it in the years to come. It is always in demand.” Ten years later, other tales circulated
about the rising prices in downtown, and the savvy investments of some prominent citizens. The
brothers Adair, Forrest (1865-1936) and George, Jr. (1874-1921) had long been city real estate
moguls, but even Asa Candler, Sr., best known for his Coca-Cola fortune, emerged as one of the
shrewdest land dealers in town. He passed his property acumen to at least one of his sons,
William Candler (1890-1936), who brokered numerous property deals in Atlanta and Florida.
The construction of the Spring Street viaduct in the twenties would send parcel prices in that
section soaring.88
But the successful development of real estate depends on accessibility to the property.
The value of land relates directly to the ease and speed of the transport to reach it. Horsepowered vehicles running on tracks in the mid-1800s had first allowed the small town to expand
beyond the original one-mile circle centered on the train depot. The circular city boundary with a
three-mile diameter represented the distance a man might walk in an hour.89
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Electric streetcars made possible the 1895 eastern extension of Atlanta to the DeKalb
County line in order to annex the first streetcar suburb, Joel Hurt’s fashionable Inman Park. The
availability of the automobile in Atlanta in the early 1900s increased people’s choices of the
transit mode they would utilize to traverse the city. Edwin Percival Ansley (1866-1923), real
estate magnate and president of the Realty Trust Company, began developing Ansley Park, the
city’s the first automobile suburb in 1905. Atlanta would extend its boundaries northward to
include both the neighborhood and Piedmont Park, situated on the opposite side of Peachtree
Street.90
Ansley planned an exclusive neighborhood aimed at buyers who could pay not only the
price of the lot, architect’s fees, and construction costs of a large home. They could also afford
an automobile or two which they or their chauffeur would drive. He had tried unsuccessfully to
convince the streetcar to run a line into the subdivision, but failed. Residents, should they want to
take a trolley, had to walk, drive, or be driven over to Peachtree Street to catch one. New homes
in Ansley Park usually included the novel, free-standing structures—garages—to house motor
cars. The chauffeur would reside in the detached servant’s quarters, the only place in the
neighborhood where an African American could live.91
The car clearly offered greater range, infinitely more flexibility, and faster speeds than
any of the other transit modes. However, private ownership meant that only the wealthy could
purchase a motor vehicle in the early 1900s. It would remain far beyond the reach of even
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middle-class citizens until 1914, when Henry Ford’s moving assembly lines produced masses of
affordable Model Ts, and installment buying became available.
Cost considerations did not deter the enthusiasm of the growth advocates, however. As
early as 1909, they had determined that the car would best help them meet their goals for city
expansion, with no streetcars necessary. As an added bonus, the auto industry itself provided
exciting new retail and manufacturing opportunities. With Ansley Park in mind, investors started
surveying the wide-open suburban landscapes for development options.
Merchants as well as professionals hailed the automobile as a way to grow their
businesses by increased efficiencies and wider customer bases. David Tobias Howard (18491935), an African American embalmer and undertaker, exemplifies an entrepreneur who
successfully monetized a motor vehicle. Born into slavery, he became one of the most successful
operators in the state after purchasing an automobile hearse/ambulance, which expanded his
business far beyond metro Atlanta.92 As his wealth and his fleet of vehicles grew, he chartered
the first Black banking institute in Georgia, the Atlanta State Savings Bank, and came to rival
Alonzo Herndon as a leading philanthropist. Numerous others also increased their personal
fortunes, directly or indirectly, by or from motordom.
Having chosen their course, the business elites by 1920 needed to convince Atlantans that
creating an automotive infrastructure to expand and ease travel by car would benefit everyone in
the city. This process had deeper significance than simply decisions about moving people and
goods through the city; it involved an understanding of how the city should be spatially
configured, and by whom. As place entrepreneurs, their land-based interests and accompanying
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accessibility requirements dictated their selection of the automobile. They understood that to
make mobility by car effective, they had to get city government to pave the streets, supply
parking spaces, and create a system to keep traffic running smoothly.93
Atlanta’s growth coalition succeeded with its adoption of the motor vehicle as the new
transportation method. In the twenties, cars began to supplant trolleys, and would have
completely replaced them much faster but for the interventions of the gasoline shortages and
rationings of the Great Depression and World War II. Trucks, likewise, made inroads on the
railroads’ short-haul business, but not until the construction of the interstates would trucking
substantially replace trains for long-hauling freight.
By 1929, Atlanta was as automobile city, but it did not arrive there on its own. Always
promoting itself as progressive, the city really only adopted its modern ideas from somewhere
else. It never produced a single innovative traffic measure, like street paving, curb cuts, signal
devices, crosswalks, traffic cops, or stop signs. Instead, it followed the lead of cities like Detroit,
New York, and Chicago.
Atlanta officials made frequent trips to the Northeast and Midwest to observe practices
and study laws in other urban areas, bringing back ideas to try out back home. The city council
brought in the same national experts used by other cities to advise on the best methods for traffic
control, zoning, and street regulation. That cross-pollination explains why by 1930, the U.S. was
well on its way to possessing nationally uniform traffic codes and procedures, with Atlanta an
eager devotee.
Atlanta’s induction into the automobile age began with the appearance of the first car
there in 1899. Thirty years later, local residents and businesses registered more than fifty

Jason Henderson, “The Politics of Mobility and Business Elites in Atlanta, Georgia,” Urban Geography
25, no. 3 (2004): 193-95; Brownell, The Urban Ethos in the South, 1920-1930, 117-18.
93

62
thousand motor vehicles with the Georgia Secretary of State. The journey from 1 to 51,890
began slowly, encountering varying degrees of resistance and acceptance along the way.
Municipal leaders were fairly conservative at the start, though the Atlanta Spirit did exert itself
with the 1909 auto show. Local automobility continued to progress intermittently over the next
decade, culminating in the twenties, when the pro-growth coalition consolidated the dominance
of the automobile. The next chapter introduces the main event: the Roaring Twenties.
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3

INTRODUCTION TO THE 1920S

In an address to Congress in 1921, President Warren G. Harding asserted that “the motor
car has become an indispensable instrument in our political, social, and industrial life.” The
members of Atlanta’s pro-growth coalition would certainly have concurred; they, too, saw the
automobile as a modern necessity. They had adopted it as the essential tool in achieving their
goal of stimulating city expansion, which would, in turn, increase business opportunities leading
to financial gains. Wealth accumulation remained their chief objective; urban growth supplied
the means to achieving it; and the car was the engine driving that growth.94
Promoting and facilitating automobile use was therefore imperative. To accomplish that,
they had to persuade local officials to put into place the structures, facilities, and regulatory
apparatus needed to ensure that Atlantans would choose the car as their main transit mode. As
Tedlow observes, the mass manufacture of motor vehicles may have been one of the great
technological marvels of the twentieth century, but achieving national automobility required a
vast legal, social, and economic infrastructure. Atlanta’s growth alliance undertook that massive
overhaul of roadways, legislation, and culturally-acceptable definitions of street usage in the
1920s.95
A number of non-car-related factors assisted their efforts. It was a decade of Republican
presidents, who ushered in a pro-business “New Era” of peace, prosperity, and virtually
unregulated capitalism. Anti-trust fervor waned, labor struggled, and the power of corporations
strengthened. Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, from 1921 until his election as president
in 1929, sought closer ties and cooperation between government and business. Although often
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expressing a disdain for large government and bureaucratic interference with American
individualism, Hoover greatly expanded the Commerce Department which published statistical
data and standardization tools. In the motor vehicle category alone, his office authored numerous
“recommended” and “uniform” standards, guidelines, policies, and sample legislation for states
and municipalities to adopt for highways, street signals,
traffic codes, and road signage. Most states readily complied.
Hoover’s promotion of interstate connectivity through new
highways led to the adoption of the official U.S. numbered
highway system in 1926 (see Georgia sign at right), still in
use today.96
The end of World War I brought high unemployment
levels as industries struggled to re-adjust to post-military

Figure 4. Georgia U.S.
highway sign, ca. 1926;
worthpoint.com.

production and soldiers returned from overseas looking for jobs. A national business recession
began in January 1920, and reached its nadir in July 1921. Numerous labor strikes had
Washington searching for ways to better industrial relations. Rising crime rates had cities such as
Atlanta calling for the federal government to hire men for public works projects, including roadbuilding, because “the most effective way to keep down crime is to keep down unemployment,”
and “public construction is better than relief.” President Harding in turn asked municipalities to
expand their workforces to aid the more than 2.3 million out-of-work Americans. Atlanta, with
its plans for a new jail, the Spring Street viaduct, and a backlog of war-delayed construction,
should have had plenty of jobs. But Mayor Key had to urge businesses to hire more men,
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promising to publicly humiliate any uncooperative employers. It would be early 1923 before the
post-war slump ended.97
World War I had effectively halted the state-federal partnership for road building and
maintenance, as men, monies, and industries diverted to military activities. Within months of the
war’s end, however, Congress expanded the 1916 Federal Aid Road Act, and in 1921, passed a
new Federal Highway Act. Many Georgia counties vigorously and successfully pursued federal
dollars for their road projects, with Fulton County, Atlanta’s home, leading the charge.
Motorized equipment and trucks made paving more efficient, and specialized machinery
replaced farm tractors for road work. A flurry of road building led the Highway Board to publish
the state’s first highway map in 1920. The national safety goal of eliminating at-grade railroad
crossings spurred counties to build numerous concrete bridges, a practice which Atlanta would
soon emulate by constructing viaducts over the downtown railroad gulch.98
American industry had emerged from World War I more bureaucratically structured, an
outcome of the high degree of organization demanded to create, equip, and transport a fighting
force, then conduct a successful armed conflict overseas. Wiebe observes the new “bureaucratic
orientation” in which businesses established their national trade associations, based on principles
of scientific management. By uniting, group members could share expertise, present a united
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front, solve common problems, set legislative agendas, and promote their particular industry and
its products.99
Herbert Hoover elevated the lobbying power of national trade associations; they served as
his preferred means for coordinating business interests with government policy. With his
encouragement, the leading national consortium of municipal engineers produced the country’s
first uniform automotive standards. Atlanta possessed an array of trade, civic, and professional
organizations, many of whom would play decisive roles
in the city’s planning, zoning, and traffic control efforts.
Their efforts led to the city’s embrace of the federal
uniform standards in 1929.100
Recovering from the national business recession
during its first two years, the 1920s emerged as the
decade of consumption and leisure. The twenties
witnessed the crowning efforts of American corporate
capitalism to create what Leach describes as “a future-

Figure 5. Night riders, “Parents
Who Shirk,” Atlanta Constitution,
January 31, 1926.

oriented culture of desire that confused the good life
with goods.” Although not everyone shared in the material prosperity, no one escaped its
imagery perpetually on display in movies, signs, billboards, store windows, and magazine and
radio advertisements. Technology, mass production, and managerial efficiency supplied a
plethora of novel products which transformed daily life, assisting the revolution in manners and
morals. The automobile played its part by supplying a new sort of freedom. Courting couples
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could escape parental scrutiny as they went for all-night rides (see sketch above), giving rise to
the car’s scathing label as “a house of prostitution on wheels.”101
Automobile manufacturing emerged as the major growth industry of the decade. In 1921,
Atlanta’s Chamber of Commerce described how the world had come to depend on the motor
vehicle. “Without the automobile, practically all industry would stop—transportation would be
paralyzed—living costs would soar higher and higher—the progress of the world would be
impaired and retarded.” By 1923, the car, that once “indifferent product with an uncertain
future,” would surpassed meat packing and petroleum as America’s most valuable
manufacture.102
The whole of Atlanta’s business community celebrated the automobile’s success. In the
first months of 1920, civic boosters bragged about the city’s position as the distribution point for
automotive products throughout the Southeast, and the industry had already established a sterling
reputation among local real estate investors. “Atlanta automobile firms occupy the finest
buildings, pay the highest rents, and are requiring a greater number of new buildings than any
other line of business.” A drive out any direction out from Five Points brought views of
“handsome and substantial structures which have been recently constructed expressly for the
automotive industry.” No one doubted that cars were not only good business, but also good for
business.103
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The 1920 census officially declared America a majority urban nation, with 54.3 million
city dwellers compared to 51.4 million people living in rural areas. As a consequence of the
population growth, now larger, denser cities confronted problems of insufficient housing,
inadequate city services, and increased conflicts between different social and racial groups.
Modern technological innovations brought contradictory pressures of centralization and
decentralization. Steel-framed skyscrapers concentrated workers in downtowns, while the
telephone and the automobile allowed for population dispersal to the suburbs.104
Atlanta followed the trend. In twenty years, the city had gone from a population under
90,000, to a new high just over 200,000. Ebullient over the expansion, the mayor, city council,
and pro-growth business leaders would spend the decade coping with the outfall of that success.
Providing merely adequate services required massive expenditures in the form of multiple bond
issues to add water and sewer lines, construct new schools, and pave city streets with the hard,
smooth surfaces demanded by the growing numbers of motorists.
Traffic congestion emerged as a severe problem for downtowns across the country,
including Atlanta’s. Every commuter was inconvenienced, whether traveling by trolley,
automobile, or jitney. No one was happy—in addition to the street travelers, pedestrians were
angry about being crowded onto the packed sidewalks, and by the rush of vehicles which made
crossing the street as difficult as it was dangerous. Business owners worried that customers
would go elsewhere if they could not find a nearby parking space. Something had to be done;
editorials complained about the problem as well as the lack of response by the city council.

article included nine photos of new buildings constructed for “automobile distributing firms” (i.e., car dealerships),
along Atlanta’s Automobile Row, which was Peachtree Street north of the Candler Building, but by 1920, had
expanded to West Peachtree, Spring, and Ivy [Peachtree Center Ave.] streets.
104
Bureau of the Census U.S. Department of Commerce, Abstract of the Fifteenth Census of the United
States: 1930 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1933), Population, p. 14, Table 6; Brownell, The
Urban Ethos in the South, 1920-1930, xxi.

69
Throughout the decade, government officials struggled, trying various remedies, searching for
one that would not only allay the problem, but also—and more importantly—would appeal to all
of the influential policymakers in the growth coalition. Out of many possible solutions, the one
that would have been most effective was never tried in Atlanta: limiting the number of
automobiles using the streets.105
The city undertook major studies to comprehend and resolve its growth-related problems,
exercising the progressive era propensity to seek the advice of specialists. Municipal business
leaders preferred to consult engineers when seeking answers to what McShane calls “the
diseconomies of urbanization.” Civil engineering at the time epitomized scientific knowledge
and offered modern technological solutions. Atlanta would turn to three nationally-prominent
experts for guidance on zoning and traffic, all engineers.106
Throughout the decade, the city expanded in people and territory. For Atlanta to remain
the banking and distribution center of the Southeast, civic leaders had to embrace the concept of
city planning to bring order and direction to current and future growth. By creating a planning
commission and adopting a comprehensive land use plan, Atlanta would join the ranks of the
larger U.S. cities, and further enhance its stature as a good place to live, work, and invest.
City planning in Atlanta had two major components: (1) zoning the city into segregated,
use- or race-based sectors; and (2) fabricating the physical and regulatory components needed to
solve the traffic problems caused by the ascent of the automobile. Chapter 4, Planning Atlanta’s
Streets, describes the creation of the physical infrastructure necessary to provide motor vehicles’

105
“The Traffic Problem,” Atlanta Constitution, February 5, 1920; Brownell, “A Symbol of Modernity:
Attitudes toward the Automobile in Southern Cities in the 1920s,” American Quarterly 24, no. 1 (March 1972): 2830.
106
Clay McShane, “The Origins and Globalization of Traffic Control Signals,” Journal of Urban History
25, no. 3 (March 1999): 389.

70
ease of movement in and around Atlanta, especially in the central business district. The volume
of traffic generated by cars and trucks required wider roads, which proved difficult-to-impossible
to achieve in downtown, although sidewalks could usually be trimmed—and were. Uniform
grades and improved street paving enabled smooth driving and facilitated traffic flow, with
asphalt and concrete the preferred low-traction hard surfaces for motor vehicles. Grade crossings,
especially with the magnitude of both railroad and vehicular traffic, caused lengthy backups, not
to mention crashes and deaths. Building viaducts over the downtown rail lines reduced gridlock
and injuries.107
Chapter 5, Regulating Atlanta’s Streets, describes the creation of the legal superstructure
to regulate all street users. Cars were fast, fun, and flexible; drivers could go anywhere, any time,
and at speeds unsurpassed by any other earthbound transit mode.108 But cars were also deadly,
fueling carnage in the streets. The bodies from vehicular collisions piled up to amounts
exceeding even today’s ho-hum 30,000+ annual national deaths. Cars, and all other users of the
public roadways, had to be minutely regulated in an attempt to mitigate the hubris and stupidity
which, then and now, cause most traffic “accidents.”109
Local power elites founded a number of popular and influential automobile-related
organizations. These associations worked intimately with city, state, and federal officials,
crafting car-enabling policies. Together, they spun a legislative “web of regulation” to stem the
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costs of the human and property damage resulting from countless collisions. This massive
regulatory apparatus included laws on the books, as well as a tsunami of novel devices, signs,
signal lights, structures, and painted lines on the streets to control movement and activities on the
roads and sidewalks. To ensure compliance, the police department re-instituted the traffic squad.
Its top priority was to check the crime wave sweeping over the city—motor vehicle infractions—
which produced so much death and destruction.110
A large number of the restrictions applied to non-vehicular street users, such as
pedestrians, street vendors, peddlers, and child entrepreneurs. Many were banned altogether.
Foot travelers did retain a place in the public streets increasingly occupied by private vehicles,
but within a closely circumscribed space. New laws confined them to a small portion of the
roadway delineated by painted lines at intersections only. The crosswalk dictated where a person
walking could utilize the street, and local ordinances restricted when they could use it, subject to
penalties for non-compliance. A major effect of the regulatory network was the removal or
restriction of anything that was not a motor vehicle or a streetcar. Bicycles did retain street
privileges as a transit mode, but cyclists had already to a significant degree self-deported from
Atlanta’s busy downtown.
Reconfiguring and regulating the streets facilitated the growing presence of the
automobile, but rapid and chaotic city expansion brought additional challenges. The urbanization
of America meant greater density as newcomers crowded into city centers. The 20-story high
rises of the 1920s towered over Atlanta’s now-diminutive, eleven-story “skyscraper” of the
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1890s. Their presence guaranteed even more people and vehicles in downtown on a daily basis,
and limited the light and air reaching the streets below. Gas stations and other small commercial
establishments edged into residential areas, fleeing high rents in the central business district.
Apartment complexes disturbed the rhythm and density of single-family neighborhoods. Well-todo, in-town dwellers escaped to exclusive suburbs sprouting at the city’s edges.
Chapter 6, Segregating the City, documents how the Atlanta growth machine met these
challenges. Zoning was a way to manage the chaos by organizing land uses and limiting what
could be done and where. It provided a mechanism to channel new development into defined
sectors. By putting more distance between where people lived, shopped, and worked, zoning
increased the necessity for an automobile. Most power elites eagerly embraced the regulatory
power of the comprehensive zone plan, which allowed them to maintain their influential position
within the city while also taking advantage of burgeoning real estate investment opportunities. A
few realtors resisted, especially if they had properties negatively affected by zoning, but the
promise of “preserving property values” (usually code for “keeping out the riff raff”) won over
nearly everyone with white skin.
For many southern cities during the twenties, zoning also provided a means to tighten the
noose of Jim Crow. Atlanta’s 1922 zoning ordinance offered the most well-known challenge to
the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1917 ruling against racially-segregated zoning. The city’s distinctive
race-based residential districting was eventually found unconstitutional, but its zone map
continued to influence the racial composition of city neighborhoods into the 1960s.
Atlanta’s African American population increased during the decade, but remained close
to one-third of the total as the Great Migration continued. The zone plan straitjacketed those who
stayed behind into segregated neighborhoods, resulting in severe overcrowding around east
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side’s Auburn Avenue and west side’s Atlanta University Center. The restricted housing options
mirrored the restricted seating options on streetcars and the just-introduced “motor buses.” While
white customers utilized the bulk of available seating, Blacks had to crowd into the back, just as
they had to crowd into confined race-defined residential districts while whites expanded into the
outlying suburbs. Whites made sure that Blacks were kept “in their place” everywhere.
Segregated housing districts might create locational distance between the two races, but
the confined space inside a trolley permitted no real separation. The daily face-to-face encounters
often resulted in conflicts and violence. Complete segregation proved impossible to achieve on
either the streets or the streetcars, but traveling in the privacy of an automobile allowed escape
from mixed-race crowds. Freedom from a chance confrontation supplied yet another compelling
reason to buy a car.
The physical and legislative re-shaping of Atlanta did, to some degree, relieve traffic and
land use problems, as well as burnish the city’s modern, progressive reputation. But the middecade rise of a regional competitor and a lull in automobile sales required potent counterpunches. Chapter 7, Selling City and Car, describes how the advertising industry swooped in
both to renew the Atlanta’s standing as the Southeast’s leading financial and distribution center,
and to invigorate sales of new motor vehicles.
Marketing came of age in the 1920s, solidifying its ascendancy over American consumer
purchasing. Young college graduates, often from the new business schools, entered the
increasingly scientific field of advertising. They studied the markets, honed the soon-ubiquitous
customer survey, and developed fresh merchandizing strategies directed toward specific
audiences. Advances in color processing led to a wave of vibrant signs and vivid print
advertisements. The billboard enlarged to become an effective way to reach car-driving
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consumers, a stark contrast to the poster-sized, black-and-white card ad which had lined streetcar
interiors since 1900. Electrical displays, especially those with colored lights, meant publicity did
not stop at sundown, and added exciting tints to Atlanta’s downtown white way.
Newspapers, journals, and magazines papered the nation, extending the publicity reach of
those with a story to sell, which Atlanta did in 1924. Florida real estate speculation, long lurking
at edges of the city’s financial corridors, boomed in the 1920s. Suddenly, tourists and investors
sought sunny shores instead of Atlanta’s more prosaic attractions. To counter the flow of people
and dollars southward, the Chamber of Commerce inaugurated the Forward Atlanta campaign. A
mammoth publicity crusade, it nationally advertised the advantages of the city’s stolid but secure
banking facilities, its enlarged and zoning-enhanced manufacturing opportunities, its unrivaled
railroad facilities for shipping, and its status as a provider of airmail service at the city-owned
Candler Field. Forward Atlanta, a shining example of the media arm of the growth coalition in
action, produced outstanding results. Hundreds of new enterprises, including some automobile
manufacturers, located in the city, bringing employment to thousands of local workers.
It paid to advertise, not just the city, but also the automobile. Mid-decade auto sales
lagged as the industry for the first time faced market saturation. Consumers hesitated to replace
their older, still-functional automobile which had cost them so much—a common problem for
retailers whenever a commodity was heavy, durable, and expensive. Advertising agency
executives persuaded their car manufacturing clients to create new vehicle models every year, in
several colors and with a variety of features, as a way to stimulate desire and appeal to new and
returning customers. Newspaper ads quickly reflected the new marketing strategies. The
automotive industry eventually grasped what the fashion world had known for decades: if you
keep changing the styles, you never have to worry about flooding the market.
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The advertising industry had since the late nineteenth century purposely and with great
calculation shaped modern consumer attitudes to crave ownership of the latest designs with stateof-the-art accessories. A new sensibility of out with the old, in with the new, the advanced, the
up-to-date, the modish had taken over. “Keeping up with the Joneses” proved to be a powerful
motivator for the American consumer, and the automobile ranked as the most highly visible
status symbol. Along with advertising and the introduction of planned obsolescence, two related
factors greatly contributed to the tremendous increase in car sales. The availability of easy
money and the removal of the stigma of buying on credit allowed middle- and working-class
families to acquire a vehicle. During the 1920s, more than 70% of all cars were purchased on an
installment plan; gone were the days of the cash-only cars available in the 1910 Sears catalog.111
The combination of new advertising with favorable interest rates and changing consumer
sensibilities soon took effect: between 1920 and 1929, the number of private automobiles in
Atlanta increased by 66%. All the new cars on the roads, coupled with the city’s half-hearted,
sporadic efforts to regulate traffic flow, brought renewed gridlock to downtown. The situation
frustrated commuters, hindered tourists, obstructed business, and smudged the city’s reputation.
Civic leaders, forced to confront the intractable problem, turned to nationally-known experts for
guidance.
Chapter 8, State of the Streets 1929, describes that year’s traffic survey, undertaken by
the mayor’s specially-appointed Traffic Commission, with the invaluable assistance of the
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company of New York City. Most of those participating in the
survey had strong automotive interests, and the report understandably had a pro-car slant. The
Commission also intentionally omitted trolleys from its consideration. The study’s authors
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claimed they were not “in a position to consider the effect of street car operation on traffic,”112
prompting the question, if they weren’t, who was? Their disingenuous dodge, however, did not
restrain them from faulting the streetcar as the major hindrance to swift and efficient traffic flow.
One wonders how they managed to reach that conclusion without even studying trolleys.
Ignoring the daily transit mode of thousands of Atlantans yielded a distorted view of city traffic
patterns, but at the same time provided a crystal clear understanding of the vision of the progrowth coalition and its legislative allies.
The study supplied a snapshot of the prevailing travel conditions in Atlanta in 1929.
“Businessmen and politicians had come to a full realization that the streets of a city are the most
important element in its economic usefulness” [emphasis added]. The traffic survey made no
mention of the railroads, except as obstacles to movement. The railroads, the city’s life lines
which pre-dated Atlanta itself, were viewed as interlopers slicing up downtown, instead of as the
creators and sustainers of the central commercial hub.113
The railroads had long held an absolute monopoly on long- and medium-distance
transportation in the United States. Thirty years of automobility increasingly challenged that
dominance. Trains maintained their critical economic importance, but trucks had begun to make
inroads on the short-haul side of rail freight traffic, signaling greater changes to come. With the
viaducts and laterals built in the twenties, Atlanta had beginnings of a bi-level downtown (now
greatly expanded). With railroads literally at the bottom, the automobile physically occupied the
top tier. The concrete structures also symbolized the new order of the hegemony of motordom.
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The pro-growth coalition succeeded in their goal of city expansion. By decade’s end,
Atlanta had added nearly 70,000 new residents and received official designation as a
metropolitan area. The common understanding of the streets as public places where everyone had
equal rights had disappeared, replaced with a general acceptance that streets were for cars. In
actuality, the car did not “win” the road. Rather, the civic and business leadership eagerly handed
Atlanta’s streets over to the automobile. By 1929, their surrender was complete.114
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4

PLANNING ATLANTA’S STREETS

At the 1919 the annual meeting of the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, the leadership
proposed that a city planning commission be formed to meet the demands of what Mayor James
L. Key described as “the miraculous growth that the city is experiencing.” As a Chamber
director, the mayor in the coming months would appoint the city’s first official planning
commission. That the elite businessmen on the six-man commission were all members of the
city’s pro-growth coalition only affirmed Hunter’s assertion: whenever Atlanta undertook to
decide major policy on an issue, the top leaders would be well represented on any committee
having jurisdiction over it.115
The actions of the planning commission significantly impacted the city’s course for the
next decade by tackling two major problems: traffic congestion and haphazard growth. A truly
comprehensive land use plan would have addressed the two interrelated problems together, but
Atlanta’s planners chose to separate the two issues. They tackled the traffic problem first.
Trucks and cars, now essential tools for business and city expansion, needed to move
easily through the city. But the mass of vehicles crowding the narrow streets inconvenienced
customers and clients, delayed deliveries, and hindered police from chasing down lawbreakers.
The great advantage of the automobile—speed—was entirely negated by the congestion in the
central business district, much to the dismay and discontent of motorists. Worst of all, the city
was gaining a reputation for gridlock.
Atlanta’s leaders finally began to realize that in order to keep automobiles traveling
freely, the city’s antiquated road system needed an overhaul. Mayor Key led the way,
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confidently declared that bridging the railroads would provide “the ultimate solution” to the
downtown traffic problems. The many grade crossings of the network of rail lines did bring
traffic flow on numbers of streets to a complete halt multiple times a day; the viaducts would
eliminate one of the causes of downtown gridlock. However, it did nothing to address the most
basic reason Atlanta’s streets were so crowded: too many vehicles. The mayor’s assertion in a
way exemplified the common misconception that a city can build its way out of traffic
congestion.116
Throughout the twenties, the growth advocates, acting in and through the official city
planning commission, undertook major taxpayer-funded road-improvement and viaduct-building
projects. They reconfigured the city’s physical infrastructure in an attempt to facilitate motor
vehicle traffic. Despite all the evidence produced throughout the decade, Atlanta’s business and
government leaders never acknowledged the reality that building more and bigger roads and
bridges only brought more traffic.
4.1

City Planning in 1920s Atlanta
The Chamber of Commerce had proposed a city planning commission in late 1919, and

William J. Sayward (1875-1945), FAIA, a prominent regional architect and chair of the
Chamber’s Committee on City Planning, carried the concept into the new decade. In an article
about city planning in the January 1920 issue of the City Builder magazine, Sayward carefully
explained the concept of city planning, which most of the general public misunderstood as a
municipal clean-up or beautification scheme. He defined it as a process which required a
comprehensive survey of the city’s needs, studying topics like transportation, highways, street
widening, bridges, housing, parks, and building requirements. Once the situation was
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understood, solutions could be formulated in an overall strategy to fix pressing issues and
prepare for future expansion.117
City planning, while not a new idea, was a relatively new practice in the United States.
Inspired by George Eugène Haussmann’s massive 1853-70 renovation of Paris, American
architect Daniel Burnham led the design team of the White City at the 1893 World Columbian
Exposition in Chicago. It presented to the nation an early example of a comprehensive land use
plan, and exemplified the tenets of the City Beautiful Movement. Characterized by imposing
boulevards, elaborate neoclassical public buildings, and spacious, sculpted gardens, the
movement, which was most popular from 1900 to World War I, emphasized dignity, order,
harmony, and virtue in urban form. It promised to uplift and improve the mass of citizens
exposed to its artistry and refinement. Burnham (1846-1912) created plans for other cities in the
early 1900s, notably San Francisco and Chicago.118
American cities quickly embraced the new urban aesthetic and many sought, if not citywide makeovers, at least the incorporation of some of its elements. Atlanta, ever aware of
advances made by competitor cities, managed to add a few representative City Beautiful
features, such as the 1901 Carnegie Library and the 1909 City Auditorium and Armory. In 1903,
the city hired the Olmsted Brothers to create a master plan for Grant Park, at that time the city’s
largest recreational space which eventually housed the Atlanta Zoo and the Cyclorama. City
officials also attempted but failed to implement the 1910 Bleckley Plan which would have
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constructed a beautifying and unifying central city plaza over the dirty and dividing downtown
railroad gulch.
By the time Sayward’s article appeared in 1920, another type of city planning had gained
acceptance. Planners and engineers sought a less embellished, more down-to-earth and practical
approach during the second decade of the twentieth century. Civil engineer and St. Louis city
planner, Harland Bartholomew (1889-1989) espoused the new City Practical, or City Efficient,
as it was sometimes called. His consulting firm devised comprehensive plans for hundreds of
American cities and towns. Using a standardized approach, they addressed streets, transportation,
parks, water and sewer systems, zoning, appearance, housing, and finances. City Beautiful plans
also dealt with these aspects of urban design, but engineer Bartholomew took a more utilitarian
approach. His work helped circulate and popularize on a national level the pragmatic approach to
city planning.119
William Sayward advocated for planning to encompass not only the beautiful, but also
the efficient. “The city beautiful, to be sure, is a very commendable ideal and one which should
be assured its place; but we must not forget that the city beautiful must absolutely be founded
upon the ‘city practical.’” Throughout the 1920s, Atlanta’s growth advocates more often chose
the functional approach rather than striving to create beauty. They supported services which
promoted the city’s commercial growth, but paid little attention to civic improvements not
directly related to the practicalities of business. Atlantans in general would not support the
allocation of public funds for what they perceived as what Lands calls “urban primping.”120

119
Garvin, The American City: What Works, What Doesn't, 519; Isenberg, Downtown America: A History
of the Place and the People Who Made It, 47; Brownell, The Urban Ethos in the South, 1920-1930, 171.
120
Sayward, “City Planning Committee Urges Survey,” 12; Lyon, “Business Buildings in Atlanta: A Study
in Urban Growth and Form,” 367-68; Lands, The Culture of Property: Race, Class, and Housing Landscapes in
Atlanta, 1880-1950, 5.

82
The city’s business community did, however, enthusiastically embrace the concept of
planning; they would take the initiative in implementing it in Atlanta. They saw planning as a
way to understand present and future needs, to create a city attractive to visitors and investors,
and to grow the city. Robert Otis, planning commission chair, itemized the qualities necessary
for a good civic reputation: the city must be well-laid out for convenience and beauty; it must
provide for transportation, business, and recreation; and it must have comfortable housing. Such
a city would attract and retain new inhabitants. Warning that “the planned city attracts and the
unplanned city repels,” he urged that everything be considered upon the basis of expansion:
zoning, commerce, parks, schools, wider streets, recreation, and entertainment. His claim,
“Forethought along lines of city planning, with careful consideration for the growth of the city,
pays from every angle” (emphasis added), encapsulated the coalition’s approach to planning for
a larger city and the various types of paydays it could bring.121
As part of preparation for a city plan, Sayward urged that traffic be one of the first items
studied in Atlanta. He suggested that the main arteries of the city be arranged to improve traffic
flow by following the most direct pathways at ideal grades. With great foresight, he urged the
construction of an encircling road around the business district, insisting it would relieve clogged
streets in the Five Points area and improve access throughout town. His was likely the first
perimeter highway proposal, embodied today in Atlanta’s Interstate-285, although no such
roadway was built or even seriously considered during the twenties. The lack of a major arterial
circumnavigating downtown would impede Atlanta’s drivers for another forty years.122
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Sayward proposed a council-appointed planning commission provided with adequate
funding to undertake surveys and studies of the growth of Atlanta and its street traffic. He
insisted that the newspapers mount an educational campaign first, so the public could understand
what a city plan might accomplish, and then publish the commission’s findings and
recommendations. His article, itself an instructive example of public planning education, offered
a way for the city to move forward. Mayor Key embraced the message, and would soon act upon
it.123
In his annual message to the city on January 5, 1920, the mayor celebrated Atlanta’s
growth, “the most rapid and substantial . . . of any year in the city’s history,” but he also issued a
challenge. To keep up with the burgeoning population, the city had to increase its services, so he
asked for an emergency tax imposition to fulfill a long list of needed improvements: expanding
the school system, waterworks, city parks, and libraries. He called for the establishment of a
library for African Americans, who at that time were not permitted to use any of the city’s
existing public libraries.124
Denouncing the sad state of city streets, Mayor Key urged the development and
construction of cross-town thoroughfares, viaducts and bridges, as well as widening and paving
the streets. He blamed the streetcar company for the poor road conditions, and asked the city
council to force the company to repair the damage. Animosity between Mayor Key and Preston
Arkwright, president of Georgia Railway and Power Company, dated back to 1906, when thenAlderman Key first pushed for municipal ownership of all public utilities. The feud continued in
1919, when Mayor Key, in his inaugural speech, called for city ownership of the streetcar
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system. That same year, he signed the ordinance allowing jitneys to compete directly with
trolleys. The hostility persisted until Key left office in 1923, and the ramifications of the ongoing
dispute would have serious consequences for the traction company in the coming years.125
Atlanta’s greatness could expand, but only if the city took the long view. “We need to
adopt a definite and scientific plan to meet the demands for a city of not less than 500,000
inhabitants,” which he asserted Atlanta would reach in ten years. As the city population in 1920
was 200,616, the mayor’s claim that it would more than double in the next decade was bold and
inspiring. Newspaper editorials took up the theme, calling (in increasingly bolder and larger
type) for “Expansion! Expansion! EXPANSION!” and urged the city council to take decisive
measures. Atlanta, an editorial writer asserted, was “growing faster than any other city in the
south. . . . We are trying to operate a great city with village machinery, and we can no longer do
it without serious consequences!”126
City officials quickly responded, passing a tax increase and moving ahead with
preparations for Atlanta’s imminent unprecedented growth. In January, 1920, the council
adopted the entire Chamber of Commerce’s city planning recommendation from December 1919
(see figure below). A new 24-member city planning commission, the result of cooperative action
between the city, county, and Chamber, included influential businessmen, industrialists, civic
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leaders, newspaper editors, lawyers, physicians, politicians, and two prominent women. The
broad representation enabled a
coordinated, regional approach to
problem-solving, and the commission
produced a Greater Atlanta report
calling for improved schools, parks,
and roads. However, lack of funds led
to the disbanding of the commission a
mere six months after its creation.
Council had failed to bankroll the
group.127
By July, the city council had
decided to formally create a legal city

Figure 6. The new City Planning Commission, City
Builder 4, no. 12 (February 1920): 7.

planning commission, and sought authority from the state. In mid-August, the General Assembly
enacted legislation enabling the city to create a six-member City Planning Commission. On
October 12, 1920, Mayor Key appointed the first official and legal Atlanta Planning Commission
codified by city ordinance.128
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The six men appointed to the commission (plus the mayor as ex officio chair) comprised
textbook examples from a Molotch pro-growth coalition, and are listed here:
Michael Hoke Smith (1855-1931) – U.S. senator, attorney, real estate developer, former Georgia
governor, former owner of the Atlanta Journal;
Charles Almond Wickersham (1858-1949) – president of the Atlanta and West Point Railroad,
on the board of directors of Coca-Cola and Trust Company of Georgia;
Frank A. Pittman (1865-1958) –building inspector for the City of Atlanta, owner of Pittman
Construction which built homes, office buildings, churches and roads; in the 1950s his
company would construct part of the Expressway, the forerunner to I-85;
Joel S. Hurt, Sr. (1850-1926) – civil engineer, designer and developer of Inman Park-the city’s
first suburban neighborhood, built the city’s first electric street railway (second in the
nation), bank president, real estate developer, one of the city’s most distinguished
entrepreneurs;
Fred J. Terry (1880-1923) – superintendent of the composing room of the Atlanta Georgian,
labor leader, active in the Atlanta Typological Union and the Atlanta Federation of
Trades;
Robert R. Otis (1873-1960) – prominent real estate developer, agent for numerous downtown
properties, including the Piedmont Hotel and the Peachtree Arcade, founder and president
of Otis Realty Company, ardent city planning activist, and chair of the new planning
commission;
Mayor James L. Key (1867-1939) – attorney, former city alderman, mayor, and ex-officio chair
of the new planning commission.129
The group which would advise the city council on Atlanta’s comprehensive land use plan
consisted of some of the very people who stood to gain or lose most in municipal land-use
decisions. All were members of the COC; the government/business fusion was apparent. Mayor
Key appointed no ordinary citizens, not one small business owner, certainly no women.
Neither did the mayor appoint even one African American, despite a request from John
Joseph Eagan (1870-1924), president of the American Cast-Iron Pipe Company of Atlanta. A
wealthy industrialist, investor, and generous philanthropist, Eagan lived by his Christian
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principles, was active in downtown’s Central Presbyterian Church, and served on the Atlanta
Council of Churches. Listed in the Social Register and a member of the Capital City Club, Eagan
worked to improve race relations in Atlanta, and took an active part in the 1919 creation of the
Commission on Interracial Cooperation. He urged Key to select a group of representative Black
citizens to work with the new planning commission. Of course, they could not have served on the
commission, but they could have assisted in making investigations and recommendations
concerning matters affecting their communities’ welfare. Eagan’s request went unheard.130
The list of appointees, however, would have appeared eminently reasonable to the mayor
and other civic leaders. The commission’s charge spelled out the most important concern of
Atlanta-style city planning, to pay attention to the city’s “economic and commercial
advancement.” As Brownell notes, such a group, with “more than an incidental interest” in urban
real estate development, could be trusted to act accordingly.
Urban planning commissions in the South . . . drew most heavily on those local
individuals and groups who had considerable experience in finance,
transportation, and land development and who were most interested in the
consequences of a comprehensive urban design. Conflict of interest was never
mentioned. . . . It would never have occurred to them that they might not be
capable of representing the interests and concerns of the entire city.131
The planning commission employed as their first outside hire a general city planning
consultant. Nationally-known expert Robert H. Whitten had an impressive resume. A city
planner with a law degree, he served as secretary of the commission that drafted the 1916 New
York City Zoning Ordinance, and as advisor to the Cleveland City Plan Commission. At the time
Atlanta hired him, he also served as the city planning consultant to Indianapolis, and was on the
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board of governors of both the American Institute of City Planning and the National Conference
on City Planning. He had written zoning ordinances for several towns in the Cleveland
suburbs.132
Whitten looked like the obvious choice to assist Atlanta’s planning commission, but not
everyone supported his selection. Joel Hurt lobbied instead for the Olmsted Brothers, a landscape
architecture and planning firm formed by the sons of Frederick Law Olmsted, Sr. after his
retirement. In 1893, Hurt had hired the distinguished senior Olmsted to create a master plan for
the 1300-acre Druid Hills neighborhood, a plan which the brothers updated in 1905. The city had
also employed them to create a plan for Piedmont Park in 1910. Hurt favored the City Beautiful
approach of the landscapers, while realtor Robert Otis, the active chair of the planning
commission, preferred Whitten, whose methods more reflected City Practical concerns.133
Otis ultimately prevailed. The conflict between the two men represented ideological
differences, and the outcome signaled a sort of changing of the guard. Hurt, a former éminence
grise in city policy-making, was in decline, and would be dead in six years. The younger Otis,
lower in the ranks of the pro-growth advocates, displayed the more modern sensibilities of speed
and practicality.
The commission considered hiring three experts for landscape architecture, engineering,
and zoning, but financial constraints led them to employ only Whitten. While charged with
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devising both traffic and zoning plans, he tackled traffic first. A truly all-inclusive city plan
would have combined the two, as properties and streets affected and reflected the activities of
each other. Addressing them simultaneously could have provided a more thorough and
ultimately more successful way forward for the growing city. However, Atlanta in the twenties
would not adopt a comprehensive city plan.134
A sense of urgency prompted the decision to deal first with the city’s clogged streets.
Nationally-esteemed traffic expert, Miller McClintock, noted, “The alarming increase in street
accidents and in street congestion during the past few years has rendered the correction of traffic
conditions one of the most important municipal problems of the present day.” On May 30, 1921,
Whitten presented his traffic report to the Planning Commission. In it, he endorsed the alreadyapproved Spring Street viaduct. He also cited the urgent need for additional north-south routes to
relieve downtown’s traffic congestion, suggesting the grade crossings at Central Avenue and
Pryor Street be eliminated, and widening Courtland Street north of the Washington Street viaduct
to serve as an eastside traffic arterial.135
Whitten recommended reviving the 1910/1916 Bleckley city plaza plan to span the
railroad tracks, and relocating the city’s freight and passenger terminals. To the latter he
attributed special importance, claiming that “the railroad terminals are even more fundamental in
the city’s development than is its thoroughfare plan.” He encouraged the city to proceed with
zoning, traffic, and park plans, but always to make certain that those plans did not adversely
affect the railroads.136
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While the planning commission officially adopted Whitten’s report, they ignored,
delayed, or altered a number of his recommendations. The group enthusiastically endorsed the
plans for Central Avenue and Pryor Street, which before decade’s end would have their own
viaducts, but the city plaza remained a distant dream. Whitten would eventually be proven wrong
in his assertion that the railroads were more critical to the city’s development than its roadways.
At least Atlanta now had a plan. By Otis’ estimate, the city was ten years behind the rest
of the world in the urban planning process; he was off by at least a decade. Since 1899, European
nations had held international congresses to discuss city plans, zoning and housing programs,
land use systems, and street configurations. Americans did not participate in these meetings to
any consequential degree for another ten years. In 1909, Washington, DC hosted the first
national conference on city planning, and Harvard offered the country’s first university course on
city planning. In 1917, a group of planners incorporated the American City Planning Institute
(today the American Planning Association). By this count, Atlanta lagged behind Europe by
twenty years, and much of the rest of the country by at least decade.137
Atlanta’s earlier, feeble planning bodies had acted unofficially, without power or funding,
and they accomplished nothing. Not until the traffic congestion became, as Sayward described it,
“unbearable” and near the “breaking point,” did the State of Georgia alter the city charter
enabling an official planning commission. Motorized vehicles packed the downtown streets
causing traffic jams and frustrating businessmen, office workers, and shoppers. The intolerable
situation offered one of two powerful motivations for the city council to create a planning
commission. The other, which will be discussed in a later chapter, was the balkanization of land
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uses and segregation of the races through a city zoning plan. But an inescapable conclusion
remains: the automobile had already impacted street users, street paving, the traffic apparatus,
the police department, and city, state, and federal laws. During the 1920s, its impact would reach
into the organization of the official city government.138
When it came to traffic, the city continued throughout the decade to waste time in more
studies and surveys, ultimately failing to enact a truly comprehensive and effective plan to
relieve heavy traffic. The one thing they did, and that very successfully, was to construct more
and wider roads with the smooth, flat surfaces required by the automobile. Even at this early
stage in the life of U.S. motordom, Atlanta, like other cities, believed in the fallacy of building its
way out of traffic congestion.
4.2

Funding Atlanta’s Street Improvements
The planning commission could only make recommendations regarding street upgrades,

while a city council committee had the actual authority to effect change. The Committee on
Streets and Sidewalks implemented the projects under the direction of the Chief of Construction.
As Atlanta’s population grew, the number and size of streets needed to expand to accommodate
all the vehicles. More traffic also meant more wear on road surfaces. The dilapidated conditions
hampered the smooth flow of traffic, as cars slowed over rough patches and dodged potholes.
No one disputed the sorry state of many of Atlanta’s streets, but many complained about
the half-hearted, piecemeal approach taken by city employees to repairs. Whitehall Street [today
much shortened, with the northern section renamed Peachtree Street], part of the city’s premiere
commercial corridor, had been torn up by repair crews for nine months during 1920. One
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editorial writer wondered how a town with so many fine buildings and so much business could
be so indifferent to the quality of its thoroughfares.139
Poor road surfacing could also negatively affect development. Deteriorated paving on
Edgewood Avenue, one of the streets converging at Five Points, was blamed for the downward
turn of the neighborhood. After instituting street improvements, city officials credited the work
with reviving the area and making Edgewood again one of the most important thoroughfares in
the city. Its example underscored the critical connection between the condition of a road and its
surrounding properties.140
By the 1920s, the city council had several legislative instruments at its command to pay
for road repairs while at the same time retaining Atlanta’s low, business-friendly citywide tax
rate. One such tool was the power to create a tax assessment district. In order to acquire land for
“street purposes” (defined as widening or extending existing streets, or opening new streets), the
city planning commission could draw up a district consisting of properties which would benefit
from the proposed improvements. Council then could levy a tax on the property owners within
the specified area to pay all or part of the cost of the work.141
This “arbitrary assessment law” represented a new and expanded view of who should pay
for road upgrades. Formerly, only those persons or entities whose property actually fronted the
street slated for work paid a portion of the costs. Now everyone within the assessment district
would bear some of that expense because their land would benefit from the road improvements,
even if it lay a block or two away from the road being worked on. The tax assessment district
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represented a major shift away from the concept that property owners paid for the roads on
which their property fronted. City government had found an innovative way to bolster the public
financing of very expensive street projects without having to gain the consent of every affected
property owner.
Another funding source for road paving was the long-established assessment on the street
railway company. Into the second decade of the twentieth century, the streetcar company had to
pay the whole cost of paving and maintaining a width of eleven feet of any street on which it had
a single line of track, more if the street contained double tracks. By the 1920s, council had
amended the city charter to require the company to pay to pave sixteen feet of street width on
any street carrying double tracks, which included the majority of the streets within the central
business district.
Preston Stanley Arkwright (1871-1946), president of the Georgia Railway and Power
Company, argued in a speech to the Atlanta Automobile Association against the increase in the
assessment. Arkwright was a prominent attorney whose firm had helped Henry Atkinson win the
great 1899-1901 trolley war against Joel Hurt. Atkinson, himself one of the city’s great
industrialists, had helped bring electric street lighting to Atlanta in 1883, and served as first
president of the Georgia Electric Light Company, founded in 1890. The successful turn-of-thecentury collaboration between the two men led them to incorporate, along with a few others, the
Georgia Railway and Electric Company in 1902, with Arkwright as president and Atkinson as
chairman of the Board of Directors.142
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In his 1922 speech to the auto men, Arkwright described the original, nineteenth century
excuse for mandating road paving by the traction companies, that trolleys then were drawn by
horses or mules whose shod hooves wore down the street surface between the rails. However,
Atlanta’s streetcars had been entirely electric-powered since 1894, and no electric streetcar wore
down the pavement—it never touched the road surface at all, only the steel rails. Nevertheless,
the policy remained in place. Arkwright said,
The street railway is still required to pay for this paving and to keep it repaired,
although the repairs are made necessary, not by the street cars, but by the
automobiles that have to run down the center of the street [i.e., in the trolley
tracks] because other automobiles occupy the sides of the street as parking
places.143
In 1924, the streetcar company had double and single tracks totaling about 220 miles.
This number did not include the interurban lines to Marietta and Stone Mountain. As it utilized
less than ten miles of track for freight operations and moving trolley cars, the company paid to
maintain the pavement on a substantial portion of 200 miles of Atlanta roads. No wonder the city
council did not want to change the policy. For decades to come, streetcar riders in Atlanta would
continue to subsidize street paving for motorists.144
Arkwright, in his position as president of the city’s franchise trolley system, naturally
displayed a certain animus towards the automobile. However, he accurately pinpointed the true
cause of much of downtown’s traffic congestion—parked cars. Many streets within the central
business district could accommodate four lanes of traffic; unfortunately, parked cars occupied
two of those lanes, effectively reducing available travel space by 50%. The streetcar president
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had touched a sensitive nerve, as the city’s business leaders were divided over on-street parking,
an issue they never satisfactorily resolved.
The 1920 Georgia Constitutional Amendment for Street Improvements provided a third
source of road-paving capital. It gave to any municipality in the state having a population of
150,000 or more permission to sell street improvement bonds. This type of bond could be issued
without having to hold—and win—an always-contentious bond referendum. Instead, only twothirds of the city council had to approve it. The funds could be used only for grading, paving, or
re-paving streets.145
This piece of legislation applied exclusively to Atlanta, the sole city in Georgia whose
population at the time (200,616) met the size threshold. No other city even came close.146 The
law had been enacted entirely for Atlanta’s benefit. The city took full advantage, and in 1921
alone laid nearly $1 million in paving with the new bond money. Mayor Key lauded the
program’s success, observing that “there have been no objections to this plan urged, and no
antagonism to it, except by the streetcar company,” taking yet another opportunity to denigrate
Georgia Railway and Power. Nevertheless, the ten-year “baby bonds,” as they were called,
proved extremely popular and were heavily utilized throughout the 1920s.147
In sum, the city had multiple reliable ways to pay for street improvements beyond the
traditional petitions from citizens, and large bond issues. That the city had to cobble together a
variety of funding strategies for large road projects suggests that Atlanta’s taxpayers perhaps did
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not rate road paving as high a priority as the business community did—unless, of course, it was
their own street. The growth advocates worked diligently to keep property taxes low in order to
retain Atlanta’s pro-business reputation and promote real estate development. The various
methods of road improvement funding provided the means to achieve those goals.
4.3

The Spring Street Viaduct
The city’s most important paving project of 1921 was Spring Street. Prior to 1920, it ran

2.75 shady miles between Marietta and Peachtree streets. The southern end housed some mixed
commercial, transitioning to residential as far north as Fifth Street, beyond which mostly
undeveloped land predominated.
Spring Street exemplified the piecemeal, crazy-quilt approach to road paving taken by the
city. The street’s surfaces consisted of the following: 1) Belgian block from Marietta Street to
Pine Street; 2) macadam between Pine Street and Baltimore Place; 3) bituminous macadam from
Baltimore Place to North Avenue; 4) water-bound macadam from North Avenue to Sixth Street;
5) no paving at all between Sixth and Tenth Streets; 6) more water-bound macadam from Tenth
to Fourteenth streets; and 7) another section of dirt road between Fourteenth and Peachtree
streets, where Spring ended. Creating a uniform grade for the entire length of the street, and then
paving it with concrete was a large and expensive enterprise. Fortunately for the city, Fulton
County agreed to undertake and underwrite the $500,000 project.148
Spring Street had long been recognized as a westside alternative to the always-crowded
Peachtree Street. Calls to grade and pave the street began as early as 1909. An already broad
street, it ran from the business section to the city limits. In 1912, editorials called for designating
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Spring as the primary north-south corridor, and making the necessary improvements so it could
provide some relief to growing traffic congestion. That no streetcar lines ran anywhere on the
street made it ideal for exclusive automobile travel—an advantage noted at the time, but officials
claimed that, without a bond issue, the city could not afford the outsized project.149
Improving Spring Street constituted the initial 1920s step to relieving traffic congestion
on downtown’s throughways, in particular the Peachtree/West Peachtree corridor. The trolley
company had no plans to lay tracks there, eliminating the problem of streetcars hindering
automobiles, and vice versa. Once widened and paved to a uniform sixty feet, Spring Street
would become one of the city’s major arterials. When a section of the newly-surfaced street
opened in December 1921, hundreds of vehicles began using it, bringing instant, albeit
temporary, relief to the clogged traffic in the central city.150
By the end of 1920, another part of the re-imagining of Spring Street had begun. The idea
was to connect the city’s two railroad stations, Brookwood Station on the north side with the
south side’s Terminal Station plaza. To accomplish that, a new bridge would have to span the rail
lines and extend Spring Street to the intersection of Alabama and Madison streets (see map
below). A group of city business leaders organized to push for the construction. Each had
expertise in real estate development and/or banking.151
James L. Key – attorney and mayor of Atlanta;
J. Oscar Mills (1870-1946)– a civil engineer and landscape gardener, member of the public
works committee of the Fulton County Commission, and a sales manager for the real
estate firm of J. H. Ewing, Sr.;
Jones Henderson Ewing, Sr. (1867-1950) – real estate developer, pioneer of the development of
both Peachtree and West Peachtree streets, member of the Fulton County Commission;
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Frank P. Rice (1838-1923) – real estate developer, vice president of the Atlanta Exchange and
Banking Company;
Benjamin Joseph Massell (1886-1962) – builder and real estate developer, founder and president
of Massell Realty Company, and uncle of future Atlanta mayor Sam Massell;
William T. Perkerson (1874-1943) – vice president and trust officer of the Fourth National Bank
in Atlanta.
Their vision was extraordinary; such a massive construction project would be costly, and
the approaches to the new bridge would slash through a swath of downtown properties. If
realized, however, the viaduct would convey enormous benefits by extending Spring Street to
relieve traffic congestion on the three bridges to the east (see map of the Spring Street viaduct
below). A true western arterial street connecting the northside and southside commercial
districts, it would allow heavy trucks loaded with merchandise and materials (then banned from
Peachtree Street) to travel efficiently through the city, and would spur investment, especially on
the southwest side which was rapidly developing into a light industrial area.
The first and most substantial hurdle was financial. In the early months of 1921, city
officials and civic leaders worked diligently to get a bond issue passed, headed by Mayor Key
and Lee Stiles Ashcraft (1871-1953), a prominent business currently serving as president of the
Chamber of Commerce. Ashcraft made his name and fortune forming a hugely successful
fertilizer firm, then branching out into numerous manufacturing concerns. He was also a director
at Atlanta’s First National Bank. His extensive experience in a variety of businesses, as well as
his leadership of the COC, made him an ideal person to help lead the bond referendum. His
collaboration with the mayor again demonstrated the close working ties between business and
government. The new bridge was sold as a benefit not only city business, but also city motorists.
The gain to Atlanta’s mass transit riders would be the reduction of cars on streets where the
trolley ran.
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In order to get public monies
for the viaduct construction, funding
for schools, water, and sewer had to
be included; otherwise, the
controversial project might not
succeed. Writing years after the fact,
Robert Otis, chair of the city
planning commission at the time,
acknowledged that for any viaduct
bond issue, they had “a gentleman’s
agreement or understanding” that
other sweeteners had to be added to
bring the average voter to the polls.
Without such inducements (see
cartoon at right), Otis claimed, the

Figure 7. Bond cartoon, Atlanta Constitution, January
23, 1921.

general public would not have voted for a standalone viaduct bond.
This does not mean that the pro-growth coalition concerned itself solely with cars, streets,
and bridges. It took an active role in promoting Atlanta’s overall health, financial stability, social
well-being, and attractiveness to current and potential citizens, businesses, and investors. The
group acted with city government to improve schools, healthcare, sanitation, water, jobs, parks,
cultural amenities, playgrounds, and assistance to the poor.152 However, this study focuses on the
group’s role in changing Atlanta’s streets. Otis made clear that the new bridge held top priority

For a compelling study of Atlanta’s elite and their social welfare efforts during the 1920s, see
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for the planning commission, but understood it would not for the average Atlantan. Therefore,
the proposed viaduct funding amount appeared negligible compared to the other much larger
expenditures for projects with a broader appeal: only $750,000 out of an $8.85 million total bond
issue. The rest of the money was allocated for city schools ($4 million), waterworks ($2.85
million), and sewer system upgrades ($1.25 million).153
In Atlanta, two-thirds of those who voted had to approve the bond issue, and those
voting had to constitute half of all registered voters. It proved a difficult bar to reach. As
Amsterdam notes, “This requirement proved particularly nettlesome for Atlanta’s white business
elite, whose strategy for luring new firms to the city focused on improving city services while
keeping taxes low—a dual imperative that made debt spending businessmen’s leading option for
pursuing public sector growth.” The 1919 bond referendum had failed in no small part due to a
concerted African American effort. The women, led by Lugenia Burns Hope, organized voter
registration drives and the men, after registering, either went to the polls and voted “no,” or
stayed home and did not vote at all, which had the same effect as a “no” vote.154
That defeat of a bond issue which would not have served the Black communities gave
notice of the power of African Americans to influence policy despite their limited voting rights.
Black neighborhoods in general were woefully underserved by city utilities, and their schools
were few, overcrowded, and ancient. The ability to vote in bond elections was perhaps the sole
political power remaining to them in the Jim Crow era, and African Americans had learned in
1919 how to judiciously bestow or withhold their support depending on how a particular bond
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issue might benefit them or their children. City authorities and business leaders had absorbed that
lesson, too.
During the Spring Street viaduct campaign, businessmen and elected officials paid close
attention to the total number of eligible voters. Mayor Key appointed a sixteen-member bond
commission to promote the issue, chaired by Frank Martin Inman (1876-1950). Inman was a
director at Lowry National Bank and a wealthy cotton broker, having inherited both positions
from his more-famous father, Samuel Martin Inman (1843-1915).
While most of the commissioners were influential white men, the inclusion of three
women demonstrated the city fathers’ awareness of the importance of securing women’s votes in
what would be their first election since the 1920 passage of the Nineteenth Amendment. The
commission’s associate chair, Kate Richardson (Mrs. Samuel) Lumpkin (1862-1947), organized
a 450-member women’s committee. Lumpkin, a church and civic leader, had been presented an
award by the Chamber of Commerce for her Liberty loan work during World War I. She was
president of the Atlanta Federation of Women’s Clubs, and had invaluable connections to large
numbers of the new women voters. Key’s inclusion of her on the commission in a leadership
position was a savvy move which bore fruit.
The remaining fourteen members included representatives of each of the eleven city
wards. All were “men and women of character and ability, of the highest type of citizenry,
representatives of every phase of the growth and progress of Atlanta.” The head of the Labor
League, a prominent Jewish business and charity leader, a judge, bank officials, real estate
developers, insurance men, a successful stock dealer, merchants, and former education board
members, city councilmen, and county commissioners made up the rest of the commission.155
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The mayor appointed no African Americans, who organized their own commission to
coordinate with whites in promoting the bonds. Mayor Key and Chairman Inman spoke at Black
assemblies, while Mrs. Lumpkin appointed a special African American women’s committee
consisting of community-appointed leaders such as Lugenia Burns Hope. Key, Inman, and
Lumpkin met with a group of 500 African Americans at Big Bethel Church on February 15,
1921, to address community concerns over the bond funding for Black schools. The city still did
not have a public high school for African American students; to fill the gap, the city’s Black
colleges and universities had to offer high school courses, along with their undergraduate and
graduate degrees. The mayor attempted to reassure the audience at the church that there would be
“justice and fair play in spending this money,” while Kate Lumpkin urged the women to “vote
for the bonds for the sake of your children.”156
A large publicity campaign took shape, framing the issue as a referendum on whether the
city continued progressing or moved backwards. Newspapers championed the project. Rallies
and meetings throughout the city garnered support. Even the schoolchildren got involved,
reminding their parents to vote. On election day, the white schools opened late to give mothers
the chance to vote while the Black schools had the entire day off to encourage a large turnout.
Employers opened their work places one hour later so their employees could vote before coming
downtown to work. Days before the vote, the newspaper reported a record number of voters had
registered, and highlighted the African American Christian Council’s endorsement of the project.
On March 8, 1921, the bond referendum passed “by the most overwhelming majority ever piled
up in any election in Atlanta,” and Mayor Key signed the ordinance into law on June 7, 1921.157
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The bond issue was the first of several landmark municipal achievements of the 1920s. A
special victory for African Americans, it secured funding for four new Black elementary schools
and the construction of Booker T. Washington High School. It demonstrated the community’s
power to achieve a successful political intervention in Atlanta, as the 1919 bond rejection had,
but this time by effecting positive changes. Meanwhile, growth advocates, greatly assisted by the
local media, had their new cross-town automobile viaduct assured.158
The votes had hardly been tallied when Fulton County expedited its paving of Spring
Street so the street would be completed along with the viaduct. Another situation suddenly
emerged: a jump in real estate prices in the area. Barely a month after the bond vote, a small
property at the southeast corner of Spring and Poplar streets sold for $23,000, considered then an
extravagant sum. The buyers planned a three-story building for the site. Rumors of other new
projects flourished: “There seems to be considerable interest attached to the locations on and
adjacent to the Spring street section, following the bond election, which authorized the erection
of a big viaduct.” Average
property values in the area
increased five-fold, from $200
to $1,000 a front foot. Already
the prospective viaduct and
street improvements were

Figure 8. Spring Street viaduct under construction, 1923.
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generating new development.159
Construction began in October 1922 (see figure above160). Quickly the initial plan for an
Alabama Street approach at the southern end of the viaduct had to be scrapped. The desired
grade could not be achieved without blocking the fire department’s headquarters, located in Fire
Station No. 1 at 44 West Alabama Street. Switching the approach to Hunter Street [Martin
Luther King, Jr. Blvd.; hereafter M.L.K., Jr. Blvd.] would cut off frontage or buildings on both
Hunter Street and Madison Avenue. To pay for the unanticipated change in plans, the city
council attempted to impose a tax on owners whose properties fronted the two streets, which
required the consent of all those property owners. When several of them refused absolutely, the
city resorted to its arbitrary assessment law. For the first time in Atlanta’s history, council
approved utilization of the law, basically a tax levy, which needed no property owner
permissions. The planning commission quickly drew the boundaries for the new assessment
district, and city council levied a tax on all the properties within it to pay for the viaduct
approach.161
On schedule and under budget, the Spring Street viaduct opened on December 20, 1923
(see map below162). A formal ceremony at the Terminal Plaza began with the acceptance of the
bridge by the city from the engineering firms Harrington, Howard & Ash of Kansas City, and
Robert & Company of Atlanta, who implemented the project. Military groups, marching bands,
and a crowd of about 20,000 paraded across the viaduct, and pictures of the celebration opened
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every movie screening at the Howard and Forsyth movie theaters for days. The last pedestrian
group crossing the bridge included the new Mayor Walter Sims, the former mayor, James Key,
the city council, and the bond commission, and an hour later it opened to traffic.163
The main
viaduct was 1,800'
long and 60' wide,
including the
sidewalks on either
side. Built of structural
steel, the entire
viaduct was encased in
concrete to prevent
deterioration from coal
gases and the acids in
locomotive smoke.
Estimates predicted
that 8,000 vehicles,
traveling at a speed of
15 miles per hour,
could cross the bridge
Figure 9. Spring Street viaduct route.
in an hour.164
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With the completion of the viaduct, the goal of connecting the north side to Terminal
Station had been achieved, but the dream of a true cross-town traffic artery remained unrealized.
The Spring Street viaduct extended only as far as Mitchell Street, and had covered over a section
of the very modest but grandly named Madison Avenue. Real estate developers urged that
Madison be extended south to meet Whitehall Street, claiming it would raise property values and
open up new business space on the south side. Work began in early 1925, and Madison Avenue
re-opened on September 16, 1926 as the southern end of Atlanta’s newest and finest boulevard.
People in autos could drive from the Brookwood train station to Whitehall Street unimpeded by
railroads or streetcars, making the journey much faster. Whitehall Street itself, once a principal
residential street, rapidly converted to a business and industrial thoroughfare. In late 1926, the
final act occurred when council renamed Madison Avenue “Spring Street.”165
Well before that happy ending, the viaduct’s presence had expanded the commercial
district, adding five large office buildings costing nearly $2 million. The business community
was ebullient. Walter G. Cooper, chair of the city council’s viaduct committee, wrote that one of
the best accomplishments of the Spring Street viaduct would be its broadening effect on the
vision of city citizens. He predicted it would lead to the construction of additional viaducts so
that Atlanta could truly be a unified city. He wanted no trolleys on the entire length of Spring
Street, as it was “a natural route for high speed traffic from Terminal Station to the northern
limits of the city and beyond.”166
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A similar sentiment echoed in a newspaper editorial written the day after the Spring
Street viaduct opened. Calling it “the march of progress, for which Atlanta has always been
noted,” the editor asserted the greater value of the project would be its impression upon the
public. It provided not only traffic congestion relief, but offered the lesson that a viaduct was
“the only final traffic solution.”167
In 1920, Mayor Key claimed that the ultimate solution to the city’s traffic problem would
come from the new viaducts. All three men—Cooper, the editorial writer, and Key—in 1923
affirmed that constructing roadways free of other street users would alleviate traffic bottlenecks,
that the city could build its way out of traffic jams. The prognosticators opined that the Spring
Street viaduct would set a precedent, and a newly-woke public would support future ventures of
the same kind. Events proved them greatly mistaken as to the true solution for gridlock, but
correct about garnering public approval of more road projects.168
The construction of the Spring Street viaduct signified a pivotal moment in Atlanta’s
history. By agreeing to build a motor vehicle-only arterial (the largest such roadway in the city at
that time), the city explicitly acknowledged the connection between auto travel and growth.
Good car-friendly roads led to development and expansion, which in Atlanta equated to progress.
In order to facilitate business and stimulate investment, the city, with the Spring Street viaduct,
initiated its conversion of public streets to automobile channels. Once starting down that road
figuratively and literally, Atlanta never looked back. Streets for cars became, in the 1920s, a
powerful tool for city expansion, and the growth coalition wielded it frequently and effectively.
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4.4

The Twin Viaducts
Even before the Spring Street viaduct opened, plans for another set of viaducts over the

railroads had commenced. Robert Whitten, the city’s consulting engineer, had developed
separate traffic and zoning plans. Atlanta did not adopt a single, broad, long-range master plan.
Its fragmentary schemes and fitful measures always left something more to be done, its goals
never fully realized. Building more roads emerged as the city’s go-to method of solving traffic
gridlock.169
Whitten’s second traffic report, presented in August 1922, advocated more and wider
streets, viaducts, underpasses, and traffic throughways. Extreme slow-downs still severely
hampered trucking and commercial traffic. The latter, he claimed, handicapped the city’s
commerce and industry with the result that the public paid higher prices for goods (emphasis
added). These last words caught the attention of everyone: the purchasing public, city officials,
businessmen, real estate developers, and retail merchants.170
North-south roads were especially important, and Whitten strongly urged construction of
viaducts at Central Avenue and Pryor Street. Only Central would carry streetcar traffic. Its
connection to Ivy Street [Peachtree Center Ave.] on the north created an excellent trolley
throughway. Streetcar lines could then be removed from North Pryor Street [Park Place], making
it an exclusive automobile artery. Whitten’s recommendations centering on efficient traffic
movement corresponded with the street strategies of city planners across the nation.171
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Between the viaduct bookends, 1920s Atlanta experienced plenty of other road and
building construction as the city expanded. During the decade, the city grew by more than eight
square miles (from 26.6 at the end of 1919 to 34.79 at the end of 1929), while the population of
the city proper increased by nearly 35%, adding almost 70,000 people.172 Surfacing and
improving roads proceeded throughout the decade, with twenty-eight miles paved in 1925 alone.
Asphalt and concrete, the two smoothest surfaces and most preferred by motorists, competed for
primacy. Atlanta, however, poured more concrete than asphalt during the decade.173
The downtown business district expanded in all directions, as more and more of the onceresidential streets turned commercial. Central locations remained desirable for offices, hotels,
and commerce. While Atlanta would grow in every direction, “its exact geographical and
business center will be guarded by its main arteries feeding into the city from five points of the
compass.” As the City Builder explained, Atlanta had plenty of room to spread out, but
developers still razed buildings in downtown as central real estate had “grown too valuable to
permit antiquated buildings.”174
The continuing quest to widen narrow downtown streets led to the passage of the CBD’s
first setback requirements. Council contemplated establishing a ten-foot building line on all main
traffic thoroughfares, but started much more modestly, beginning with only specified portion of
five roads. At those locations, new buildings had to be constructed a certain distance from a fixed
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point. That point varied; sometimes the center of the road, the inside edge of the sidewalk, or the
curb, but all of them made a zero lot building line illegal. The new codes mandated that
structures be set back from the street so that the main downtown arteries could eventually be
enlarged to carry more vehicles.175
The setback ordinances in effect represented an Atlanta plan for future street widenings
to reduce traffic congestion. The placement of the laws into the main body of the city code,
rather than sequestered inside the building code, lent weight to their message. Lawmakers were
looking ahead to a time of even more cars on city streets.
The construction of the “twin viaducts” provided another answer to the city’s traffic
dilemma. Everyone acknowledged the need for additional bridges over the railroads. At least
twenty railroad tracks carrying more than 100 trains daily crossed the heart of downtown in
1920, making it extremely difficult and dangerous for any pedestrian or vehicle to traverse grade
crossings safely. Most trolleys did not cross at ground level due to the tracking complications.
The river of rails also created a barrier between the north and south sides of town, a bifurcation
impacting politics, business, and residents. Trains blocking the crossings caused significant
traffic delays. City code required them to move after five minutes, but they often remained
stationary at these crossings much longer, holding up motorists indefinitely. Lack of police
enforcement of the law exacerbated the backups, but erecting bridges would reduce both traffic
jams and accidents.176
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As early as 1921, a group of citizens and property owners met at the Kimball House to
discuss a proposed Pryor Street viaduct to extend between Alabama and Decatur streets at the
same elevation as the Whitehall viaduct. The meeting was headed by Colonel H. H. Dean, a
Gainesville attorney with extensive real estate holdings in downtown Atlanta. Not coincidentally
a few days before the meeting, his letter to the planning commission had appeared in the Atlanta
Constitution. Dean made the case for viaduct construction as primarily a safety concern, but also
emphasized that adjacent property holders approved, and suggested that the railroads and traction
company would also lend their backing. Obviously, he was one of the supportive property
owners whose holdings stood to increase in value if the viaducts were built. If the example of the
Spring Street viaduct building bonanza held, anybody with real estate in the area of the twin
bridges would likely see a jump in values.177
Robert Whitten supported the twin viaducts, as did John A. Beeler, the consulting
engineer who had been hired by the traction company to produce a transportation plan for the
central business district. Beeler had gotten his start conducting only urban street railway surveys,
but began to add into his reports data on the other transportation options in each city he studied.
He emphasized the importance of understanding how the various transit modes interacted. In the
cover letter attached to his 1924 Atlanta report, he acknowledged the city’s traffic problems, and
noted the need for a comprehensive traffic system. He called for the immediate construction of
the two viaducts, and relocating onto them all the streetcar tracks on Peachtree and Whitehall
between Carnegie Way and Fair Street [Memorial Drive].
During the progress of our survey, it quickly became apparent that more than a
survey of transit was necessary. It was obvious that the city’s tardiness in
177
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evolving a definite city plan, coupled with the rapid and noteworthy growth in all
phases of its life, were the underlying causes of the present acute situation.178
The pro-growth community enthusiastically supported construction of the two bridges,
especially after the unqualified success of the Spring Street viaduct in stimulating new
construction and soaring real estate values. Predictions abounded for a similar renewal in the
vicinity of Pryor and Central, which had seen no new buildings in years. Handsome, modern
offices and hotels might soon replace the old, small wood and brick structures.
The viaducts would relieve traffic congestion, though not primarily for pleasure drivers
who could take other routes over the railroads. The freight-carrying heavy trucks would benefit
the most. They could not avoid the grade crossings, and lost valuable time waiting for trains,
with their engines running, burning gas and oil, and polluting the atmosphere already smoky
from steam locomotives. Trains would move more efficiently, without having to halt for dilatory
pedestrians or vehicles. Commerce and industry would gain from the time and expense saved by
the removal of these last two grade crossings in the central business district.
The twin viaducts would eliminate the terms “north side” and “south side” from Atlanta’s
vocabulary as the two sections of the city would then be linked up on every principal north and
south artery. The city’s major business districts would no longer be bifurcated, and city and state
government entities would be within easy reach of each other. In sum, the construction of the
Central and Pryor viaducts could bring advantages to a number of Atlanta’s citizens in terms of
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traffic relief and convenience. Nearby owners could benefit from rising property values, but
businessmen, industrialists, and real estate speculators would also see financial gains.179
Two major entities had to be persuaded before the twin viaduct vision could materialize:
the State of Georgia and the railroad companies. Permissions from both were crucial and
uncertain. The railroads owned the tracks over which the viaducts would pass, and the state held
title to the land on which the rail lines lay, as well as the air rights above them. Georgia also
owned one of the railroads, the Western & Atlantic.
Early in 1925, Mayor Walter A. Sims planned a day-long conference, culminating in a
sumptuous banquet, for high-ranking railroad and state officials. He understood how essential
their good-will was. For additional persuading, he named ten prominent Atlantans as the
reception committee greeting the dignitaries coming to town. This group included two bankers,
two attorneys, the editors of the three daily newspapers, the president of the Chamber of
Commerce, the president of the Atlanta Convention Bureau, and the editor of the Journal of
Labor. Commenting on the makeup of the reception committee, the Constitution noted that it
was “representative of leading business interests here,…composed of civic leaders who are
interested in what is best for Atlanta.” The article not only approved of the committee and
supported the venture, but it also equated business concerns with those of Atlanta.180
On March 25, six railroad officials and Georgia Governor Clifford Walker met with the
mayor and his committee. The visitors all pledged full cooperation and support of the viaduct
construction project, with the affected railroads agreeing to pay their share. After a series of
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discussions, Thomas Kearney Glenn (1868-1946) provided lunch at the exclusive Capital City
Club for the
assembly. As the
vice president of
Georgia Railway
and Power
Company, board
member of First
National Bank, and

Figure 10. Mayor's dinner at the Biltmore, March 25, 1925; City
Builder (April 1925): 7.

a director of the
Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Railway, he would have made an excellent host, being
conversable in so many fields. The group then took an “automobile tour” of Atlanta to see the
locations of the proposed viaducts and other attractions.181
The long day culminated in the mayor’s “Let’s Go, Atlanta!” banquet held at the new and
luxurious Biltmore Hotel, owned by William Candler (1890-1936), real estate entrepreneur and
one of the Coca-Cola Candlers (see photo above). More than 200 men attended, including five
railroad presidents, state and city officials, and a host of prominent business leaders. Numerous
speakers endorsed the viaduct project. Robert Foster Maddox (1870-1965), president of Atlanta
National Bank and former Atlanta mayor, spoke for the bankers and other business interests.
Chairman of the Board H. M. Atkinson gave his personal guarantee of the support of the Georgia
Railway and Power Company. Prominent attorney Reuben Rose Arnold (1868-1960) vowed to
lobby the General Assembly for permission to construct the bridges. The five railroad presidents

“Atlanta Faces Greatest Era of Prosperity, Declare Speakers at Get-Together Banquet,” Atlanta
Constitution, March 26, 1925.
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expressed faith in Atlanta and the belief that the project would benefit everyone. All three
newspaper publishers added their fervent pledges of news articles and editorial columns
supporting the project.182
“A spirit of harmony and cooperation” characterized the dinner. Classic booster
hyperbole accompanied assurances of funding for the viaducts and other civic improvements,
which would produce “a new era of prosperity, one that should far exceed anything of its kind in
Atlanta’s history.” Optimism prevailed as Mell Romayne Wilkinson (1864-1947), industrialist,
banker, and insurance executive, confidently asserted that “Atlanta usually gets what she goes
after.”183
Everyone attending the event understood the multi-faceted benefits they and their
businesses would ultimately reap from the bridges. They also firmly believed that the project
would benefit the city as a whole, that their interests and Atlanta’s interests were essentially the
same. Leading newspapers would deliver favorable publicity for the coming bond referendum
needed to finance the structures. City authorities knew that such “publicity and education was
necessary in order to pass a bond issue.” The ordinary reader would see nothing but positives
from this shining example of a progressive city at work.184
On some level, perhaps, the city elites may have acknowledged that their interests did not
in fact match those of most Atlantans. Or perhaps they simply discounted the uninformed masses
whose priorities did not match their own. But whatever their degree of self-awareness, the top
pro-growth leaders understood that the majority of citizens did not want to spend their tax dollars
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on a couple of bridges many of them would never cross. As with the Spring Street viaduct, “the
usual compromises for other city growth items” had to be added to the bond package in order to
gain the interest and approval of a wider public. Pro-growth civic leaders had to mask their top
priority—the viaducts—with additional projects which would attract the vote of the average
citizen.185
Mayor Sims ended the banquet urging the attendees to contact their state representatives
to quickly approve the viaducts. The legislature needed to act with speed so the governor could
sign a bill that year; otherwise, the project would be delayed until 1927, as the general assembly
would not meet during 1926. On July 23, 1925, the Georgia house approved the senate’s viaduct
resolution, and the governor signed it later that same day. Atlanta could now officially proceed
with plans for the Pryor Street and Central Avenue viaducts over the railroad tracks. The mayor
responded immediately, announcing plans for financing the structures with a bond issue.186
An enthusiastic campaign delivered the desired result. In March 1926, voters ratified an
$8 million municipal bond program containing funds for schools, sewers, waterworks, a new city
hall, and, of course, the viaducts. Mayor Sims rejoiced, and Alderman William B. Hartsfield,
chair of the bond committee (and future mayor of Atlanta, the City Too Busy to Hate), lauded
the old Atlanta spirit displayed by the consensus vote.187
A number of wrinkles in the plans developed over the course of the next two years which
delayed the project. The big “Viaduct Row” (as the newspapers called it) involved the railroads;
a disgruntled property owner brought suit against the city; and the traction company wanted a
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guaranteed public transit monopoly before contributing funds to the project. All three caused
serious delays. The first, most serious problem began with the city’s proposal to lower the
railroad tracks 4.5 feet beneath the two bridges. Reducing the grade would shorten the
approaches, limit the damage to properties on Decatur and Hunter [M.L.K., Jr. Blvd.] streets,
make the new viaducts level with the existing Whitehall Street viaduct, and greatly reduce the
cost of the project. The four railroads refused to allow anyone to tinker with their tracks or
interrupt their service. Their intransigence jeopardized not only the viaducts but the entire bond
issue.188
Engineers saved the day. The bond commission, needing assistance with the technical
details, sought the expertise of professionals with national reputations. The American Society of
Civil Engineers appointed a committee to collaborate with the commission. Their two reports
ultimately persuaded the railroads that they, too, would benefit. The lowering of the tracks could
at last begin, but the malcontent property owner threatened to take his case to the U.S. Supreme
Court. In the end, the city council voted to remove the nuisance by settling with the man. Nearly
a year had passed since the $8 million bonds had been voted and the public was getting restless.
A newspaper headline proclaimed, “Now, To Work!”189
A few financial issues remained unresolved. Fulton County had to be persuaded to
contribute to the viaduct funding; they eventually agreed to a sum of $500,000. Georgia Power
(by this time, the company name had changed from Georgia Railway and Power) initially agreed
to help fund the viaducts, but first wanted from the city a traction monopoly. After weeks of
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discussion, Preston Arkwright, the traction company president, proposed a compromise by which
the company would donate $400,000 to the project with a city franchise assurance in the form of
an eventual repeal of the jitney ordinance. On December 13, 1927, Mayor Ragsdale and
Arkwright signed the viaduct contract, removing the last impediment to the project.190
A profusion of machines and laborers working 24/7 lowered the level of the railroad
tracks within two months. The new laterals necessitated razing dozens of buildings and
constructing concrete retaining walls. Walter F. Schulz, consulting engineer from Memphis, TN,
drew blueprints for the super-sized structures, while William A. Hansell, the city’s chief of
construction, solicited viaduct bids. The winning firm, MacDougald Construction Company,
began building the bridges immediately and made rapid progress.191
Another form of progress resulted as viaduct work started—real estate development. The
Spring Street viaduct had produced a building boom in nearby areas, and investors looked for
similar opportunities around the new viaducts in what had been a depressed section of the
business district. To attract attention to growth opportunities, the Atlanta Central Improvement
Association issued a free Viaduct Booklet, listing the names and holdings of property owners in
downtown along with a map of the viaducts. The Association noted that while the area formerly
lacked adequate transportation, the viaducts would erase that deficiency, bringing “one of the
greatest opportunities for real estate activity and growth and development that Atlanta has had in
many years.”192
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Property owners’ optimism surged though they were spending between $1,000 and
$100,000 each to remodel their properties. The new roadways did expand the city’s business
district “with level streets essential to retail shopping.” Alabama and Pryor streets became
commercial corridors. Central Avenue saw a mix of industry and retail combined with major
wholesalers and parking garages. The Wall Street lateral opened up businesses along its rail-side
walkway, and made a more pedestrian-friendly conduit between shopping on Central and Pryor
(see both the pre-Photoshop “doctored” photo and Sanborn map below193). The viaducts did
more than facilitate travel; they generated income and promoted growth. They signaled to the
rest of the nation Atlanta’s stature as a progressive city.

Figure 11. Artist’s rendering of the Pryor Street viaduct; City Builder (August 1925): 4.
The 794-foot-long Central Avenue viaduct opened to traffic on March 16, 1929, less than
a year after construction began, but officials held no ceremony as the Pryor Street bridge was not
finished. Both viaducts officially opened on April 15, 1929, but with only the unveiling of a
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commemorative bronze plaque to mark the occasion. Perhaps the length of the project—nearly
five years—had muted any celebratory spirit. Also, the total cost exceeded $2 million.194

Figure 12. Downtown viaducts; New York: Sanborn Map Co., 1931.
The completion of the twin viaducts and their laterals furnished an opportunity to re-open
discussions about Bleckley Plaza, the original 1910 plan to construct a central square above the
soot-filled railroad gulch running through the middle of downtown. The idea had been rejected
by city and railroad officials in 1916. A group of concerned property owners and area merchants
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now believed that the new structures over and around the gulch provided an “opening wedge for
the construction of a plaza over the tracks,” especially as a portion of the work had just been
done.195
The city still had no signature downtown park or assembly space. Five Points, never an
especially large or aesthetically pleasing gathering place, had turned into a gigantic traffic jam.
Smoke from steam locomotives continued to plague center city businesses with soot-damaged
merchandise, even though railroad engines were prohibited from emitting black smoke for more
than one minute when on the tracks between Washington Street and Union Station. Civil
engineers were well aware of the structural harm caused to metal girders by the acidic smoke.
The city had just paid extra to have its new viaducts encased in concrete to protect the underlying
steel—a process costly not only in materials, but also in the additional time and labor required.196
A Georgia Tech city planning professor, writing in 1927, cited the many disadvantages of
steam engines beyond air pollution. Atlanta had by then fourteen different railway companies
running over 1,000 train units daily, and the only way to eliminate the smoke nuisance and other
problems was to electrify all the railroads. With that accomplished, he claimed, the city could
then easily place concrete slabs above all the downtown tracks, eliminating the unsightly gulch
which still cut the city in two and was visible from an airplane. The plaza would create plenty of
space for traffic-relieving boulevards, beautiful public buildings, and a large number of parking
places.197
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The professor’s solution and the dreams of civic leaders for a central plaza remained
years in the future. Only a narrow pedestrian strip called Plaza Way was built over the tracks to
bridge Pryor and Whitehall halfway between Wall and Alabama streets (see map above). Not
until 1943’s Plaza Park [Peachtree Fountains Plaza] connected the Pryor, Wall, Whitehall, and
Alabama viaducts did a true public pedestrian plaza exist, but the viaducts and laterals of the
1920s were foundational towards its creation.
With Atlanta’s great viaduct project complete, a noticeable improvement in traffic was
seen across the district. Trains could go into and out of Union Station without having to stop and
uncouple. Elimination of the grade crossings reduced danger and delays to people and vehicles.
The Capitol, Fulton County Courthouse, and the in-progress new Atlanta city hall were easily
accessible from anywhere in town. Construction of the viaducts created a street corridor above
the east-west rail lines uniting the north and south sections of town.198
The pro-growth community achieved many of its goals with the construction of the twin
viaducts. Property values increased, and the many building improvements enhanced the
appearance of the once run-down neighborhood. The two bridges received at least partial credit
for the record-breaking number of building permits issued by the city of Atlanta during 1928.
They exceeded 1923’s previous high by almost half a million dollars.199
City businesses quickly jumped at the chance to advertise their proximity to the new
viaducts, and the convenience such a location afforded their customers. One of the city’s
signature department stores, Chamberlin-Johnson-DuBose, took out nearly a full-page
advertisement (see ad below), claiming that “All Roads Lead” to their store on Whitehall Street.
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Patrons could now easily avoid the traffic congestion at the Peachtree-Whitehall viaduct, and
park conveniently and free for three hours at two nearby garages.
Both mayors who oversaw
the viaduct bond issues during the
1920s had appointed special
commissions tasked with ensuring
the successful passage of the
referenda. These commissions
consisted of prominent white
businessmen, professionals, and
civic leaders, along with a few of
elite white women to assist in
securing the women’s vote. In both
instances, the groups took care to
reach out to the city’s African
Americans.
Without backing from Black
voters, bonds did not pass in the city
of Atlanta. Prominent financier

Figure 13. Department store ad; Atlanta Constitution,
March 3, 1929.

Frank M. Inman, chair of the failed 1923 city park bond campaign, declared, “In the past few
years two campaigns for bonds were defeated by the negro vote because of their lack of
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confidence in getting any of the benefits therefrom.”200 It should have been obvious that funding
another city park from which they would be excluded was never going to win their votes.
Since 1919, Atlanta’s African Americans refused to support any bond project which
would not contribute to their welfare or interests. However, the city’s leaders ensured that the
two viaduct referenda included amenities like schools specifically for the African American
neighborhoods. Similarly, the city’s planning commission understood that average Atlanta voters
would also not pass a bond referendum that did not address needs and concerns closer to their
hearts and homes than some downtown bridges.
Robert Otis, planning commission chair, admitted that the viaducts were their top
priority. The commission composed of elite businessmen added schools, water, and sewer
projects—all of which were needed, but which also would guarantee passage. The two city bond
issues which failed during the twenties contained no viaducts or street upgrades. While each
would have provided civic enhancements, none would have advanced business growth and city
expansion as much as new viaducts and better roads. The pro-growth alliance made more
extensive efforts to pass the viaduct bonds because these mattered most to those dedicated to city
expansion. When the stakes were high enough, the coalition would even reach across the racial
divide to achieve its goals.201

The construction of the viaducts is at the heart of this thesis. The city-as-growth-machine
viewpoint incentivized Atlanta’s businessmen and government officials to embrace the
automobile as a key driver of municipal growth. Linking efficient transportation with more

“Inman Discusses Negro High School,” Atlanta Constitution, September 18, 1924.
The two failed bond referenda of the 1920s included $2 million for city parks in 1923; and $2 million
for a new city hall in 1925.
200
201
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development led to increased efforts to facilitate traffic flow. The viaducts demonstrated the
city’s willingness to eliminate other street users from the new roadways; no streetcars ran the
entire length of Spring Street while the Central Avenue viaduct accommodated no pedestrians.
But road improvements comprised only the infrastructure portion of the traffic
component of a city plan. The regulation of street use supplied the legal superstructure. During
the twenties, Atlanta’s leaders had to confront the problems of collisions and carnage which
road-building alone could not solve. By the end of the decade, the city council, ably assisted by
automobile clubs and associations, enacted an enormous amount of legislation to control
everyone and everything in the city streets. Along with the various necessary enforcement
mechanisms, a regulatory superstructure blanketed the city. The massive legal apparatus forever
changed the appearance of the streets and sidewalks, the daily lives of citizens, and local
citizens’ understanding of the proper use of public roads.
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REGULATING ATLANTA’S STREETS

On January 5, 1920, James L. Key gave the annual mayoral speech to the city council,
and as the paper of record, the Atlanta Constitution printed the complete text of his message.
Following longstanding tradition, his opening remarks mentioned the previous year, during
which Atlanta had experienced unprecedented growth. In order to sustain that growth, he said, a
number of issues had to be addressed, one of the most pressing of which was the crowded
condition of downtown streets.
Traffic congestion has reached a point where it seriously handicaps business and
travel. An effort is being made now by bodies of business men and others to
propose a traffic ordinance that will afford some remedy to the situation. No fully
adequate remedy can be found by mere traffic regulations. We have more traffic
in congested areas than the streets will accommodate. The city must furnish
additional thoroughfares for traffic and remove all possible physical barriers that
impede its movement.202
The mayor’s comments contained several striking items. First, he cited the grave harm to
businesses caused by clogged traffic, an indicator of his top priority—keeping Atlanta’s
commerce and industry healthy and happy. Such a priority was not surprising in a city where the
Chamber of Commerce had close ties with and held significant influence over the municipal
government.
Key’s position as an acting director of the Chamber almost certainly played a role in his
advocacy for business, as his next sentence confirmed when he noted that members of the
business community were currently at work on a new traffic ordinance. No one apparently saw
any impropriety in the fact that bankers, merchants, and professional men might actually write
ordinances. Such an arrangement exceeded lobbying or personal attempts to influence

“Atlanta Urged to Prepare for Population of 500,000 in Mayor Key’s Message,” Atlanta Constitution,
January 6, 1920.
202
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legislation, but it would not be the last time during the decade that a local commercial entity
prepared the draft of an ordinance for the city’s council’s consideration.
That Mayor Key even mentioned a new traffic ordinance was ironic, given that he had
vetoed the city’s 1919 comprehensive traffic law just a few months before giving his speech. The
new law would have created a one-hour parking zone in the central business district, eliminated a
number of streetcar stops, and provided other changes to relieve traffic jams. Although council
had unanimously approved the bill, the mayor vetoed it, and a veto override vote failed. A timely
meeting between Key and members of the Atlanta Automobile Association, who opposed the
traffic ordinance, led to the veto and the council’s change of heart. The city’s governing body
had caved to pressure from a group of “auto men” dedicated to promoting the interests of
motorists and the automobile industry. Another traffic ordinance, already in the works, would
surely better represent business and automotive concerns, as it was being composed by members
of those very groups.203
The mayor made a third remarkable assertion in his speech: the city must “remove all
possible physical barriers that impede its [traffic’s] movement.” The notable part of that
statement was his underlying assumption that the purpose of city streets was the unobstructed
movement of motor vehicles. The “physical barriers” would include not only streetcars, whose
stop-and-start motion hindered non-rail vehicles, but also pedestrians and anyone or anything
else that slowed the flow. Already, as far as the mayor was concerned, the streets functioned as
automobile conduits, obligating the city, as with the water and sewer pipes, to keep things
moving along.204
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Key’s speech called for action, yet he personally had contributed to the impasse. The
frustrated community reaction to the gridlock—in both city streets and city hall—was pointed.
While not calling out the mayor specifically, editorial writers complained that when it came to
traffic the city talked too much and acted too little. They strongly urged council to do something
to relieve the city’s problems.205
In spite of nearly constant road work, Atlanta’s traffic problems had not been resolved.
The viaduct projects comprised the city’s initial attempts to build its way out of traffic
congestion, but the relief they provided proved only temporary. Narrow downtown streets
remained inadequate for the growing numbers of vehicles. Moving and parked cars competed for
the shrinking road space. Central city businessmen feared that people would no longer come
downtown to shop or do business if too much traffic made the trip time-consuming and
unpleasant. The city code would soon include a formal definition of the “congested area.”206
Civic leaders also had to contend with other traffic congestion-related consequences:
collisions and carnage. The rising numbers of deaths and serious injuries from automobiles
dismayed Atlantans as well as urban dwellers across the country. Traffic expert Miller
McClintock in 1925 wrote, “The alarming increase in street accidents and in street congestion
during the past few years has rendered the correction of traffic conditions one of the most
important municipal problems of the present day.” Authorities embraced two major regulatory
solutions: (1) reduce the number of pedestrians in the roadways; and (2) control all street
activities.207
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No evidence could be found to suggest that city leaders ever considered obvious
alternatives, such as reducing the number of vehicles in the central business district, or reducing
the speed of those vehicles. Nor did they consistently utilize the one method of effectively
widening the narrow downtown streets—eliminating on-street parking. Originally four-lane
major thoroughfares, such as Peachtree, Marietta, and Whitehall streets, had been basically
reduced to two-lane roads because both outer lanes were occupied by parked cars. The remaining
two center lanes had to accommodate the double-tracked trolleys as well as masses of new
automobiles.
Shifting focus onto moving more people instead of more vehicles would have led to
significant improvements in the range and efficiency of mass transit options. Instead, the growth
coalition remained determined to privilege the automobile and its movement. Through the
imposition of a massive regulatory superstructure, the business-friendly city council radically
altered the behaviors of all street users, the duties of police officers, and municipal governance.
The 1920s would prove a decade of trials, failures, stalemates, and unhappy compromises,
resulting in more restrictions of the use of public streets than anyone had ever imagined. But
none of their efforts resolved the twin traffic dilemmas: congestion and carnage.
5.1

Carnage
Automobiles had been killing people since the earliest days of the horseless carriage,

creating fresh outrage as the numbers mounted. With more people and cars in urban settings,
frequent collisions inevitably occurred. The heavier and much faster motor vehicles crashed with
more catastrophic results than horse-drawn wagons or carriages. The statistics told the story; so
did the newspapers. Being struck by a moving car was a modern, very public, and especially
horrific way to die. Society had not yet adjusted psychologically to the massive number of U.S.
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traffic fatalities, and automobiles could at times appear threatening (see sketch below). Since the
end of World War II, the national traffic death count has fluctuated between 30,000 and 50,000
per year. Today, the U.S. as a nation is comfortable with this number of traffic-related fatalities,
and most citizens apparently are willing to countenance even more traffic deaths, given the
appetite for unlimited cell
phone usage and demand for
more in-car amenities which
distract drivers.208
Between 1920 and
1930, numbers of U.S. traffic
fatalities ballooned from about
12,000 to over 30,000—and

Figure 14. The menacing automobile; “Talion,” Atlanta
Constitution, January 16, 1927.

this with vastly fewer people and cars than the nation has today.209 The rate of U.S. trafficrelated deaths per 100,000 population in 1920 was 11.5, but Atlanta’s rate was 26.4—more than
double the national rate. The following tables demonstrate the rapidly increasing counts of
registered motor vehicles and roadway fatalities. Automobile-related deaths increased

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, “Traffic Crash Fatalities,” Fatality Analysis Reporting
System (FARS) Encyclopedia. Since 1930—the first year traffic-related deaths in the U.S. reached the 30,000
threshold—the number has not dropped below that figure, with two exceptions: across two years in the heart of the
Great Depression (1932-33), and during four years of gas rationing in World War II (1942-45). Both examples
suggest that substantially raising the gas tax would reduce fatalities and congestion. As a former Atlanta police chief
noted, the war years interrupted the dominance of the car in American life; Jenkins, Atlanta and the Automobile, 59.
The number of traffic deaths, after a decline in the early 2000s, is again on the rise, with more distracted driving
(cellphones and complex dashboard entertainment centers), and increased sales of heavier-than-cars sport utility
vehicles and light trucks. A recent report documents that pedestrian fatalities are up more than 50% over the past
decade (2010-2020), following a three-decade decline.
209
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Government Printing Office, 1930).
208

131

Table 7. U.S. Traffic Fatalities, 1920, 1930, 2017

Year
1920
1930
2017²

U.S. Traffic
Fatalities
12,155
31,204
37,133

Motor
Vehicles
Registered in
the U.S.¹
9,239,161
26,749,853
272,480,899

U.S.
U.S.
Fatalities per
Fatalities
100,000
U.S.
per 100,000 registered
Population
pop.
vehicles
106,021,537
11.5
132
123,202,624
25.3
117
325,147,121
11.4
14

¹Includes all motor vehicles; buses were not counted until 1925.
²The most recent numbers available from the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics.

Table 8. Atlanta Traffic Fatalities, 1920-1930
Atlanta
Motor
Atlanta Traffic
Traffic
Vehicles
Fatalities
Fatalities
(federal
Registered in
(APD)¹
government)²
Atlanta³
29
53
16,290
17
53
17,168
37
53
21,561
34
53
26,977
32
53
36,012
38
65
37,946
40
68
38,753
42
65
42,046
41
71
45,788
56
89
51,746
53
87
51,394
419
710

Atlanta
Fatalities per
Atlanta
100,000 pop.
Population
(APD)¹
200,616
14.5

Atlanta
Fatalities per
100,000 pop.
(federal

Atlanta
Fatalities per Atlanta Fatalities
10,000
per 10,000
vehicles
vehicles (federal
(APD)¹
government)²
18
33

government)²
Year
1920
26.4
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
270,366
19.6
32.2
10
17
Total
Increase
from 1920
to 1930
83%
64%
215%
35%
¹Atlanta Police Department (APD) numbers from the annual reports of the Atlanta Chiefs of Police.
²Numbers from the 1930 U.S. Statistical Abtract . Figures for 1921-1923 are averages.
³All years, except 1928, are calculated as a percentage of Fulton County registrations, based on the 1928 figure in the 1929 City of Atlanta Traffic Survey.

at higher rates than the city and national populations.210 In 1924, an insurance expert noted that
the number of automobile wrecks had kept pace with the rate of growth of the automobile
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industry. He remarked, “To-day more people are accidentally killed by the automobile than by
any other single means, barring the occasional earthquake or flood catastrophe.”211
The most commonly calculated death rate gives the number of deaths per 100,000 people.
However, the number of deaths per 100,000 registered motor vehicles provides a more
informative comparison. The tables show both, but the startling and horrifying take-away
remains: the national death rate per number of cars in 1920 was nearly ten times higher than in
2017—and Atlanta’s rates were worse than either. City and country faced intolerable numbers of
fatalities from the new death machines.212
Sensationalism characterized the newspaper coverage of traffic-related deaths in the early
1900s. By the twenties, reporting had been toned down, as the print media played its part in
growth machine attempts to reduce negative associations with automobiles. Nevertheless,
gruesome details enlivened articles about particularly poignant deaths, especially those of
prominent citizens or children. Besides documenting the crashes, the papers frequently ran
readers’ letters as well as their own editorials decrying the carnage in the streets. An Atlantian
editorial railed against 1919’s forty-three automobile-related deaths. “Speed maniacs” drove
recklessly, knowing they would not be punished, because, as the editor correctly observed, “the
authorities do not care to do anything that might injure the automobile business.”213
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During the decade, the civic leaders and city officials intermittently reacted—only at
periods of peak public outrage—by calling for more stringent police enforcement, holding the
occasional safety week, tweaking road laws, and conducting yet another traffic study. They
ignored the corrective called for by the editorial writer: to impose on all perpetrators prison
sentences of six months to five years, which would instantly reduce road deaths. They would not
contemplate such a drastic measure against the motor vehicle.
Roadway collisions did benefit the flourishing automobile insurance companies, who also
kept an eagle eye on traffic statistics. As the ones who handled the losses, the insurance carriers
were experts on the causes of vehicle wrecks. As their profits depended on accident prevention,
they worked diligently with safety organizations (e.g., the National Safety Council and its local
branches), car manufacturers, police departments, and government entities to improve safety.
The insurance companies’ program to prevent automobile accidents included education, better
highway engineering, safer motor vehicles, proper legislation and enforcement, driver licensing,
and the offer of lower
insurance rates for the safest
drivers.214
A local insurance
agency’s newspaper
advertisement (see figure at
right) urged subscribers to

Figure 15. Insurance Agency ad headline; Atlanta
Constitution, September 17, 1923.

drivers had “caused death to some of the most substantial and valuable citizens of Atlanta;” “Police Launch ‘Finish
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purchase travel and pedestrian insurance. The ad pointed out that danger threatened, whether the
customer walked, rode, or drove. The large numbers of crashes causing deaths and injuries to
both people and property sent city automobile insurance rates skyrocketing. In 1926, a vice
president of the Atlanta Casualty Exchange wrote that Atlanta’s insurance rates remained high
primarily due to incompetent, unlicensed, underage, and “hoggish” drivers; employers who
inadequately supervised their company drivers; and the failure of the public to learn and observe
the traffic rules. He called for the city council to put teeth into and enforce existing laws, a
common cri de cœur throughout the twenties.215
In 1923, the Chamber of Commerce responded to the carnage by creating the Atlanta
Safety Council to reduce the “alarming number of deaths and injuries” from automobile
collisions, and to make Atlanta safe for motorists and pedestrians. Carl L. Smith, the secretary of
the National Safety Council, spoke at a Chamber meeting, describing how such organizations
operated elsewhere in the country, noting how one group functioned as vigilante traffic law
enforcers. That very evening the Chamber organized a committee to initiate its own council
headed by Mell R. Wilkinson, a leading city manufacturer, head of a large brokerage firm, and
president-for-life of the prestigious and highly-influential Presidents’ Club. Prominent industry
leaders pledged financial and moral support from their companies.216
The safety council had offices, first in the Candler Building, later in the Chamber of
Commerce Building, and it hired a secretary-manager with national experience as a safety
underwriter. Both illustrated the group’s substantial financial resources and expertise as well as
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the seriousness of its intent to have an impact on the city’s traffic problems. Composed of civic
elites, Atlanta’s safety council insisted it did not exist to wage war on motorists, as every member
owned at least one car and many of them controlled fleets of commercial trucks. Its officers (a
president, a first vice-president, and fourteen other vice-presidents) represented every sector of
the growth coalition. Claiming that the 100 members on its Board of Control were
“representative Atlantans,” the council’s interests clearly lay more with car and business owners
than with average, working-class, or minority citizens. In 1923, the majority of Atlanta
households did not own even one car.217
The Atlanta Safety Council would have enormous impact on all traffic-related matters
throughout the decade. In addition to educating the public and pressuring the police, the group
functioned as a quasi-governmental traffic agency, drafting city ordinances and apprehending
violators. It exemplified the extraordinary reach of the power elites into the basic city
responsibilities of making and enforcing laws. As a creation of the COC, the safety council acted
as devoted guardians of Atlanta’s reputation as a good place to do business. Traffic deaths,
downtown gridlock, and reckless drivers did not match their idealized image of a growing,
progressive city. Unfortunately, those were precisely the problems of the modern U.S. city;
Atlanta had plenty of company.218
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The mounting death toll, however, demanded even more intervention. The census bureau
reported:
Each year it becomes more and more dangerous for a person to walk the streets.
The reason usually given, and probably the correct one, is that the number of
automobiles in use is constantly increasing. How, then, shall this ever increasing
danger be lessened? The obvious remedy is to improve constantly the traffic
regulations to keep pace with the ever-increasing number of automobiles. . . .
Automobile traffic must be slowed down and controlled until it becomes safe.”219
The bureau called for more regulations; reducing the number of vehicles on the road never
received a mention. At no level—federal, state, or municipal—did authorities ever attempt that
obvious solution, certainly not in Atlanta. The city did not take the census bureau’s advice to
slow down automobiles. When it came to speed limits in the 1920s, Atlanta only raised—never
lowered—them.220
The city did increase controls on all street uses and users, instituting a massive array of
measures to manage everyone. This legislative superstructure encompassed all the traffic-related
entities imposed upon the streets, sidewalks, and the air spaces above them. The blanket of
regulation included devices: painted lines on the roadways, raised safety islands in the middle of
streets, regulatory and directional signs, and the various types of traffic signal lights embedded in
the road surface, installed on posts (in the street or at the curb), or hanging in the air above
intersections.
It also comprised the plethora of ordinances imposed upon those in or beside the
roadway, as well as the specialized motorcycle cops and cornermen (policemen who stood on
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street corners or in the streets), whose duties consisted primarily of enforcing laws and directing
traffic. In Foucauldian terms, the superstructure comprised a new “microphysics of power,”
extended to the public streets, with police as part of the panoptic apparatus.221
The automobile ushered in a new stage in the development of a greatly expanded
disciplinary society. The regulatory framework emerged in Atlanta primarily in the twenties in
response to the car and the resulting chaos, congestion, and carnage it brought to the city. The
entire structure evolved gradually, with numerous false starts, revisions, and revocations along
the way. By the end of the decade, it still remained a work in progress, but slowly approached
the comprehensive and stable system we experience today (albeit with ongoing adjustments and
alterations). The remainder of this chapter describes the various elements of the superstructure,
beginning with the regulation of people in the public streets.
5.2

Regulating Pedestrians
Civic leaders extolled Atlanta’s expanding population, the influx of tall buildings holding

thousands of employees, and the concentrated retail sectors and large downtown department
stores drawing throngs of shoppers. However, they deplored the resulting crowded sidewalks,
and enacted new local ordinances to remove obstructions between the curb and the building line.
These included outlawing all commercial sidewalk displays in the central business district;
requiring property owners to keep walkways and streets clean and clear; scheduling time and
placement of garbage cans left out for refuse collection; and restricting all street and sidewalk
encroachments with time-limited permits. But the new regulations could only optimize existing
sidewalk capacity, not expand it.222
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The 1924
Beeler Report
documented the
large pedestrian
presence in
downtown. At
Five Points,
between noon
and 2 p.m.,
observers
counted 27,590

Figure 16. Underground sidewalks and subway; Beeler, Report, 1924, p.
83, Exhibit 10A.

pedestrians moving through the intersection on a weekday. The Saturday count was 21,125. The
Report proposed a radical solution to the congested foot traffic: move pedestrians underground to
stationary and moving sidewalks, the latter called “subways without trains” (see figure above).
Beeler’s unique approach, unlike any other remedies of the time, prioritized pedestrians over all
transit modes.223
The pedestrian far outranks all the rest in both number and importance. It is the
pedestrian who watches the shop windows and patronizes the stores. He may have
come down in an auto or a street car, but he becomes a pedestrian as soon as he
walks on the street. Already the sidewalks are crowded and jammed in many
places and street intersections are difficult to negotiate. The safety and comfort of
the pedestrian is of paramount importance.224
Beeler understood that everybody at some point in their journey was a pedestrian.
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Although sidewalk demand had increased, sidewalk area did not. In any competition for
the space between building lines, the streets would always win, particularly since national
experts constantly proclaimed that street widening would solve the congestion problem.
McClintock correctly observed that creating more space to relieve sidewalk congestion “cannot
be anticipated by most cities in the near future.” In Atlanta, no future would see downtown
sidewalk widening, at least not until the twenty-first century and then only infrequently as a
traffic-calming measure. Instead, city roadways continuously cannibalized portions of the
walkways as the demands of more vehicles ranked higher than the needs of more pedestrians.225
Atlanta’s street expansions devoured not only sidewalks but also vegetation and real
estate. City officials eliminated a traffic bottleneck on Marietta Street by cutting eight feet off the
sidewalks to widen the road. They removed the trees around city hall “which interfered with
traffic,” and rounded the curbing so vehicles could more easily make the turn from Marietta onto
Forsyth. The latter action was the result of a new ordinance requiring intersection curbs to be cut
on a fifteen-foot radius—a measure which facilitated vehicle movement but reduced the size of
every single city sidewalk corner. Property owners on South Forsyth Street lost frontage so the
access to the Spring Street viaduct could be widened and extended. The omnivorous and everhungry motor vehicle demanded more and more territory, which city leaders happily ceded to it,
relegating people on foot to a distant second class status.
The city’s first jaywalking ordinance took effect in late 1915, but lackadaisical police
enforcement emboldened foot travelers to cross the streets at will, as they always had. The 1920s
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saw increased regulation of those who walked, designed primarily to limit the time they spent
with their feet in the roadways. New laws prohibited pedestrians from carelessly or maliciously
interfering with passing vehicles; required them to exit expeditiously from cars and streetcars
proceeding immediately to the right-hand curb; and mandated that they keep to the right at all
times. The Constitution reflected the growing use of the pejorative label for pedestrians walking
in the street: prior to 1920, it published 48 articles containing variations of the term “jay-walk,”
while during the twenties, that number more than doubled to 106.226
As early as 1921, a newspaper editorial called for the city to paint lines at Five Points to
safeguard against “innocent” jay-walking, and to create stop-lines for vehicles.227 In 1922, the
city council passed a new traffic code requiring the Chief of Construction to “paint white lines
upon the streets of the City at the intersection of the streets and other places . . . to indicate where
pedestrians are to cross streets.” While the new lines would also serve as vehicle stop lines, the
ordinance specified that their purpose was to delineate where people could walk in the road. A
corresponding ordinance required pedestrians to walk only in the portion of the street between
the cross-walk lines, not diagonally. Both statutes effectively corralled pedestrians, limiting their
presence in the street to the sections between the white lines. As Barrett observes, pedestrian
control in the early decades of the twentieth century revolved around the principle of traffic
segregation—keeping the foot travelers out of the streets as much as possible.228
Another pedestrian regulation new in the 1920s read, “Pedestrians shall not stop or
congregate in the center of the sidewalk, but must move to either side promptly.” Not content
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with removing people from the roadways, the city code barred them from stopping to chat in the
middle of the sidewalk. Standing people, like the other sidewalk obstacles, hindered forward
motion and needed to be curtailed. The new paradigm of streets as automobile conduits also
applied to the sidewalks, now pedestrian conduits. For both, unhindered and efficient flow was
the goal, and each represented steps in the development of the automotive city.229
City authorities frequently waged “war” on both speeders and jaywalkers, who alternately
received the blame for the rising number of injuries and deaths. Sometimes, but not often, the
vehicle drivers received heavy sentences for fatal crashes. Whenever they did, it made bold, allcaps headlines, like “SPEEDER SENTENCED TO PENITENTIARY.” Newspaper editorials
and opinion pieces tended to fault either the walkers or the motorists, but sometimes called for
everyone to take responsibility and for police to enforce all the traffic laws.230
Outcries against speeders and reckless drivers never ceased, but as the decade progressed,
pedestrians more and more often carried the blame for the rising number of road injuries and
deaths, including their own. A 1927 article cited the 445 pedestrian injuries which occurred in
1926, blaming nearly all of them on the pedestrians themselves who had jay-walked or ignored
traffic signals. Fewer than 12 injuries occurred while those on foot were obeying the law (the
unstated corollary being that someone else, obviously a motorist, had disregarded the law). The

229
Atlanta, The Charter and Ordinances of the City of Atlanta, Code of 1924, Ch. 95, § 3139; Norton,
Fighting Traffic: The Dawn of the Motor Age in the American City, 134. A newspaper editorial urged pedestrians to
move along, not even stopping to gaze in shop windows, unless one did not impede other walkers; “When You Are
Walking on the Street, Keep Moving Forward,” Atlanta Constitution, December 31, 1922. The phrase “on the street”
in the headline did not actually mean in the street, but alongside the street on the sidewalk.
230
Atlanta Constitution: “Authorities Push War on Speeders, September 30, 1920; “Safety on the Street,”
November 29, 1920; “Heavy Penalties Given Traffic Law Violators; City-Wide War Opens,” August 14, 1921;
“War Is Declared on Bright Lights and ‘Jay Walkers,’” May 13, 1924; “No Cases Made in Police ‘War’ on JayWalkers,” January 11, 1927; “Speeder Sentenced to Penitentiary,” October 21, 1920. The driver, who killed a
pedestrian, was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter receiving a sentence of one to three years. The fact that the
driver had previously been convicted of manslaughter in a stabbing death, coupled with the prominence of the
victim, contributed to the case’s successful prosecution. The article, “Making Traffic Safe,” Atlanta Constitution,
January 30, 1922, stated that there were two sides to every question, and that the pedestrian was “frequently quite as
much to blame as the motorist.”

142
city’s greatest traffic weakness, the article claimed, was its failure to rigidly enforce pedestrian
observance of traffic signals. By 1929, the civic and government authorities were asserting that
most traffic deaths resulted from people crossing the street in the middle of the block or against
the light at intersections, and condemned pedestrians as a “serious interference to the free and
efficient movement of vehicular traffic.” People on foot, along with the streetcars, increasingly
bore responsibility for the carnage and congestion on Atlanta’s streets—neither of which existed
prior to the coming of the automobile. Yet motordom and its enablers refused to assign much
blame to newcomer on the scene.231
In his January 3, 1927 inaugural speech to the city council, the new mayor Isaac N.
Ragsdale initiated a drive to improve police regulation of pedestrians who, he claimed,
consistently ignored traffic signals. “The traffic situation, in my estimation, needs to undergo
improved regulation, particularly as respects pedestrians. . . . The large majority of pedestrians
ignore the signals unless an officer is present to impress them. Numerous traffic accidents have
been caused on Atlanta’s streets. . . by failure of pedestrians to regard the traffic laws as rigidly
as motorists are required to do.” The mayor called for equal enforcement of traffic light
ordinances on both pedestrians and motorists. Within days, jaywalker arrests increased and the
Recorders Courts began to crack down on violators. Police assigned two officers to every
downtown intersection with a traffic signal to watch for infractions by walkers.232
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Ironically, Mayor Ragsdale and the mayor pro tem, Alderman Guy Dobbs, were arrested
eight days later for jaywalking as they strolled south on Peachtree Street. Despite warning
sounds from a police whistle, the two men crossed against the red light at Marietta Street. Both
received citations from the two officers working the Five Points intersection, then continued their
walk south over the Whitehall Street viaduct. A few moments later, another policeman blew his
whistle as the two men began to cross Alabama Street against the red light. The mayor came to a
halt, but Alderman Dobbs did not, so he received a second citation. The next day in Recorders
Court, both men “cheerfully” paid their fines, $6.00 per violation.233
The incident demonstrated the ingrained habit of pedestrians to proceed across the street
whenever they deemed it safe, no matter the color of the traffic light. Two prominent city
officials well versed in the city code still managed to violate the law and become ensnared in a
process which one of them had made a signature project of his administration. The mayor’s
actions confirmed his own assertion that Atlanta’s pedestrians did, indeed, ignore traffic signals.
If even he failed to obey the traffic ordinance, why expect strict compliance from the lessinformed, less-aware average citizen?
The National Safety Council’s 1927 annual safety congress actually studied whether or
not pedestrians could even be regulated. They concluded yes, but most effectively via two
means: a timely blast from a loud police whistle to publicly shame the offender, and ongoing
pedestrian education. As McShane notes, pedestrians had difficulty adapting to the regulation of
an old, familiar behavior—walking across the street. New Atlanta ordinances upended the
traditional English common law concept that street users shared equal rights to the roadways.
They gave the right-of-way to motor vehicles, except at signal-light-controlled intersections.
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Even those, however, gave pedestrians only a partial right-of-way where right turns on red were
allowed.234
During the week of August 7-13, 1921, Atlanta held a “No Accident Week” organized by
the newly-formed Junior Chamber of Commerce. The service organization, later known as the
“Jaycees,” provided opportunities for young people to study city government and learn a proper
sense of civic duty and responsibility. City businesses and civic groups contributed to the
campaign and held employee and member meetings to stress “safety first.” Streetcars displayed
safety ads. The Atlanta Urban League distributed literature and convened rallies while the
newspapers promoted the week’s assorted events. Despite the efforts, thirteen automobile
crashes occurred, leaving two dead and thirteen injured, while several hundred traffic law
violators were hauled into police court. In one of the week’s collisions, a large car hit a muledrawn wagon, and then hastily fled the scene, scattering a group of white children playing on
Central Avenue, narrowly missing them. A “wave of popular indignation against reckless
driving” arose at the sorry outcome of the city’s designated “safety” week, manifested in angry
letters to the newspapers, demanding action. But the mayor and city council had just gotten the
$8 million bond project passed, and had schools, water, sewer, and the Spring Street viaduct
occupying their time; someone else would have to take the lead on traffic control.235
Seven days after the infamously unsafe “safety week” concluded, concerned individuals
created the Citizens’ Safety Association, headed by Philip Thornton Marye (1872-1935),
esteemed Atlanta architect. During World War I, Marye was the assistant to the commanding
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officer in the Motor Transport Corps in France and Germany. The Association’s vice presidents
were leading Atlanta insurance man, William Thomas Winn (1875-1930), and Coca-Cola heir
and Biltmore Hotel builder, William Candler. The group mounted an educational campaign to
eliminate jaywalking; campaigned to reduce traffic hazards on city streets; and waged warfare
against reckless, speeding, and often-intoxicated auto drivers—the cause, they claimed, of the
many road deaths.236
The Citizens’ Safety Association partnered with Junior Chamber of Commerce for
another safety week the following year. It eventually formed the basis of the Atlanta Safety
Council, one of the most active and influential motor safety organizations in the city. The Junior
Chamber continued to hold annual safety weeks throughout the 1920s. Both groups led the larger
COC’s efforts to decrease traffic injuries and deaths.237
5.3

Regulating Children
The failure of safety week underscored the need to increase the security of Atlanta’s

children, both at play and in travelling to and from school. If grown-ups, even city officials,
could not re-train themselves to stop, look, and listen before crossing the road, it proved even
more difficult for children who, until the advent of the automobile, had utilized the street for play
space, especially in crowded urban centers. Fear for children’s well-being motivated civic
leaders to provide traffic education school programs, institute school safety zones, and organize
play areas during the summer recess.
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In 1913, the Atlanta Public Schools had launched its first school safety program with the
catchy slogan, “Don’t Get Run Over!” By the twenties, school safety programs could be found
across the country, with new curricula designed by recently-formed entities like the Highway
Education Board and the Education Division of the National Safety Council. High school
students received driving instruction, while students age 14 or under participated in national
essay-writing contests on highway safety. Kindergarten and elementary school children had play
activities to raise street safety awareness. Rules for a traffic game, bearing some resemblance to
the once-popular “Red Light, Green Light,” appeared in the National Safety Council’s Bulletin of
Safety Education for school teachers. A newspaper’s children’s crossword puzzle sometimes
included traffic-related clues.238
Since 1906, Atlanta had operated “recreation grounds” for white children during the
summer months; a playground for African American children did not open until four years later.
Editorials observed that Atlanta’s children had been robbed of areas for play, with the city’s
crowded buildings and congested streets. “The only play place is the back ally [sic] or the narrow
streets teeming with street cars and automobiles,” and, until conditions changed, drivers were
urged to slow down.239
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As an alternative, in 1923 Marion Columbus Kiser, Sr. (1880-1933), a real estate
developer, president a national chain store system, and bank executive, proposed a new city park.
He suggested that it be constructed on the site of a former leather-tanning yard which had a creek
running through it. Citing the city’s need for a signature recreational center, he urged passage of
a $2 million bond referendum to pay for the new park as well as upgrades for existing parks.
Discontent with city spending of previous bond funds and concerns about the lack of details in
Kiser’s proposal contributed to the bond issue’s defeat. However, African Americans voted
overwhelmingly against a park they could never use; they were restricted to Washington Park,
the sole public recreational space open to Blacks. The only sector in the city which voted in favor
of the bond referendum was the Sixth Ward, which contained the proposed location of the new
park.240
The bond defeat did not end Atlanta’s push for children’s play areas. The city continued
to expand its summer playground programs, and by 1926 had twenty-one for white children and
three for Black children, most of them held at public schools. National studies demonstrated that
playgrounds reduced the number of child fatalities by automobiles (see cartoon below). A
newspaper commented, “Providing more playgrounds in Atlanta means greater peace of mind for
our motorists,” suggesting perhaps that the larger concern lay with the ease of the motoring
public than with safety in the roadways. Atlanta’s playground system continued throughout the
1920s, with increasing levels of participation, and in 1929, proudly proclaimed that for the first
time in six years, no child was killed by a car during the summer months.241
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Atlanta did not limit efforts at children’s street safety to summer playgrounds. School reopenings in the fall prompted annual
back-to-school awareness campaigns
for motorists. Following the lead of
the National Safety Council, Atlanta
installed signs to designate safety
zones in front of all the schools. The
Atlanta Automobile Association
organized the School Boy Patrols,
who, wearing white belts and arm
bands, assisted with traffic control
within the zones. Both the Atlanta
Safety Council and newspapers

Figure 17. NSC Cartoon; American City 25, no. 3
(September 1921): 225.

offered prizes to the schools having the fewest number of car wrecks and child injuries. All were
part of motordom’s ongoing campaign to keep school children out of the streets.242
The Atlanta Motor Club and the American Automobile Association annually warned that
having thousands of schoolchildren in the streets created traffic hazards. Both organizations
emphasized that school children’s safety in the streets was the responsibility of motorists—a rare
instance in which civic organizations (but noticeably not the city government) placed the burden
of a collision solely upon the automobile driver. The city’s younger pedestrians, at least when on
their way to and from school, received this special consideration—the presumption of innocence.
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Those same children, however, did not warrant that same level of care and concern if they were
playing in the street or crossing a road outside a school safety zone. A large distinction existed
between the child and the schoolchild when it came to assigning responsibility for traffic wrecks.
Older children were sometimes held liable, but increasingly the public faulted parents for not
properly watching or instructing their young offspring.243
A 1923 Atlanta Constitution article lamented the multiple causes of the city’s traffic
woes, a solution to which appeared elusive. It described the back-and-forth of the blame game
between motorists, pedestrians, city officials, and police officers, and urged the hiring of more
traffic cops. It praised the city’s three major car-related organizations (Atlanta Automobile
Association, Atlanta Safety Council, and Atlanta Motor Club) who worked to introduce new
traffic control measures and raise public traffic awareness. Even the streetcar company won a
word of praise for its safety efforts. In one oddly-worded sentence, the article praised everyone
who was working to make “Atlanta’s streets safe and free from time-killing congestion.” Despite
the article’s focus on street safety, the writer apparently rated traffic more important as a killer of
time rather than as a killer of people.244
Treading carefully, the reporter also partially faulted children—at least the careless
ones—for playing in the streets, saying, “Automobile traffic cannot be regulated rigidly enough
by law . . . to make the streets safe as playgrounds for irresponsible children.” Nationally, car
associations and safety groups also had to maneuver between children’s safety and the
automobile as an essential resource. A representative of the National Automobile Chamber of
Commerce said, “Our industry . . . will welcome any program that will safeguard pedestrians,
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particularly children. At the same time, the motor vehicle as a medium of great public service
must be reasonably protected in its rights.”245
Atlanta’s mayor, Walter A. Sims, even investigated the possibility of legislation to ban
children entirely from all city streets, but City Attorney James Mayson advised it would not
withstand a constitutional challenge. Mayson did not mention, at least in the public record, the
public outrage which would have erupted from such a draconian measure. But the dilemma
remained of who to blame for child traffic deaths. A false binary eventually emerged in the
responsibility equation: is it parent or child? The car’s driver was slowly disappearing from
consideration. Certainly no motorist ever intended to harm a child; therefore, they should not be
held accountable if they did. However, society demanded that somebody answer for the deaths of
little ones. Ultimately, the mayor pronounced, “The burden rests finally on the shoulders of
Atlanta fathers and mothers.” It was not politic to fault children, no matter how “irresponsible”
they might be, so he chose the less precarious position—blame the parents.246
Intensifying rhetoric served to demonize pedestrians of all ages, characterizing them as
motorists’ enemies. Confrontational government campaigns, aided by the print media, stompedout the last unregulated pedestrian presence on the city streets. Formerly, the roads served as
open public space, equally available to all. The introduction of new transit modes in the 1800s,
such as omnibuses or streetcars, had not altered that understanding, but the motor vehicle did.
Unlike today, no organized pedestrian resistance arose in Atlanta or much of the U.S. The New
York City editorialist and publisher, Harold S. Buttenheim, called that city’s 932 traffic deaths in
1925 “municipal murder” permitted by the citizens. He asked if city dwellers were “baffled and
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beaten, definitely and permanently, by the lethal avocations of machines that should be our
servants and not our masters?” Their answer ultimately proved to be affirmative.247
As Norton observes, “Whatever the legitimacy of their claim to street space, the motoring
minority had the power to drive pedestrians from the pavements. Fearful for their safety, nonmotorists learned to limit their own access to streets and to caution their children to look both
ways before crossing.” Even children now bore some responsibility for their own safety.
Everyone on foot capitulated, however unwillingly, to the domination of the larger, heavier,
faster motorized vehicles, and therefore to the redefinition of the public streets as automobile
conduits. The city street became a place where pedestrians did not normally belong. But
throughout the 1920s, the increasingly heavy hand of regulation fell not only on pedestrians and
children, but also on other street users, including vehicles.248
5.4

Regulating Traffic
No one questioned whether Atlanta’s sundry traffic-related problems required immediate

and comprehensive attention on multiple levels. Prominent businessmen, realtors, and financiers
worried that traffic issues would sully the city’s reputation, and they weren’t wrong. In 1924,
Louie D. Newton, editor of the Chamber of Commerce’s journal, City Builder, invited Douglas
Southall Freeman, then editor of the Richmond News Leader, to record his impressions during a
visit to town. The resulting article had several positive observations about Atlanta, its beauty, its
spirit, and the Chamber elites who hosted his tour. But Freeman did make note of neglected
street repairs, torn-up roads, sidewalks blocked by building construction, and over-all dirtiness.
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In regard to the latter, he politely remarked that the street cleaning department’s equipment was
“not of the best.” About city traffic, however, he pulled no punches: “The pedestrian apparently
has fewer rights than in any city I know in the South. Traffic regulation is lax and needs
complete, expert reorganization.” After commenting on the “slouchiness” and incivility of the
traffic officers, he noted that taken altogether, these items marred “the favorable impression
Atlanta makes on visitors.” Not the ringing endorsement hoped for by the Chamber.249
Traffic congestion spoiled more than just the visitor’s experience of the city. Business in
the downtown retail district felt the drag as customers and deliveries slogged through the
crowded streets daily. An editorial summarized the situation in 1920:
During the hours of heaviest congestion each day, with pedestrians, street cars,
automobiles, trash wagons, horses, mules and dogs, all in one great heterogeneous
mass, shouting, clanging, honking and barking, all trying to make headway in
varying directions, it often requires half an hour for a vehicle to advance from
Five Points to the intersection of the two Peachtrees [a distance of just over half a
mile], and to attempt to cross the street at such times is to hazard a trip to the
hospital!250
Heightened awareness of both the traffic problems and their negative impacts on
commerce and tourism led to the creation of new levels of city bureaucracy to enact and enforce
traffic laws. In 1921, the city council created its own Traffic Committee and in 1923, established
the police department’s first Accident Prevention Bureau—a section allocated specifically for
traffic control. Newspapers unfavorably compared Atlanta’s traffic woes with those of other
cities. The mayor, council members, and police brass frequently took “observation tours” to
places like New York, Chicago, and St. Louis to study their traffic laws and enforcement
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practices. Local officials implemented many of the innovative solutions they acquired in these
trips, assisting in the creation of national uniformity in traffic regulation. The tours also enhanced
official awareness of Atlanta’s place as an important regional center—a concept which would
guide the city’s trajectory over the decade. But, like most southern cities, Atlanta always lagged
a few years behind those of the northeast and mid-west in implementing traffic control
measures.251
Limiting the public streets to vehicles only, or at least primarily, proved a popular method
of easing congestion and improving traffic flow. The streets as public meeting/gathering/trading
spaces sharply declined as the city council placed regulatory burdens on fruit peddlers, street
vendors, and farmers coming into town to sell their produce. New ordinances required everyone
to have a business license, a tag, and signage on their wagons or trucks, as well as scales to
weigh their products. Flower sellers had to display business licenses on their hand-held baskets.
Food vending required a stove to keep cooked foods hot, and the once-ubiquitous bootblack
stands were banned from both street and sidewalk. Offenders faced fines or time in the
stockade.252
Even the construction of the city’s Municipal Market [today’s Sweet Auburn Curb
Market] functioned as a traffic control measure. Located at the corner of Edgewood Avenue and
Bell Street, the market, which opened on May 3, 1924, was just outside of the congested district,
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but still only five blocks east of Five Points. It took the parked vehicles of farmers and truck
gardeners off the streets and into a segregated space where they could sell their produce. The
market’s board of directors included influential citizens such as financier Colonel William
Lawson Peel (1849-1927), former mayor James L. Key (1867-1939), successful publisher Walter
O. Foote (1871-1933), and Derelle E. Harsey Sharp (1882-1969), president of the Atlanta
Woman’s Club. They lobbied for and helped construct the market. Sharp and the Woman’s Club
insisted that the building be constructed of fireproof brick and concrete. The building’s
cornerstone still bears her name, Derelle, although newspaper accounts always referred to her as
Mrs. Norman Sharp. The board travelled to see other city markets and incorporate features from
them in the Atlanta structure. Albert Anthony Ten Eyck Brown (1878-1940), one of the city’s
most popular and prolific architects, designed the building, which eventually became the largest
single retail center for farm products in the state.253
Clearing the streets of most other users, however, did not resolve all of Atlanta’s traffic
issues. A large apparatus of traffic control measures had to be put into place to achieve the
smooth flow of traffic envisioned by city officials and elites, although they never truly
succeeded. The city electrician, an engineer, was in charge of traffic planning for the City of
Atlanta. Like countless other traffic planners in municipalities across the country, Raymond L.
Torras followed the lead of larger cities. As McShane notes, no one had predicted that the U.S.
would end up with uniform traffic controls, but he explained how the system developed.
Once cities . . . began to employ full-time, professionally trained engineers to
direct traffic, they deployed only certain traffic solutions. Traffic engineers had
253
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linked themselves together into a large, self-reinforcing, international,
professional community by the early 1930s. Big-city political groups, especially
downtown business interests, had a long history of turning to engineers for
solutions to the diseconomies of urbanization. Engineers carried the enormous
prestige of modern science and technology. Urban elites liked engineering models
of problem solving.254
The history of Atlanta’s traffic control devices followed the typical national trajectory in
the implementation of the new technologies. The hand-held semaphores of traffic officers in the
nineteen-teens remained in use through part of
the 1920s, being gradually replaced by crow’s
nest-type traffic towers in which two
policemen controlled red and green signal
lights and sounded a bell when the lights
changed. Later came the Milwaukee
mushroom and its variants (see photo at
right255); red octagonal stop signs; and twolight, individually-controlled electric signals

Figure 18. Variant of the Milwaukee
mushroom; Atlanta Constitution, January
16, 1927.

suspended from wires above intersections (see figures on following pages256). The three-light,
synchronized traffic light system, recognizable today, first went into operation in Atlanta on July
8, 1925. Earlier that year, the city had its first automobile crash resulting from a driver running a
stop sign.257

McShane, “The Origins and Globalization of Traffic Control Signals,” 389.
In the photograph, Atlanta Motor Club secretary, Oscar L. Haymond, explains this variant of the in-road
Milwaukee mushroom stop “button” to Police Chief James L. Beavers; Atlanta Constitution, January 16, 1927.
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Figure 19. Five Points looking east, after 11/29/1921 and before 07/08/1925.
Along with the new signals and signs, lines painted on the roadways constituted another
physical traffic control device. In addition to the pedestrian crossing lines (which also served as
vehicle stop lines), white stripes marked centerlines to separate vehicles moving in opposing
directions. For very heavily-travelled areas, roadway marks separated lines of traffic moving in
the same direction. National authorities urged adoption of on-street traffic markings, claiming
they increased traffic capacity and segregated fast from slow-moving vehicles. As with all every
other new traffic control device or measure, Atlanta first installed the new lines and markings in

of Signal Lights,” Atlanta Constitution, November 24, 1921. However, a traffic mushroom variant was introduced in
1927, “New Type Traffic Boulevard ‘Stop’ Signs,” Atlanta Constitution, January 16, 1927. The three-light
synchronized traffic signal system went into operation on the evening of July 8, 1925,“New Traffic Signal Lights in
Use Today,” Atlanta Constitution, July 9, 1925. The first crash from an ignored stop sign occurred on March 22,
1925; “Eight Are Hurt in Auto Crashes,” Atlanta Constitution, March 23, 1925.
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Figure 20. Five Points looking north, after July 8, 1925.
the congested district of downtown, with Five Points the testing ground for modern trafficcontrol ideas.258
In addition to white lines, the city also painted red lines to designate “non-parking”
zones. Sometimes the curbing was painted red instead of the roadway lines. While the city
council enacted the 1922 ordinance requiring the lines, and the police chief had charge of line
locations, the city power elites actually oversaw the painting of the lines. An extraordinary
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section of the city code specified that painting lines on the streets was to be done “under the
supervision of the Atlanta Motor Club.”259
The Atlanta Motor Club, a non-governmental civic organization, formed in 1922 for the
purpose of improving traffic conditions in Atlanta for locals and tourists. Acting under the
slogan, “Motorists and Progress!” the members, including many business leaders, installed traffic
signals and directional signs around the city. According to the group’s president, J. M. Van
Harlingen, the club approached the city council, asking them to co-operate with the club’s efforts
to relieve congestion “by having parking lines painted on the streets, under the direction of the
club officials.” Council complied with the club’s request.260
Atlanta’s growth coalition heavily influenced government’s automotive regulations.
Acting principally through the big three automobile-related civic groups, they not only
suggested, but also directed the adoption of numerous traffic laws throughout the decade.
Examples already presented have illustrated the involvement of the Safety Council and the
Motor Club in shaping street and automobile regulation, with the photo of the motor club’s
secretary showing a new signal device to the police chief a telling demonstration of the fact (see
Figure 17 above).
Likewise, the Atlanta Automobile Association (the local chapter of the American
Automobile Association) proudly acknowledged its success in securing legislation favorable to
the automobile. The newspaper notice of the group’s general membership meeting, scheduled for
October 17, 1923, quoted their executive secretary, C. V. Hohenstein, saying, “The Atlanta
Automobile Association is intensely interested in the welfare of the motoring public. The
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association believes that motor car owners are entitled to reasonable enjoyment in the use of their
cars, and are opposed to drastic restrictions in the way of traffic regulation.” He announced the
special guest for the upcoming meeting: Councilman James L. Wells, former chairman of the
city council’s traffic committee and current member of the police committee. The supper
meeting, held in the roof garden of the Cecil Hotel, featured a special orchestra providing dinner
music. W. R. C. Smith, president of a prominent city publishing company and vice president of
the association, delivered the keynote speech on “The Outlook in the Automotive Industry.”261
The Atlanta Automobile Association did not limit itself to wining and dining city
officials to influence car-related ordinances, but actively introduced pro-automobile legislation
and kept an eye on other bills, ready to block anything which might negatively affect the
industry. A 1925 City Builder article boldly proclaimed,
One of the outstanding features of the association’s activities is along the line of
legislative work. Every year the association’s office checks daily every piece of
legislation introduced in the Georgia legislature, and during the past five years,
not a single piece of legislation, seriously affecting adversely the interests of those
engaged in the automotive industry has been passed. Many constructive pieces of
legislation have been passed, which were backed and supported by the
association. What applies to state legislation, applies to city legislation (emphases
added).262
The article then proceeded to give details about how the association, working closely with the
Atlanta Retail Merchants’ Association, had organized local businesses to push through an
ordinance to reduce city taxes on mercantile assets. The unsigned article concluded that it would
be impossible for the automotive industry to prosper without such organization behind it.263
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The association welcomed anyone owning or interested in cars, but all of the city’s car
dealers held memberships. A newspaper more accurately labeled it “the auto dealers” group.
John E. Smith, a highly successful dealer, served as president of the Atlanta Automobile
Association in the 1920s, having been president of the Atlanta Automobile Dealers’ Association
the previous decade. During the dealers’ association 1919 annual banquet held at the swanky
Capital City Club, speakers from the National Automobile Dealers’ Association told the
audience to “get politics out of business and put business in politics,” and declared the necessity
of passing laws which would promote the interests of the automobile dealers.264
Absolutely no doubt exists that civic organizations such as Atlanta’s Motor Club, Safety
Council, and Automobile Association, successfully ensured that city, county, and state laws
proved favorable to automotive interests. The city’s business organizations, like the Automobile
Dealers’ Association and the Retail Merchants’ Association, also pressured lawmakers not only
to refrain from passing legislation that might negatively impact motordom’s commercial
concerns, but also to pass legislation that positively benefitted them. Similar groups across the
country, as well as the umbrella national organizations, also worked hard to ensure that
government at all levels championed motorists, the motor vehicle, and the automobile industry.
Traffic regulations were written by people with vested interests in motordom, or they were
members of the upper classes who owned cars and did not take public transit. Few, if any
streetcar riders or ordinary citizens participated in the crafting of Atlanta’s traffic laws.
The city enacted reams of this new legislation. The number of street user, vehicle, and
traffic laws grew dramatically between the publication of the 1910 and 1924 city codes,
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demonstrating the significance of the automobile’s impact on everyday life in the city.265 In
1910, the list of eight, simple “Rules of the Road” took up one page of the chapter on Streets and
Alleys. By 1924, “Traffic Laws” warranted its own separate, 18.5-page chapter in the code.266
In Atlanta as elsewhere, the 1920s witnessed the massive investment of local government
economic resources into accommodating the automobile. A 1928 newspaper account announced
that the city now spent more than $230,000 annually just on traffic control. The reporter cited the
city comptroller’s report, a copy of which he had received, not from the city, but from the
Atlanta Safety Council, with whom the comptroller had shared his findings. The city had 66
traffic signal lights and 564 stop signs—all costing the city close to $50,000 a year to operate and
maintain. The city spent nearly $5,000 a year painting lines on the streets and installing nonparking signs. Even more of the city’s budget went to the salaries of the 35 policemen assigned
to the traffic squad, the 125 policemen on traffic duty three hours a day during the “rush” period,
and the police assigned to protect children in the school zones. These superstructure numbers do
not include the much higher infrastructure costs of paving, widening, and maintaining the roads
and bridges, gutters and curbs (which had to be re-shaped and downsized to accommodate a car’s
turning radius). Beyond infrastructure expenditures on streets and viaducts, the city in 1928 spent
over $1 million to meet the ever-growing needs of the automobile.267
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Yet the city still had not solved the problem of so many cars competing for road space.
Today urban intersections without stop lights or at least stop signs are unimaginable. The lack of
these essential devices contributed to the horrendous congestion and carnage on Atlanta’s streets.
The trial-and-error development of traffic controls occurred gradually in the first two decades of
the twentieth century, and accelerated rapidly in the 1920s. But the dithering of the city council
meant the continuing condition of traffic congestion in downtown, with no satisfactory resolution
in sight.
5.5

Speeding and Parking
A discussion of the ins and outs of council’s struggles and failures to relieve traffic

congestion by fiat is not the purpose of this study. However, two contradictory traffic laws in
particular represent the power elites’ efforts to privilege the automobile: vehicle speeds and
curbside parking. While city speed limits changed over the thirty-year period, they only moved
in one direction: up. On-street parking, however, had a bumpier path, with varying degrees of
restrictions applied across different locations.
Achieving previously unimaginable speeds of travel was one of the car’s major
attractions, something no other mode of transportation provided. Not only did it make motor
vehicles personally exciting to drive, but also it facilitated business by moving raw materials,
goods, and customers quickly and efficiently. As insurance expert Ambrose Ryder stated in
1924, “Speed is the essence of twentieth century commerce, and . . . ninety percent of the value
of the automobile lies in its speed.” Many civic leaders united in their goal to make it easier for
more vehicles to travel at greater speeds through the city—it was good for commerce and in
multiple ways would assist in growing Atlanta. They did recognize that heavily-travelled areas
with scores of pedestrians, such as the central business district, required somewhat lower speeds.
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Outlying areas of the city had speed limits five to ten miles per hour higher than in the congested
district. Speed limits in Fulton County, beyond the city limits, were even higher. The problem
with speed was that it killed (see figure below).
The truly spectacular wrecks—where the car
“turned turtle” (flipped over) and crushed the
unfortunate occupants—usually happened in the
suburbs or beyond the city limits. Traffic deaths
did occur in town, but less frequently.268
Some people failed to realize, or at least
acknowledge, that higher speeds did lead to
more deaths. The Atlanta Constitution’s motors
and highway department editor, O. J.
Willoughby, insisted that speed did not cause
most of the injuries and losses to life and

Figure 21. Editorial cartoon; Atlanta
Constitution, January 21, 1928.

property. Instead, he asserted that 99% of the time, collisions could be attributed “to other traffic
violations by motorists or pedestrians, with carelessness leading the list.” He argued, rather
obviously, that 50% more traffic could pass a given point driving at 20 miles per hour than at 12
miles per hour.269
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Perhaps persuaded by Mr. Willoughby’s all-too-fallible logic, the city council never did
lower speed limits— intentionally. On one occasion they did inadvertently lower speed limits
when, on May 1, 1922, they expanded the boundaries of the inner fire limit. Inside the inner fire
limit, the speed was restricted to 12 miles per hour, while beyond, the speed was 20 miles per
hour. The council did not realize the problem until five months later, when numbers of hapless
drivers received speeding citations. At that time, the city did not post speed limit signs; motorists
just had to learn for themselves where the speed limits changed. Council then made a concerted
effort, assisted by the newspaper, to publicize the enlarged lower-speed-limit area. Willoughby
suggested council set the speed limit to 20 miles per hour in all of downtown, but they eventually
did better in 1929, setting the maximum speed limit throughout the city to 30 miles per hour,
even in the congested district.270
One city councilman did note a particularly attractive feature of higher speed limits and
faster-moving cars—they intimidated pedestrians. Council’s traffic committee member Harry
York made improving traffic flow a priority. He urged synchronized traffic lights as one
solution, but also condemned those on foot as impediments to moving vehicles. He called
pedestrians “the most flagrant and consistent traffic law breakers on the streets,” observing,
The slow speed of motor traffic encourages them to disregard the red light signals
because they know that a motorist can and will stop rather than hit a pedestrian,
regardless of who has the legal right of way. If motor traffic moved at high speed,
as it does in practically every other large city, pedestrians would not cross until
the proper signal was given, because it would not be safe.271
Using higher speed limits to threaten pedestrians constituted a remarkable example of the
mindset that roads were for cars, not people. The ultimate goal was rapid movement at any cost,
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a cost which is unthinkingly accepted today. Car dealers abetted the speed narrative with
advertisements touting high performance vehicles capable of quick getaways at traffic lights. A
1926 ad for the newest model of Hupmobile assured buyers that they could experience “the thrill
of being away first at the traffic signal.” The 1929 new Chevrolet Six, however, could
accommodate any driving situation: “At the slower speeds of city traffic it idles along with
wonderful silence and ease. It shoots you ahead at the traffic light like an arrow from a bow. . . .
Its spirited performance on the open road is a delight to everyone.”272
By the end of the decade, speed had become an important goal for city officials and civic
leaders. Its presence symbolized modern society and a progressive city. “Speed used to be a
luxury; it is now one of the necessities of life.” Everything now moved faster, as seen in the
rapidity of the telephone, radio, express mail, modern machinery, and the automobile.273 But
higher speeds could only be achieved on roads cleared of all obstructions. After the city had
removed or severely curtailed all other street users, motor vehicle traffic congestion persisted.
Why? Because the biggest obstacles to cars traveling on city streets were other cars—parked
cars.274
Unimpeded traffic flow might mean higher speeds and shorter travel times, but no one
wanted to give up their right to park anywhere, anytime, and for free—just as they had since
1837 in the small village of Terminus.275 Not until the 1930s did municipal zoning ordinances
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require off-street parking to relieve parking shortages and improve traffic flow, but during the
twenties, city leaders understood that they had a major conflict on their hands.276 “Active”
(moving) vehicles competed with “standing” (parked) vehicles for space in the public streets,
with the greatest friction occurring on downtown’s narrow streets lined with office buildings and
retail stores. Curb parking in the congested business district effectively turned four-lane
thoroughfares into two-lane streets (see photo below277). With half of the roadway unavailable to
moving vehicles, gridlock prevailed. On-street parking not only took up traffic lanes; it
contributed to street traffic by individuals cruising in search of a vacant parking place, or by
chauffeurs driving around while waiting for their car’s owner to shop or transact business. The
1924 Beeler Report showed 4,652 automobiles parked in Atlanta’s business district one day,
more than half of them parked in the streets. Preston Arkwright, citing the narrowed travel space
due to parked cars, said that unless the city acted to solve the congestion problem, “it will choke
us to death.”278
Parked cars on city streets had emerged as a major problem in most large U.S. cities by
the 1920s. William Phelps Eno, an early advocate for traffic regulation beginning with the stop
sign in 1900, had by 1924, turned his attention to the problem of “dead” (parked) vehicles. He,
along with other nationally-renowned engineers, advocated painted lines to delineate parking
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zones, which should only be located in places where they could not hinder moving traffic. They
all viewed vehicular travel as the primary purpose of roads, permitting only brief pauses to load
and unload passengers or freight. Traffic specialists suggested a variety of parking options
preferable to curbsides: vacant lots, rooftops, basements, even public parks. Most agreed that
eventually the construction of multi-story parking garages would provide the best solution,
especially once entrepreneurs recognized their profit potential.279

Figure 22. Peachtree (left), Broad (south), 1925; Progressive Atlanta, pg. 27.
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Eno and others had a pretty good grasp of the main issues and offered some reasonable
solutions, but their considerations omitted one important party with a large stake in downtown
parking: the downtown businessmen. Most members of this group usually had no problem
meeting their own parking needs. They could easily afford to rent personal spaces for their cars
in one of the city’s new parking garages, and probably preferred to do so given the security,
proximity, and variety of amenities and services provided by these luxurious entities.
Throughout much of 1920, the city council debated creating a “non-parking” zone in the
central business district where traffic congestion had become intolerable. A citizens’ committee,
composed of prominent citizens, drew up an ordinance eliminating on-street parking in much of
downtown. They also proposed making some downtown streets one-way to increase flow.280
One letter writer to the Constitution weighed in heavily against the proposed legislation,
claiming that it reflected only the interest of the “electric octopus” (the streetcar and its riders),
not the interests of the city as a whole. In an early indicator of the probable reaction of the
commercial community, the writer declared that the non-parking regulation would bring harm to
“one of the most essential of all the classes in Atlanta—the business people.” He urged the
newspaper to keep in mind the “business usefulness” of all the cars driving in downtown daily.281
Nevertheless, city council passed a new traffic ordinance, effective June 15, 1920, which
created a non-parking zone within a radius of several blocks around Five Points. Marietta Street,
with its 60' width, remained available for curbside parking. The law prohibited parking in the
zone from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. weekdays and Sundays, and also made ten downtown streets oneway. It was a draconian measure by Atlanta standards.282
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City councilman J. C. Murphy, who wrote the ordinance, toured the business district that
first day, asking businessmen their opinions. He announced that, to a man, they declared that
clearing the parking from central streets was a great benefit and a long step toward solving the
city’s traffic problem. The Constitution reported,
Members of the police force, the motorists themselves, and most of all, the street
car riding public were quick to see big benefits accruing from the new nonparking traffic ordinance which went into effect Tuesday morning. With the
principal downtown streets, except Marietta . . . cleared of standing vehicles,
notable acceleration in the speed of street cars and vehicular traffic was apparent.
Prohibiting the parking of cars and other vehicles on the streets was like removing
logs jutting out from the bank into a stream, each one deadening and checking the
current as it flowed past. No maze of automobiles got caught up behind a trolley
car and no traffic jam was noted during the day.283
An additional benefit appeared when the owners of a number of vacant lots opened them up for
parking, making substantial sums. Storage garages (all-day parking garages) did big business that
first day, too.
The city had apparently discovered a way out of the congestion puzzle: remove the one
remaining street obstacle, the logjam of parked cars. Such a positive outcome appeared to please
a large number of citizens, with police, streetcar riders, and even motorists happy. The new
ordinance had achieved one of the goals of the growth community: smooth flowing traffic on
city streets.
Within six months, however, steady and vocal opposition to the ordinance had emerged.
The Atlanta Retail Merchants’ Association, the Atlanta Federation of Woman’s Clubs, and the
Atlanta Automobile Association protested the designation of non-parking zones, which they
claimed interfered with shopping and restricted customer access to businesses. Morris Rich, head
of the city’s flagship department store, called the new ordinance unfair and discriminatory. In
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response to the pressure by these influential groups, and disregarding the lobbying efforts of the
streetcar company, on December 20, 1920, city council reversed itself and voted by a substantial
majority to substitute limited parking in place of non-parking now in force on downtown
streets.284
Businesses’ anxiety about parking focused exclusively on customers, and never
mentioned where their employees might park. Others saw workers as part of the problem.
Someone who worked downtown would often occupy a single on-street parking space for the
entire working day. A 1929 study of city planning in the U.S. found that “many cars assumed to
be those of shoppers are really those of mercantile and commercial employees who use the
streets for day-storage purposes, an uneconomic and unsocial proceeding in the whole scheme of
urban life.” Lack of turnover translated into reduced sales, so the worker who hogged a space all
day long deserved censure.285
Atlanta merchants firmly believed that parking facilitated shopping, and the upper class
women’s groups concurred. These were women who would drive themselves, or be driven,
downtown to shop. They would not have to take a trolley. The automobile associations opposed
almost any sort of restriction on motorists. The combined pressure from these powerful groups
led the city to adopt parking policies which they erroneously believed would stimulate
development.286
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The major reason for the intransigence of the accessibility dilemma was that the growth
coalition divided over the issue. Some wanted smooth, efficient traffic flow, which they insisted
would enable city growth, while others willingly sacrificed flow to ease customer access to
downtown businesses. The Atlanta Motor Club argued for congestion relief by keeping the main
traffic arteries free of parking. They wanted to abolish the thirty-minute parking provision on
those streets, equating it with all-day parking. Writing in the City Builder, the club’s secretary,
W. G. Peebles, Jr., opined that the merchants did not understand that “thirty-minute-parking is
taking dollars and cents out of their business. Nevertheless, it is true.”287
Peebles questioned how one car owner had the right to park his vehicle and clog the
entire street, blocking and inconveniencing a hundred other car owners. Police Chief James L.
Beavers informed the motor club that merchants constantly complained about cars blocking their
entrances, yet those same men also said to him privately, “We want all the congestion we can get
and would like to see every street in Atlanta congested almost beyond movement.” Calling such
sentiment “petty selfishness,” the COC secretary called for city council to take action against
traffic jams, “the convenience of the entire public being of more importance than the
accommodation of a minority.”288
Virtually all of the city’s merchants pushed back against any parking restraints, even
against their fellow pro-growth partners. John E. Smith, successful car dealer and chair of the
traffic committee of the Atlanta Automobile Dealers’ Association, wrote to the newspaper
demanding parking privileges for customers. He maintained the thirty-minute turnover brought
more customers into the shopping district. “Deprive the car owner of parking space and he will
trade where he can park,” Smith declared, telling his fellow car dealers that in the interest of their
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customers, they should fight no-parking regulations and support time-limited parking. He
concluded by urging everyone simply to accept the unalterable fact that the Peachtree-Whitehall
corridor would never be a speedway.289
Councilman James L. Wells, chair of the committee which had drafted the 1923 traffic
ordinance, answered Smith’s letter directly in his address to the Atlanta Automobile Association.
He contended that the no-parking regulation would not harm merchants or automobile dealers,
and that if they would give it a six-month trial, they would be convinced. His memory must have
been short. The 1920 no-parking regulation had proved very successful in relieving congestion,
and popular with motorists and trolley riders. Merchants and car dealers hated it, and got it
rewritten within six months.
Wells predicted that one day, the Peachtree-Whitehall corridor would become a noparking zone (as it is today). Similarly, Judge Shepard Bryan, president of the Atlanta Safety
Council, decried the parking of automobiles in narrow downtown streets, asserting, “It is not
congested streets which make an enterprising city. It is the movement of traffic, and the more
speedily the current of traffic is enabled to move . . . the more business the city can transact.”
Individual businessmen had conflicting opinions on how to regulate cars to maximize profit, but
the growth coalition did not divide over the automobile. It did split over which should occupy the
majority of the roadways: moving or stationary vehicles. The roads had been turned over to the
cars; but the question remained. How would they divvy up the most prized real estate of all—
Atlanta’s city streets?290
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Atlanta never generated a satisfactory answer to that question. Neither did any other city
in the United States. The problem of the “standing vehicle” proved unsolvable to officials and
businessmen who refused to act in their own best interests.291 Most did not foresee a time when
traffic congestion would actually drive customers away, and retail merchants would be forced to
follow them out to suburban neighborhoods where a growing portion of the city’s white
population was already en route.
During the 1920s, the decentralization of commercial downtown began, led by smaller
food-related shops and, ironically, the filling stations essential to the operation of the automobile.
In response, the city’s so-called leaders did not lead, but continued to dither between parking and
non-parking, between constant congestion and easy travel. The automobile made possible
residential development in outlying areas, but gridlocked streets negated one of the car’s major
amenities—speed. The success of the automobile in its conquest of city streets would contribute
greatly to the decline of the center city.
Not everyone was as short-sighted as city leaders in Atlanta and elsewhere. In 1927, a
group of nationally-prominent city planners and traffic consultants studied the problem. Their
report included a set of principles designed to assist municipal authorities in formulating parking
and traffic flow policies. Their first principle stated that the streets existed for the general public,
to be used for pedestrians and for the transportation of people and goods. This statement, which
outrageously included the rights of those on foot, stood in strong contrast to the prevailing
opinion that streets should serve primarily as vehicle conduits. Sadly, most city governments
ignored the pedestrian aspect of the experts’ first principle.292
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The report strongly recommended a multi-faceted, street-control superstructure, with
various laws and regulatory
devices to ensure safety and
expedite traffic flow. The
experts cited one specific
example of a street
obstruction common in
most cities, including
Atlanta: the curbside
gasoline pump (see figure at
right293). Besides the fire

Figure 23. Curbside gas pump, 36-40 South Pryor Street,
Atlanta, ca. 1927.

and safety hazards,
pumping gas at the curb also obstructed moving traffic to an incredible degree. By the late 1920s,
many gas stations offered drive-in service, as the experts suggested. To do so, however, required
more land and they had to move away from downtown to find affordable property to expand.294
The report urged that street regulations take into account the needs of “public
transportation vehicles.” It acknowledged that streetcars and buses, which had to stop in the
street to load and unload passengers, had the right to do so, and should be accommodated. As
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with pedestrian rights, most civic authorities, including Atlanta’s, ignored the experts’ opinion
on the validity of the needs of mass transit.295
The traffic consultants also called for limited parking in business districts, and asserted
the superior right to move a car over the right to store a car in the public right-of-way. They
bemoaned the short-sightedness of merchants who opposed any restrictions on curb parking, and
predicted that eventually all large new buildings would be required to provide on-site parking for
their employees, tenants, and customers. Overall, the report contained an accurate assessment of
the parking problem and offered reasonable solutions, which most cities ignored.296
Atlanta’s city council, between 1919 and 1929, enacted, then retracted or overhauled new
traffic ordinances on at least eight different occasions.297 Often the new no-parking signs were
not completely installed before council voted to lift the parking restriction. Eliminating on-street
parking proved to be the intractable issue of the decade, one which was never satisfactorily
resolved. Municipal governments in cities like Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Detroit, and New
York also enacted, revoked, and re-enacted parking regulations, but none with the cyclic rapidity
of Atlanta. They never settled on a permanent solution. The uneasy half-measures satisfied no
one and did not relieve traffic congestion. As a New Jersey traffic engineer wrote in 1927,
hoping for a single solution to traffic congestion that would “benefit all and injure none” was
absurd; traffic relief could only come through compromise. The inability of the power elites to
reach a consensus or a compromise perpetuated the “parking evil,” and ensured that traffic
gridlock remained a constant in Atlanta’s business district.298
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Atlanta, like most urban areas, still struggles to achieve stability between parked and
moving vehicles on its public streets. It is more successful now than in the 1920s due to the large
amount of land devoted to parking. About 20% of Atlanta’s central business district parcels are
utilized exclusively for parking decks or surface lots. That percentage goes up to about 33%
when mixed-use sites, comprised of building(s) and parking on a single parcel, are included. The
percentage would go even higher if on-street parking were counted. In the twenties, city officials
and businessmen had not yet realized just how much downtown land parked cars required.299
The dearth of off-street parking contributed to the parking problem, and the development
of this important new element of the motordom infrastructure took some time. Although growth
coalition members divided over on-street parking, none argued over the benefits of off-street
parking, and a number of them eagerly embraced opportunities to profit from this emerging
enterprise. Owners of valuable vacant downtown parcels converted them to surface parking lots,
but greater returns could be found constructing public parking garages. Once again, the
automobile demanded accommodation, and pro-car, pro-growth advocates altered the city’s
physical environment to give it more space.
The new facilities had the capacity to provide real traffic congestion relief, if only they
had been fully utilized. But Atlanta’s 1929 traffic survey showed that of the nearly 10,000
parking spaces available in downtown lots and public garages, only 6,000 were regularly in
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use.300 Of course, one had to pay to park in those, while curbside parking remained free. The
country’s first parking meter was six years in the future.301
By the mid-1920s, most new hotels and department stores offered parking spaces to their
guests and customers. Office buildings did not lag too far behind. Developer Charles Palmer
observed, regarding his construction of a parking garage attached to the Glenn Building, “It is as
essential in this modern day for office buildings to make provision for the automobiles of those
who visit them as it was three generations ago for the storekeeper on Main street to have rails
and hitching blocks for . . . the many people who visited his establishment using horses and
buggies.”302
The City of Atlanta had its own municipal garage in which to storage and maintain cityowned vehicles, and car dealership buildings combined showrooms and garages into their
designs. These smaller facilities served only clients and employees. In contrast, the new-build
public garages expanded dramatically to meet the demand created by the city’s on-again, offagain curbside parking restraints. The multi-story, car behemoths holding more than a thousand
cars dwarfed the single-story, full-service garages of the early 1900s, many of which went out of
business or re-located to the growing suburbs.303
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The old moniker “automobile stable” had understandably faded from use as horses
disappeared from the city’s streets. By the twenties, “automobile hotel” emerged as the
descriptor for a very high-end parking garage. These large, modern, luxurious structures offered
repair, maintenance, and cleaning services in
addition to parking, and provided elevators for
the customers (see advertisement at right). Earlier
garages had used freight elevators to transport
cars to upper floors, but new ramp systems
allowed for self-parking, an innovation which
appealed to a driver’s sense of independence and
reduced costs for budget-conscious operators.
The higher-end garages, however, continued to
employ car “jockeys” (valets), showing that
horse-related terminology was sometimes still in
use, even if the horse was not.
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Figure 24. Ivy Street Garage ad; Atlanta
Constitution, July 27, 1925.

One of Atlanta’s finest new automobile hotels, the Ivy Street Garage, was the city’s first
to incorporate the very latest access mode, the Fernand E. d’Humy Motoramp System of
Building Design, patented in 1919. The d'Humy system used a two-unit staggered floor
construction, with level of the floors in one unit located midway between the level of the floors
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in the other unit (see image below305). Shorter ramps reduced the grade, making it possible for
large cars to ascend in high gear and with improved visibility. The design also maximized

Figure 25. Cross-section of d'Humy ramp system, 1921.
valuable parking surface, and was recognized as the best configuration for a multi-story parking
garage.306
The six-story Ivy Street building had room for 1100 parked cars, but the owner chose to
limit parking to 600 spaces, reserving the upper floors for leased offices. The efficiencies of the
d’Humy and other ramp systems soon rendered the elevator garage obsolete, and by 1929, the
ramp garage was recommended in traffic studies as the complement to no-curbside-parking
regulations.307
The garage at 37-39 Ivy Street [Peachtree Center Ave.] was the brainchild of Bolling
Hampton Jones (1897-1933), a banker, manufacturer, progressive thinker, and enthusiastic
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participant in the social, civic, and political life of the city. One-time postmaster for the City of
Atlanta, and chairman of the board of the Fulton National Bank, Jones financed the venture with
7% real estate bonds offered by his new company, the Ivy Street Corporation. The yet-to-beconstructed garage, sometimes called the Bolling Jones Building, served as security for the
bonds.308
Designed by local engineering firm Lockwood-Greene and built by Griffin Construction,
the Ivy Street Garage, like other modern garages, had a rather plain façade: pale yellow brick
exterior with brown diapering on the front (west-facing) cornice; ground floor storefront
windows; upper-story windows in every façade to provide light and ventilation; and multiple
vehicle entrances, each requiring a new sidewalk curb cut. The Yellow Cab Company building
on the east side of Ivy Street [Peachtree Center Ave.] had to be demolished to make room for the
new combination garage/office building. The implementation of the new structure exemplified
the cycle of 1920s urban redevelopment, the old being demolished to make way for a new and
different addition to the increasingly motorized landscape. The location proved ideal for
businessmen, situated only two blocks off Five Points and across the street from the newlyenlarged Hurt Building, reputed at the time to be the largest office building south of
Philadelphia. Opening on May 5, 1925, the new garage helped meet downtown Atlanta’s
desperate need for parking space.309
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It must be stated clearly and definitively and in the face of widespread misinformation
that the Ivy Street Garage most emphatically was not Atlanta’s first garage. Neither was it the
city’s first parking garage, nor even its first multi-story parking garage. Its only “first” was its

Figure 26. Ivy Street Garage, October 27,
1946.

Figure 27. Kell Hall being demolished,
August 3, 2019.

d’Humy ramp system—the first one in Atlanta, that is. Garages in forty-two other cities in the
U.S., England, and Canada already employed the ramp system, and another d’Humy-type garage
was under construction in downtown at the time the Ivy Street Garage (see photos above310)
opened.311
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George M. Sparks, director of the Atlanta Extension Center of the University System of
Georgia [now Georgia State University], purchased the garage for the school in 1945.312 Wellknown regional architect G. Lloyd Preacher undertook extensive renovations to render the
structure into something remotely resembling a classroom building. Everyone complained about
the small elevators, not appreciating the fact that at the time of their original installation, they
represented the height of luxury for an automobile hotel.
Kell Hall, for the duration of its existence, exemplified how-not-to-do historic
preservation by the choice of an incompatible new use for a very specifically designed historic
structure. After its totally inadequate conversion to a classroom building, the interior appeared
inexplicably and frustratingly convoluted to the uninitiated, while others simply enjoyed the
recreational opportunities afforded by the indoor ramps (e.g., skateboarding, bike riding, roller
blading). The building’s plain and unassuming exterior was typical for a parking garage of the
era. Despite its rather pedestrian nature, the pattern on Kell’s west façade was valued as the sole
surviving example of brick diapering in downtown Atlanta. Some preservationists, including this
writer, actually did mourn the passing of this quixotic and irreplaceable relic.313
Ivy Hall anchored the school’s central campus development for the next 30 years. On
March 11, 1964, Georgia State College re-named it Kell Science Hall in honor of the school’s
first dean, Wayne Sailley Kell. In the summer of 2019, Georgia State University demolished Kell
Hall to make room for a pedestrian plaza, a striking reversal of the city’s usual pattern of cars
displacing people. Atlanta lost its last, but never its first, early twentieth-century parking garage.
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Upon its opening, the “mammoth” Ivy Street garage was lauded with customary Atlantan
boosterish extravagance as “one of the largest and perhaps the most modern structures of its
nature in the world,” and “perhaps the best and most efficiently constructed building of its kind
in the world.” More important than its architectural marvels, however, the garage provided
protection from weather and theft. Motor vehicles required indoor storage until the mid-1920s,
when durable paints and engines that could withstand the cold became available.314
A garage also gave businessmen “a place to leave their cars without the danger of being
stolen or their owners being served with a summons to court for parking too long on the central
business streets.” The possibility of auto theft was quite real in Atlanta, with an average of 1,174
cars reported stolen annually between 1920 and 1929. Getting a parking ticket in downtown,
though, remained an infrequent occurrence during the twenties. That situation changed only
occasionally, depending on the varying levels of enforcement provided by Atlanta Police
Department.315
5.6

Policing Traffic
The problem of an inadequate number of officers to serve and protect perennially plagued

Atlanta’s police chiefs. Its crime rate, higher than the national average for cities of its size, rose
during the twenties. The arrival of the automobile, with all its attendant necessities, only
exacerbated the situation. But the number of policemen in proportion to the city’s population did
not increase at all. Civic organizations clamored incessantly for more enforcement of traffic laws
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to relieve congestion and reduce carnage, and the police chiefs pleaded with the city council for
more men. The ongoing lack of personnel meant juggling officers between regular patrol duty
and specialized traffic duty, leaving one or the other understaffed and everyone, except
miscreants, unsatisfied.316
Into the void stepped the Vigilance Committee of the Atlanta Safety Council. This group
of 100 motorists (whose identities were kept secret) cared greatly about the city’s businessfriendly reputation. If the police had inadequate resources to keep traffic flowing safely and
smoothly, they would assist. Their enforcement activities included observing traffic violations;
taking license numbers; warning violators via mail that subsequent infractions would be reported
to the police; keeping a list of violators and their offenses; reporting third-time offenders to the
police; and testifying against them in court. The vigilantes proved remarkably watchful; in the
first week they sent more than fifty letters to violators. By the end of their tenure, they had
recorded thousands of violations and induced many motorists to drive more carefully.317
The Vigilance Committee lasted only about six months. In early 1924, the Atlanta Safety
Council instituted in its place a Safe Drivers’ Club, whose members promised to support safe
motoring by their exemplary driving habits. Dovetailing with the ending of the Vigilance
Committee was the creation of the police department’s Accident Prevention Bureau. Although
never explicitly stated, the creation of the Vigilance Committee was an act of desperation by
concerned businessmen to improve traffic conditions and Atlanta’s image. After that brief stint
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of considerable citizen involvement, city leaders finally instituted an official police squad to take
over enforcement.
Most large cities in the U.S. already had a special section within their police departments
devoted exclusively to traffic control. Atlanta’s belated bureau, enthusiastically endorsed by the
Atlanta Safety Council, went operational on January 1, 1924.318 The new section was tasked with
preventing accidents, facilitating travel, and relieving traffic jams and congestion; it proved
highly effective. During its first year, traffic arrests increased 40%, and traffic casualties dropped
50%.319
Despite the impressive numbers, the city council voted to abolish the bureau after only 14
months, purportedly in the interests of “efficiency and economy.” Immediately, the number of
crashes and deaths rose. Over the course of one week in 1925, six people died and 33 were
injured in 62 traffic collisions. An editorial railed against the mounting carnage, blamed it on the
loss of the traffic bureau, and stated, “Every big city in the country finds it necessary to
specialize in traffic enforcement. Atlanta cannot longer be an exception. . . . Atlanta is suffering
economically from the present situation. Something must be done.”320
The writer smartly hit on the two points most likely to spark some action from city
leaders: (1) other big cities have a traffic bureau; and (2) it is costing us money not having one.
Usually Atlanta leapt at an opportunity to prove its progressive character by emulating
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northeastern cities, and acted quickly when negatives like carnage and congestion threatened its
business reputation. But neither argument proved persuasive this time.
No new version of a special police traffic division materialized. Instead, the pile of bodies
grew higher as traffic arrests plummeted. It got so bad that Councilman Edward Hamilton Inman
(1881-1931), chair of the council’s police committee and city influencer par excellence,
threatened to fire any officer not making enough traffic arrests. Reciting the abysmal statistics
for the first six months of 1925 (849 collisions, 21 deaths, more than 800 injured), he said, “If
you men don’t work better, you simply won’t work at all.” As usual, enforcement efforts briefly
increased for a time, then quietly subsided.321
Three deadly years later, the newspaper wrote even more emphatically about the effect of
traffic casualties on the city:
Something must be done to stop the number of accidents, in the name of
humanity, and—cold-bloodedly speaking—in the interest of the economic welfare
of this city and community. This is the great trading center of the southeast.
Atlanta has the largest retail and department store trade of any city in the sixth
federal reserve district. . . . Visitors must not become apprehensive as to the safety
of Atlanta’s streets. Thousands motor to the city each week to shop, go to the
theater, and enjoy the cosmopolitan life.322
According to this article, traffic collisions negatively impacted the health of Atlanta’s citizens,
but more importantly, the health of its reputation as a regional shopping and entertainment
destination. Playing its role in the growth coalition, the paper publicly called for civic action to
halt this ongoing threat to city expansion and prosperity.
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The understaffed police department had no adequate response to the dilemma. Focusing
resources on downtown traffic enforcement allowed robbers and burglars to operate more freely
in the suburbs. Taking officers off traffic duty to walk patrol in residential neighborhoods left the
central streets in a tangle. In 1928, Chief Beavers observed how untenable the situation had
become:
The increased traffic on our streets has made it necessary to take a large number
of officers off of patrol duty and put them to regulating traffic, thus leaving a
large portion of the city without police protection. This condition is growing
worse, and will continue to grow worse until we are given sufficient officers to
properly police the city as well as to regulate traffic.323
Not until 1929 did the city again create a special squad of officers assigned exclusively to
traffic duty, which they continue to maintain in various forms today. When the new section with
20 men on foot and 24 on motorcycles went to work, the number of traffic arrests more than
doubled (see graph below). Traffic arrests had hit a new peak of over 8,000 in 1924 with the
creation of the Accident Prevention Bureau; they dropped to less than 5,000 in 1925 after the
bureau’s dissolution. With the establishment of the new traffic squad, traffic arrests more than
doubled in 1929.324
By the end of the decade, city and community leaders as well as the police department
had come to understand that traffic enforcement could no longer be a sporadic affair. The nature
of policing had changed. Traffic control was on its way to becoming a principal component of
policing, and the reason why today’s officers often refer to their job as “working the streets.”
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The police were not the only ones having to accommodate the new circumstances created
by the more cars on city streets. In addition to status, speed, pleasure, and convenience, driving
an automobile provided countless citizens with a novel experience: an up-close and personal
encounter with a city policeman. In 1906, officers made only 56 traffic arrests; in 1929, they
made 10,921. Large numbers of city dwellers for the first time faced an arrest for vehicle law
infractions, though few were taken to jail immediately. Most violators simply received a
summons to appear the next day in Recorder’s Court, but the process was unfamiliar and
upsetting. It also proved costly in higher insurance rates for serious or repeat offenders.325
The number of overall arrests in the city of Atlanta during the 1920s skyrocketed. Also,
the number of white arrests rose dramatically. The automobile accounts for both. In general
fewer African Americans owned cars than whites, and consequently broke fewer traffic laws.
The car proved to be the great equalizer in the city’s race-based policing: for the first time,
greater numbers of whites, both men and women, were arrested than Blacks. An in-depth look at
vehicle ownership and traffic arrests can be found in the next chapter.
The possibility of an in-the-street interaction with law enforcement would have been
unthinkable to the majority of Atlantans in 1900 or 1910, but during the 1920s, had become an
increasingly commonplace occurrence. Life would never be the same again, as even the most
respectable citizens and elected officials now appeared in court on traffic charges. Alternatively,
riding a trolley seldom resulted in an arrest and citation—an additional benefit of mass transit
seldom considered then or today. Declining streetcar ridership exposed more people, as
automobile drivers or passengers, to the regulatory superstructure established for motordom.

The citizen of today is likewise “arrested” when given a traffic ticket, even though most people are
unaware of the fact. A police officer is free to take a driver to jail for running a stop sign, but seldom does as the
jails would be even more crowded than they are now, plus it is a boring waste of time.
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5.7

Regulating Streetcars
The high volume of automobiles resulted from the actions taken by the pro-growth

coalition to remake the city to accommodate and privilege cars at the expense of other street
users. Mass transit in the form of the streetcar paid the highest cost, as motor vehicle proponents
marginalized and eventually eliminated it completely. Continuous city expansion during the
1920s required the traction

Table 9. GA Railway & Power Track Mileage Increases

company to lay always-expensive

Type of Track
Single Track
Double Track

new track as it double-tracked

1905
72
70

1918
68
150

1920
68.324
157.840

1927
58.582
175.722

formerly single-track lines (see table above326). By mid-decade, Georgia Power began utilizing
“motor coaches” (aka, buses) to serve customers residing in outlying suburbs. It was a significant
concession, signaling the switch from rail to road—the latest development in mass transit.327
In the early twenties, the Georgia Railway and Power Company faced significant
challenges on numerous fronts: labor conflicts, low fares, poor morale, a bad public image, and
stiff competition from the jitneys. They also confronted a skeptical city council and an
antagonistic mayor (James Key) who saw no need to lend any form of aid. Labor problems took
early precedence as the local union staged a three-day walkout on March 10, 1920 in a pay and
contract dispute, following two strikes the previous decade. During the strike, the Atlanta

Table data is from James M. Wright, “The Fare Problem of the Atlanta Street Railways,” Journal of
Land & Public Utility Economics 6, no. 2 (May 1930): 183.
327
Atlanta’s last streetcar ran on April 10, 1949. It could be argued that the demise of the streetcar system
would have occurred much earlier except for two exceptional events: the Great Depression and World War II. Both
curbed the use of automobiles by the general public and increased reliance on trolleys. The reasons are numerous
and not the subject of this study, but both events brought disruptions to the nation’s transportation system as it
functioned in late 1929. The result was a sort of artificial extension of the life of the streetcar while the use of
motorized vehicles was temporarily curtailed.
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Constitution reported on the resulting “grand parade” of nearly 20,000 cars and trucks in
downtown—with not a trolley in sight.328
Unfortunately, worse-than-usual traffic congestion ruined the party. “The statement has
often made that our streets would take care of the traffic if it were not for the streetcars. Another
balloon bursted. . . . Anyone who was down town between 5 and 7 p. m. during the strike will
affirm this.” The reporter’s eyewitness testimony that streetcars actually provided traffic relief
quickly faded from memory, and the familiar narrative—streetcars cause congestion—quickly
regained and retained its dominance.329
Annual contracts and pay raises brought the strikers back to work. A second fare hike,
from six cents to seven cents, went into effect. The company hired the nationally-renowned
public relations firm of Ivy Lee to refurbish its image. President Arkwright instituted a campaign
to train workers and build collegiality and pride. He personally travelled the local speaking
circuit to push back against the false narrative that streetcars caused congestion.330
In one speech to the Atlanta Automobile Association at the prestigious Capital City Club,
he made three main points. First, his company paid for the pavement that motor vehicles
destroyed. Second, the automobile cut into the company’s revenues by free-hauling prospective
streetcar passengers, and by competition from the jitneys. Third, parked cars created congestion,

Martin, Mule to Marta, 2, 1902-1950, 60; James M. Wright, “The Fare Problem of the Atlanta Street
Railways [Continuation],” Journal of Land & Public Utility Economics 6, no. 3 (August 1930): 278, 87.
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The first fare hike, from five to six cents, was enacted in 1919—the first streetcar fare hike in 22 years.
“‘Come Seven’ Is Cry of Car Conductors To Their Passengers,” Atlanta Constitution, October 2, 1920; Martin,
Mule to Marta, 2, 1902-1950, 80-81. “Ivy Lee Retained by Power Company,” Atlanta Constitution, May 17, 1921;
Carson, The Trolley Titans: A Mobile History of Atlanta, 78. Ivy Ledbetter Lee (1877-1934), a native Georgian,
established a publicity firm in New York City with clients like Pennsylvania Railroad, Bethlehem Steel, the
Rockefellers, and Standard Oil. He is considered one of the founders of modern public relations.
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slowing streetcars and disrupting their schedules. He predicted that on-street parking in
downtown would eventually be banned altogether with so many people driving cars.331
Amazingly, the automobile men gave Arkwright an enthusiastic reception. He was one of
the power elite, a member of the most prestigious clubs, listed in the Social Register, and an
owner of cars. He had an abundance of close friends in the automobile industry. He also presided
over Georgia Railway and Power Company which supplied electricity and gas as well as
streetcars to the city; every person at that meeting was one of his customers. While the speech
might not have changed any minds about the place of the motor vehicle in Atlanta, it did
generate some much-needed goodwill toward the traction company—goodwill which would
soon prove critical.
By 1923, things were looking up for the street railway system, and they placed an order
for 33 new streetcars. Even better, the company’s arch nemesis, Mayor James L. Key, was voted
out of office. New mayor, Walter Arthur Sims (1880-1953) had never been a huge streetcar fan,
complaining that they did not have enough “hustle.” Sims, like all of Atlanta’s mayors during the
1920s, was not in the top tier of the growth coalition. An attorney, he was active in numerous
fraternal organizations, belonged to none of the exclusive clubs, but was a member of First
Baptist Church as well as the Ku Klux Klan. During his two terms in office (1923-27), the Klan
prospered until its self-implosion; the traction company won its ten-year battle against the
jitneys; and Atlanta became one of the best paved cities in the South.
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The first jitney appeared
on the streets of Atlanta in
January 1915. It operated like a
cross between a city bus and a
taxicab (see photo at right332),
running up and down Peachtree
Street between Five Points and

Figure 28. Lakewood Jitney, Fulton County, 1920-29.

the split at West Peachtree
Street, stopping to pick-up or discharge riders. The standard fare was a jit, a slang term for a
nickel (five cents).333
Atlanta’s first jitney ordinance passed in 1919 at the urging of Mayor Key, who had been
militating for municipal ownership of all public utilities since 1906. The law imposed few
requirements on the owners, and did nothing to restrict their areas of operation, even when their
runs matched the most heavily-traveled sections of trolley routes. Unlike the streetcar franchise,
no regulation required jitneys to cover all sectors of the city, leaving them free to cherry-pick the
most profitable lines.334
By the twenties, many jitney operations had evolved into sophisticated operations, having
standardized routes with scheduled stops very much like a trolley line, except on tires, not rails.
The earliest jitney type, a small five-passenger touring car, was joined by seven-passenger cars,
and even 10- to 20-seat Mason Road King buses, making serious inroads into streetcar revenues.
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Figure 27 photo is FUL-940-85, from Vanishing Georgia, Georgia Archives, University System of
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The jit fare increased to ten cents.335 The American Electric Railway Association issued this
stern warning:
Just so long as jitneys and buses are permitted to skim the cream off of street
railway traffic, they are working an injustice . . . to the car company. . . . The
jitneys take away a large part of the street railways profitable portion of the
business. The short haul business in the thickly populated districts is the portion
of the revenue of the street railway companies from which they can obtain that
comparatively small amount of profit which enables them to live and give service
to the community as a whole. . . . The operation of jitneys should be confined to
non-competitive and supplementary or auxiliary service. 336
Some city council members saw jitneys as healthy competition to the street railway
system, but estimates place the amount of fares they cost the streetcars during the 1920s at
$1,500-$2,000 per day. The street railway system was losing money. New, outlying
neighborhoods requested that trolley lines be extended to their locations, but the company could
not raise enough capital for expansion. Carson observes that by this time, “The permissive jitney
control law was looking more and more like an act of revenge perpetrated by petulant politicians
rather than action taken in the public interest by responsible legislators.”337
In 1923, city council did pass an ordinance requiring each jitney owner to obtain a $1,000
indemnity bond. Because of the cost, 66 of the 95 jitney companies ceased operations. The
remaining jitneys could no longer conduct business on roads with trolley tracks or within two
blocks of a streetcar.338
Even with its competition curtailed, Georgia Railway and Power remained unsatisfied.
The company had already contemplated expanding into the motor coach business because laying
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track to reach riders in outlying suburbs proved too costly. It also realized that its bus service
would be subject to a number of regulations from which jitneys were exempt. In a preemptive
move to eliminate jitneys entirely, it boldly petitioned council in 1924 for an exclusive franchise
to supply all of the mass transportation within the city. It was an either/or proposition in their
view. As Atkinson, stated, “A highly regulated and taxed business and an unregulated business
cannot both live on the same streets. . . . It must be a choice between jitneys and the street
railway. Both cannot survive on the same streets.”339
The city council held a well-attended public hearing on the petition. Power company
executives Atkinson and Arkwright spoke in its favor. Not surprisingly, the major speaker
against was attorney and former mayor, James Key, representing the Atlanta Jitney Bus
Association. Council chose to defer action, but citizens in the community, including many
influential businessmen and real estate investors, continued to express their support of the
streetcars, along with Atlanta’s City Club, Motor Club, and Safety Council. The Atlanta
Automobile Association took a neutral position, simply calling on the city to build more streets
in every direction. In general, growth advocates endorsed the abolition of jitneys, whose unfair
competition threatened the streetcar and soon-to-be bus company, both of which aided municipal
growth.340
In the midst of the jitney war, the traction company gained a strong ally in John A.
Beeler. The city council agreed that Atlanta needed a survey of its traffic problems. In February
1924, they chose the Beeler Organization, Inc., Consulting Engineers, of New York City to
conduct a ten-month-long study paid for by the traction company. The report’s findings and
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recommendations, issued in December 1924, vindicated the streetcar company’s assertions about
fares, the jitneys, and prevailing traffic patterns.341
The street railway had long claimed, based on its own studies, that during the evening
rush hour (5-6 p.m.), motor vehicles constituted 90% of the traffic, and streetcars only 9%.
However, autos conveyed only 17.75% of the people, while streetcars carried more than 82% of
the people. Most traffic surveys counted the number of vehicles, when in reality the number of
passengers was a more important count. Cars carried on average two persons, while a streetcar
averaged 49 persons. Taking into account the greater length of streetcars, the average trolley still
transported 49 people to the six carried by three automobiles. The street rail system did not cause
the bulk of the city’s gridlock (cars did), and it provided a much-needed service to Atlanta’s
traveling public.342
Beeler’s report fully supported the streetcar company’s statistics. During a single rush
hour, it documented 346 streetcars carrying 16,286 people, while 3,505 other vehicles carried
only 6,345 people in the same period. More than ten times the number of cars transported less
than half as many individuals as the trolleys. A compilation of the annual numbers, costs, and
miles traveled were even more compelling (see table below343). The study documented the
overwhelming economy and efficiency of the streetcar over the automobile in moving people
through the city. It recommended that streetcars should be given precedence in traffic movement
because more people were dependent on them.344
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A 1928 Detroit report comparing private automobiles to public transportation, echoed
Beeler’s findings, declaring that “if either type of vehicle is to be given preference over the other,
Table 10. 1924 Atlanta Passenger Vehicle Use and Cost

Vehicle Type
Streetcars
Private automobiles
Jitney buses
Taxicabs

Cost to
Number of
Total Cost to
Number Passengers
Passenger Users in the
of
Passengers
Annual
(cents per Seven Mile
Carried
Vehicles
per Trip
Mileage¹
mile)
Annually¹
Zone²
330
75,500,000
35.3 14,000,000
2.00
$5,139,000
27,540
54,000,000
1.8 176,000,000
5.16 $16,391,000
136
4,500,000
3.6
6,000,000
4.26
$417,000
147
1,300,000
1.4
3,000,000
32.18
$742,000

¹In round numbers. ²The Seven Mile Zone denoted the area of operations of the Georgia Railway and Power Company (which
included electricity, gas, steam, and streetcars). It was a circle with a seven-mile radius, centered at the northeast corner of the
Union Passenger Depot, and extended well beyond Atlanta's 1924 city limits. Its modern boundaries would roughly be Buckhead,
north; Decatur, east; Hapeville, south; and I-285, west.

it unquestionably must be the street car and bus.” That study, conducted by civil engineers, found
that nearly 80% of the passengers in the afternoon rush hour were carried by mass transit
(streetcars and buses), which comprised less than 6% of all the vehicles on the road. In
comparison, only 20% of passengers traveled by automobiles and taxicabs, which comprised
85% of the moving vehicles. The motorists were the ones contributing the most to traffic
congestion. Mass transportation in its most efficient forms provided the only solution to
transportation problems in the largest cities.345
Beeler’s report also had suggestions for improving the efficacy of the streetcars;
specifically, re-routing trolleys off the Peachtree-Whitehall corridor, leaving it and the Spring
Street viaduct free for motor vehicle traffic only. In addition to increasing trolley fares, the report
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also strongly advocated for a unified transportation system, eliminating jitneys and allowing the
streetcar company to extend its service using motor coach lines.346
Beeler, in no uncertain terms, censured the jitneys as parasites. “The jitney is merely
living off the best and most highly developed territory and operating on well paved
thoroughfares largely paid for by the railway.” In 1925, as a result of his Report, the city council
finally voted to revoke the
1919 jitney ordinance, and
created a new, much more
restrictive law. Among other
requirements, jitney buses had
a 17-passenger minimum, and
could not operate in sections
of the city already served by

Figure 29. Fageol double-deck bus to Morningside Park.

the street railway company.347 The jitneys were not abolished and could still run in Atlanta, but
not where the streetcar company had operations. Within days of the new ordinance taking effect,
Georgia Railway and Power announced the inauguration of its bus service to the suburban
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neighborhoods of Ansley Park, Sylvan Hills, and Morningside (see photo above348). It proved a
successful power move which effectively eliminated jitney bus service in Atlanta.349
The company implemented other Beeler recommendations throughout 1925 and 1926 to
increase efficiency, attract customers, and reduce traffic congestion. It re-routed tracks,
purchased larger streetcars, and spruced up all rolling stock, inside and out. The public
responded with generous patronage and company revenues increased, especially with the new
bus lines. The power company’s public relations manager exuberantly proclaimed the street rail
systems good service, without which no city could progress. “It would be futile for Atlanta to
invite new industries to locate here if good street car service could not be listed among Atlanta’s
many assets.” Some writers have called the late 1920s the trolley system’s golden years, yet
Garrett registers the irony that at the height of the company’s popularity, the rubber-tired buses
“sounded the first faint death knell for the steel-wheeled street car.”350
One negative constant remained from the early years of the decade: the refrain that
streetcars caused congestion. Studies, statistics, logic, even the assertions of the national traffic
engineering experts did not matter. Most city officials and influential businessmen cast the
trolley in the role of “villain rather than victim” of road congestion. Instead of seeing mass
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transit by rail as a solution, they saw it as the problem. Either they truly did not understand the
difference between moving numbers of people versus moving numbers of vehicles through the
streets, or they chose to ignore the facts. They undeniably preferred to retain the autonomy and
flexibility afforded by automobiles for private and commercial use. At the same time they
endlessly bemoaned the congestion, collisions, and carnage—and the subsequent damage to
Atlanta’s reputation—generated by their own actions and choices.351
In 1925, city leaders began to push for the elimination of “unnecessary” trolley stops
throughout the city. The moves were part of the Forward Atlanta campaign, a massive city
advertising scheme initiated by the Chamber of Commerce, which will be discussed in more
depth in a later chapter. As the name made obvious, a major theme of the campaign was the
progressive character of Atlanta, its constant forward motion as a successful and expanding locus
of commerce, industry, and economic opportunity.
A series of newspaper ads referenced a more literal component of the “forward motion”
idea—the rapid movement of traffic through the city. Three prominent men and Forward Atlanta
leaders personally appeared in these ads. Ivan E. Allen, Sr.’s credentials are listed (see
advertisement below). Thaddeus Johnson (1879-1953) was president of the Atlanta Automobile
Dealers’ Association and manager of the city’s Olds Motor Works (later Oldsmobile). W. R. C.
Smith (1872-1941) was president of the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, a highly successful city
publisher and the prime mover in the Forward Atlanta campaign. Their three ads called for
Atlanta to speed up and give automobiles a chance to move. Slow street rail service hindered not
just traffic, but also city progress. Streetcars acted as “a dam against the swift and regular flow of

351

Carson, The Trolley Titans: A Mobile History of Atlanta, 91.

200
automobile traffic during rush hours,” because other vehicles could not pass a stopped streetcar.
Unnecessary trolley stops absolutely had to be eliminated.352
Ironically, the streetcar
company paid for the ads. Georgia
Railway and Power played an
active role in Forward Atlanta, and
it also had an interest in reducing
the number of streetcar stops.
Routes with more stops created
scheduling difficulties, especially
coordinating with feeder buses and
interurban lines, plus they were
slower and more costly for the

Figure 30. Forward Atlanta ad, Atlanta Constitution,
December 7, 1925.

company to operate. The Beeler Report even recommended increasing the distance between
stops in downtown to speed up traffic flow.
By reducing trolley access points the company may have alienated some customers, but
the streetcar division was just part of its business. Hydroelectric power overwhelming provided
the most revenue, and the company signaled its increasing importance in 1927. It changed its
name to the Georgia Power Company when becoming a subsidiary of the Southeastern Power &
Light Company (today the Southern Company).353
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Despite dropping “railway” from its name, Georgia Power by no means abandoned its
transit operations. That same year, the Railroad Commission of the State of Georgia granted the
company another fare increase, from seven cents to ten cents, along with the rather remarkable
admission that the 1920 one-cent fare increase had been too low.354 The traction company also
continued to push back against the narrative that streetcars caused congestion. The publication of
the city’s 1929 traffic survey had conclusively proved that cars—not trolleys—made up the bulk
of Atlanta’s traffic, so the company ran a series of ads touting the number of passengers the
streetcars carried. The ad copy concluded that, “Obviously street cars don’t cause traffic
congestion, they reduce it. Without them to do the biggest part of the job in city transportation,
traffic conditions would be insufferable.”355
Suburban residential development, initially driven by the streetcar in the 1800s and early
1900s, was almost exclusively driven by motor vehicles in the twenties. Most Atlantan families
still did not own an automobile (see Figure 31 below), as the clamor for mass transit by the
suburban residents of Ansley Park, Morningside Estates, Virginia Highlands, and Sylvan Hills
demonstrated. For Georgia Power, the motor coach proved a more cost-effective way to expand
its operations into the outlying suburbs as laying trolley track was too expensive. Glidewell notes
that the suburbs destroyed the densely developed urban communities that provided residents with
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nearby everyday necessities. Their automobile-oriented development spread out those amenities
over distances that one could only cross in a motor vehicle, car or bus.356
The pro-growth community did not vilify buses, despite the fact that they shared the
traffic-congesting characteristics of streetcars so-often complained about (frequent stops, wait
times for passenger loading and unloading). Instead, it actively championed the elimination of
jitneys in favor of the power company’s embrace of coaches. Apparently, a city franchise on
mass transit per se was not the problem, just mass transit on rails. After all, automobile
manufacturers produced buses, too.
By 1920, the motor vehicle clearly had surpassed the trolley as the key transportation
component of city expansion, with unmatched advantages for industry, trade, and, to an extent,
residential development. By their own admission, powerful city figures deliberately crafted the
automobile-centric superstructure (financing, traffic controls, personnel, and legislation) along
with its corresponding infrastructure (viaducts, attenuated sidewalks, curb re-design, and wider
roads with smoother paving). While the pro-growth advocates enacted the various components of
both structures in a piecemeal fashion over the years, the overall effect was a comprehensive
remaking of Atlanta—physically, legislatively, organizationally, and fiscally.
The sweeping transformations implemented in the 1920s overshadowed earlier efforts; it
was the decade of the consolidation of motordom. Like the construction of the viaducts, the
revision of the city codes and the restructuring of city government lie at the heart of this
dissertation. Transportation had long been recognized as key to city growth, and the latest
mode—the motor vehicle—now superseded all others. Powerful decision-makers initiated,
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enacted, and sustained that process of city transformation for the car. All of these massive
changes were instituted before most Atlantans even owned a one.
However, in Atlanta, numbers of the wealthy owned multiple cars. In 1909, elite
businessman Edward H. Inman personally owned two cars. He paid $6,500 for a six-cylinder
Stearns roadster (about $182,000 today), which he used for racing, while his four-cylinder
Stearns touring car cost $5,000 (about $140,000 today). Ivan Allen, Sr., in 1928, owned several
cars, including one he gave to his son, Ivan Allen, Jr., upon his matriculation at Atlanta’s Boys
High School. The members of the Atlanta Safety Council in 1924 all owned at least one
automobile, and most owned fleets of vehicles for their businesses.357
A meaningful way to look at numbers of people and cars is to consider the number of
families who owned a car. The graph below (Figure 31) charts the percentage of Atlanta families
who owned a car from 1916 to 1930.358 In 1929, the percentage reached a high of 47.9% (and
fell again after the onset of the Great Depression). But it never reached 50% during the time
period of this study. Despite the fact that a slim majority of its citizens did not own a motor
vehicle, the city of Atlanta passed copious amounts of legislation and invested millions of dollars
in transforming its streets and their usages to accommodate the car and to restrict all other street
users. No one can reasonably contend that such actions exemplified democracy in action when
the majority of “the people” had little or no say in these transformations.359

“Ed Inman’s Autos Injured By Flames,” Atlanta Constitution, July 24, 1909; “Damaged Machines Are
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Figure 31. Atlanta car-owning families, 1916-1930.
While all non-vehicular street users lost ground in the contest for street space, the biggest
loser was the streetcar system. Although trolleys moved much greater numbers of people through
the city than cars, the great fiction, perpetrated by the power elites in traffic studies and in the
media, counted a single automobile as equivalent to a single streetcar. The number that weighed
most heavily was number of vehicles, not number of passengers carried. In that argument, the
trolley—or any mass transit system—by definition could not win, and consequently lost street
space. Adding insult to injury, the street railway paid taxes to use the public streets and paid to
pave the roadways. No automobile owner paid to use the public streets. The gasoline tax, which
was (and still is) minuscule, has never covered the cost of road maintenance and paving,

1932; U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration, Office of Highway Information
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especially since most state legislatures, including Georgia’s, frequently utilized the gas tax for
purposes other than road maintenance.
Atlanta by the end of 1929 could without dispute be labeled an automotive city, even if
all its people were not yet “automobilic.”360 Influential business and civic leaders had engineered
the reshaping of the city infrastructure, and had without compunction inaugurated ordinances
privileging the car on the city’s streets, shunting aside or outlawing other street users. Taxpayer
dollars in ever-increasing amounts paid for changes to the streets and sidewalks as well as the
installation and maintenance of all the regulatory devices and personnel to enforce the laws. The
system of automobility was well on its way to being fully integrated into the city’s fabric,
society, and culture.361
The streetcar had the disadvantage of running on a schedule and only in specified
locations; it lacked the autonomy afforded by a car. The trolley also was shared space; anybody
could ride one, if they had a nickel (or a dime in 1927). Streetcars were the transit mode of
necessity for ordinary office personnel, shop girls, store clerks, non-elite housewives, domestic
workers, and laborers of all types. A well-to-do white person might have to sit beside or near
them. The automobile freed the monied not only from time and space constraints, but also from
the possibility of contact with other classes—and races.
African-Americans on streetcars, even though segregated at the back, sat or stood nearby.
The closely-confined trolley interiors, where the races daily met face-to-face, were the sites of
ongoing conflict. Jim Crow laws might effectively separate Blacks from whites in many city
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spaces, but on the street and in the streetcars, that division broke down. Traveling in the privacy
of an automobile provided an escape from the mixed-race crowds on mass transit. Automobile
travel further divided the segregated and segregating city.
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6

SEGREGATING THE CITY

The census of 1920 marked the first time that the majority of Americans lived in urban
areas. Although the state of Georgia remained overwhelmingly rural, Atlanta’s population grew
by nearly 35% between 1910 and 1920. Increasing urbanization in the U.S. meant cities with
expanding territories, populations, influence, and wealth. Valuable downtown real estate became
scarce and more costly than ever. Aided by advances in construction technologies and
architectural designs, builders erected ever-taller skyscrapers for maximum square footage on
minimal lot sizes, intensifying density in the city core.
Increasing automobility served as an urban segregating mechanism. Cars facilitated the
development of suburban residential areas, deepening the live/work divide, at least for whites.
Automobile ownership was virtually mandatory for those who lived in the outer neighborhoods
with no streetcar service and sparse bus lines. Downtown morphed into the central business
district as elegant homes on graciously-landscaped parcels along Peachtree and Washington
streets fell when owners sold out to commercial concerns and moved north toward Buckhead or
east into Druid Hills. In the poorer, in-town neighborhoods, more people jammed into closer
quarters, especially African Americans, many of whom could not afford private automobiles and
had to rely on the streetcars for transportation. They could not have lived in an Atlanta all-white
suburb anyway, even if they had a car and the money to purchase a house there.
One method of gaining control in the midst of unregulated, chaotic growth was to zone
the city, identifying its essential elements and separating them into discrete, carefully delineated
geographic sectors. The component parts could be variously defined by land use, building or
parcel size, economic indicators, or cultural constructs. A form of Taylorism writ large, zoning
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provided a means of scientifically managing city growth, and as such held great appeal for place
entrepreneurs.
The racial animus already codified in Georgia’s and Atlanta’s Jim Crow laws intensified
with the city’s zoning efforts during the 1920s. The 1922 Atlanta Zone Plan extended the
partitioning to residential race sectors, claiming that such zoning would benefit everyone. After
neighborhoods were segregated, the streets constituted perhaps the largest remaining space
where the races mixed by necessity and on a daily basis. Pedestrians jostled on overflowing
sidewalks and riders jammed into overfull trolleys. In the downtown district, virtually all
categories of persons intermingled frequently. Not all the encounters were friendly or harmless.
No matter how much power elites and city officials sought to divide the city into functionally
and racially distinct sectors, the public streets remained inescapably integrated.
6.1

Segregating Stratagems
Atlanta, like other southern cities, was already well-practiced in hegemonic segregation

before the 1920s zoning craze. Acting illegally but with impunity, whites since Reconstruction
had employed brute physical force in the form of lynchings, peonage, and individual as well as
mob violence to dominate, suppress, terrify, and kill African Americans. Legally, white
Georgians enacted the first race-based transportation restrictions in 1891, and continued to
buttress their supremacy with Jim Crow legislation throughout the early decades of the twentieth
century. Segregation of the races in Atlanta was mandated by both custom and municipal
ordinance in restaurants, hotels, saloons, barber shops, prisons, chain-gangs, parks, libraries,
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swimming pools, and cemeteries where, even in the paupers’ section, Blacks and whites were
separated.362
Conditions for Blacks further deteriorated with the 1915 re-emergence of the Ku Klux
Klan, the vigilante enforcers of racial separation. Atlanta carried the designation as the Imperial
City of the Invisible Empire, and estimates of the number of Atlantans in the local chapter,
Nathan Bedford Forrest Klan No. 1, range between 15,000 and 40,000. The city benefitted
economically by the presence of the Klan through its robe factory, publishing company, and
other entities. The Atlanta Constitution covered its activities, meetings, participation in
community events, and Lanier University without editorial comment. One national journal editor
remarked on the city’s
attitude toward the group,
“Atlanta . . . does not
consider the Klan a menace
or a joke, but an institution,
like the Elks, the Salvation
Army, or any other.” In
other words, for many white
Atlantans, the Klan was

Figure 32. Klan advertisement, 1924.

simply another civic association for men of good will.363

362
The law required railroad and streetcar companies to provide separate but equal accommodations for
“white and colored passengers;” State of Georgia, The Code of the State of Georgia, Adopted December 15th, 1895,
vol. 2 (Atlanta: Foote & Davies, 1896), § 2269 -2274 (Acts 1890-91, p. 157, § 2188).
363
White, “The Black Sides of Atlanta: A Geography of Expansion and Containment, 1870-1970,” 215,
lists 15,000 in 1923. Jackson, The Ku Klux Klan in the City 1915-1930, 262, fn. 17, cites a 1921 estimate of 40,000.
Edward T. Devine, “The Klan in Texas,” Survey 48, no. 1 (April 1, 1922): 10.

210
In 1920, the Klan began to recruit nationally under the direction of a fund-raising agency,
the Southern Publicity Association. Disavowing the terroristic acts attributed to it, the group
endorsed Americanism, Protestantism, temperance, and adherence to traditional social mores
(see advertisement above364). Their message proved attractive to many white city dwellers
disturbed by modernity, changing cultural values, and perceived threats to their racial
supremacy. Henry Ford called Klan members patriots, and claimed the group was working for
“the preservation of the supremacy of the true American in his own land.” The Dearborn
Independent, his weekly newspaper, was filled with anti-Semitic articles. It was mailed free to
schools and libraries across the country; Ford dealerships were required to sell subscriptions
along with their automobiles.365
Between 1923 and 1927, Atlanta was led by Mayor Walter A. Sims, and the state of
Georgia by Governor Clifford M. Walker, both Klansmen. Having them in the two highest
offices in the state lent respectability to the group, as well as significant influence. A former
Atlanta police chief admitted that at one time, most of the members of the police department
were Klan members. However, violence and scandals brought sharp declines in membership, and
by the late 1920s, the Klan had lost much of its potency. Zoning provided an alternative, nonviolent way to keep African Americans in their places.366
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Long before Jim Crow, city authorities controlled Black areas with unjust measures by
sometimes (literally) turning off the municipal spigot. Those citizens received far less than their
fair share of public services like running water, schools, sewer lines, and street lighting. Even the
streets in Black neighborhoods remained “unwashed, unswept, and unmended,” despite nearconstant protests from the African American media and leadership. Only one city institution
would never be charged with a lack of attention to African American citizens, at least while they
were on the street in a white section of town: the police department.367
African Americans made up a constituency easily ignored as they could not vote in most
municipal elections. No city official’s job depended on African American ballots; whites
comprised the critical voting bloc. Only when seeking the passage of bond referenda did elite
policymakers and government authorities patronize the Black electorate by promising to build
new schools or extend sewer lines in exchange for their support. Otherwise, African American
neighborhoods seldom entered into the political calculations of those in power, i.e., white men.
Whether by police harassment or withholding vital utilities, civic leaders ensured that
almost one third of its population was less healthy, less safe, and had fewer educational and
economic opportunities. As Brownell’s notes, the commercial-civic elites’ manipulation of the
distribution and utilization of municipal resources and facilities functioned as a means of
institutionalized social control. Zoning would provide another hegemonic oversight tool for
white authorities.368
The paving and naming of roads also afforded very tangible means of separating citizens.
A single street could serve as a physical delineator of racially-distinct sectors. Crossing through
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an intersection, the modern asphalt or concrete paving might give way to an inferior surface,
such as macadam or Belgian block, or no surfacing at all. The name of the roadway could
change, often indicating that one had traversed between Black and white living spaces. Atlanta
today retains numerous street name changes which appear random to the uninitiated and are
frustrating to all. A typical example is the north-south thoroughfare, Glen Iris Avenue-Randolph
Street, which runs through 1.3 miles of the old Fourth Ward district between Ponce de Leon
Avenue on the north and Edgewood Avenue on the south. The northern, Glen Iris Avenue end
housed whites in the 1920s, mostly Jews and persons of German descent. South of Highland
Avenue, the named changed to Randolph Street and was exclusively African American.369 As
former city mayor Maynard Jackson observed, “Whites didn’t want to live on the same street as
blacks. So blacks lived on ‘Randolph Street’ and whites lived on ‘Glen Iris.’”370 Despite their
location on the same street, the two neighborhoods remained physically and experientially
distinct, exemplifying the two different Atlantas.
6.2

Zoning: Segregating the City
Zoning proved to be the most comprehensive and effective way to segregate the races in

a citywide fashion, but it accomplished much more than that. It allowed city officials to organize,
direct, and facilitate Atlanta’s explosive expansion. In a way, the place entrepreneurs had been
almost too successful. Rapid and haphazard expansion had brought unforeseen problems, such as
traffic congestion, which threatened to undermine the smooth functioning of the city and
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jeopardize the very growth it sought. Yet it was not solely for local well-being that they sought to
tame the civic disorder. They had positioned Atlanta as a regional leader with an increasingly
national reputation which could suffer if the problems associated with progress continued.
Zoning provided a tool by which the growth coalition could maintain its position of control
within the city while allowing it to correct existing problems, encourage economic growth, and
take advantage of development opportunities in newly-annexed city territory.371
Zoning, in its segregation of land uses, separated where people lived from where they
worked, shopped, worshipped, and sought services (e.g., banks, barbershops, the post office, hair
salons), entertainment (e.g., theaters, restaurants, sports venues), and recreation (e.g., parks).
Slowly, the city was being reconfigured so that owning an automobile was becoming more of a
necessity. Between 1900 and the start of World War I, the majority of car owners lived in rural
areas. Urban dwellers could walk or take a trolley to most places in town. All that was about to
change.
U.S. cities had, from the 1600s, directed how property owners could use their land,
whether it was keeping pigs off public roads or requiring fireproof construction of buildings.
During the 1800s, regulating land use by means of deed restrictions and land covenants was
common, but enforcement difficulties led most American cities to terminate these forms of
private regulation. By the 1920s, municipalities had turned to a public and more comprehensive
land-use strategy which utilized their delegated police powers to protect the public order, health,
safety, and morals of the community by a local zoning ordinance.372
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Welke documents the widespread “regulatory urge” as part of the process of early
twentieth century state formation. From railroad legislation in the late 1880s, Jim Crow laws in
the 1890s, anti-trust and truth-in-advertising acts in the early 1900s, and traffic ordinances
throughout the 1920s, government at all levels employed police power to regulate a broad
spectrum of activities and relationships that previously had been viewed as “inappropriate for
state intervention.” This centralization of authority, she explains, was often though not always
designed to protect individual liberties from the expansive reach of corporations.373
The creation of the traffic control system represented another example of this type of
governmental interposition. The automobile, with the carnage and congestion it spawned,
necessitated government action to protect the safety of the public, though in this instance by
curtailing individual liberties in the roadways. Initiated in the early 1900s and exploding during
the 1920s, the system extended the insinuating reach of regulatory power into the daily lives of
American citizens through their use of the public streets.374
In a similar fashion, zoning controlled Americans’ use of their private land. Another
shrinking of personal freedoms, this intervention served to protect the welfare of the greater
public, and was in direct reaction to urban growth. All of these actions were justified as the
exercise of police power in the interest of the public welfare. Each served to expand and
centralize government authority.375
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In the well-known 1926 zoning case, Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the U.S. Supreme
Court found a comparable justification for both traffic and zoning regulation. The court noted
that building zone laws had existed in the U.S. for only about twenty-five years. During that
time, the increase and concentration of urban populations created problems which necessitated
new restrictions on the use and occupation of private land within city boundaries. “Such
regulations are sustained, under the complex conditions of our day, for reasons analogous to
those which justify traffic regulations, which, before the advent of automobiles and rapid transit
street railways, would have been condemned as fatally arbitrary and unreasonable” [emphasis
added]. The court basically acknowledged that Americans of an earlier era would properly have
denounced the stringent new zoning and traffic laws, but a modern, urban society demanded
government abridgement of individual liberties for the greater good of, presumably, everyone.
But in the laws limiting land use, just as those limiting street use, there were winners and losers;
“in the public interest” did not always equate to “in everybody’s interest.” Atlanta’s growth
community, in both instances, acted to safeguard a primary interest: their continued ability to
direct activities to ensure a vibrant, expanding municipal economy.376
Surrounding land uses could directly affect conditions on city streets. The number of
vehicles on the roads, the severe traffic congestion in downtown and its attendant damage to
property and persons, even the types of vehicles predominantly in use in certain areas—all
depended to a degree on the uses of the properties lining the roadways. Zoning not only affected
activities on the public thoroughfares, those activities were part of the impetus for zoning in the
first place.
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Opponents to zoning in Atlanta and elsewhere saw it as a gross intrusion of state power
into their private property rights, which it was. Zoning advocates asserted its many positive
effects, including the benefits which could accrue to the public streets. Height limitations on
downtown buildings ensured that lower nearby structures and the surrounding roads could get
sufficient light and air. Taller buildings meant more people and more traffic—burdens Atlanta’s
narrow central streets could not bear. Limiting skyscraper heights reduced population density
which facilitated traffic flow. Siting commerce and industry away from residential streets meant
fewer cars parked at neighborhood curbs, and the absence of the dirt, noise, and disturbances
caused by the bustle of workers, clients, shoppers, and vehicles coming and going. With heavy
freight traffic kept off single-family housing streets, neighborhoods experienced fewer vehicle
collisions, children could play in safety, and the quiet, home-like character of the area was
preserved.377
The creation of distinct commercial and manufacturing districts could even lead to
economies in street paving. Heavy trucks continuously delivering goods and raw materials to and
from stores and factories required durable and costly pavement, which now could be limited to
those zoned areas. Less expensive paving sufficed for residential neighborhoods with their lightweight, low-volume traffic.378
But the most important benefit of a zoning system, far exceeding any other, was that it
conserved property values. In many cases, it even increased property values. Segregating land
uses facilitated that objective. Nobody wanted to live next door to a factory belching filth into
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the sky; it was unpleasant and unhealthy. Nobody’s house in such a location would have a high
resell value.379
The minimum lot sizes which zoning imposed in some residential areas preserved
property values by preventing overcrowding and congestion, which many would view as
admirable goals.380 But they also excluded working-class people who could not afford to
purchase a large lot or house. Collins Park, south of Buckhead, opened in 1922. Its average lot
size was 100' x 300', selling for from $60-$100 per front foot; that is, between $6,000 and
$10,000 per lot. An article about the new development stated, “It is probable that purchasers will
be required to erect residences costing not less than $15,000;” in other words, working class
families should look elsewhere.381
The phrase “preserving property values” served as a class- or race-distinction signal, code
for keeping out the riff-raff. These types of zoning restrictions acted like land covenants, but they
had the advantages of covering the entire city and never reaching an expiration date. Lowerclass, multi-family, and African-American-occupied housing could be relegated to less-desirable
areas of the city, away from the new suburbs and the older areas of the city that whites viewed as
white.382
As Richard Sennett asserts, the segmentation of zoning introduced a rational
homogeneity which investors in new construction found reassuring. “They knew exactly what
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kind of area they were putting their capital into.” Zoning regulations classified each residential
area in two senses. First, it categorized every neighborhood by lot size, house price, and the
presence of amenities like sidewalks, street lights, and parks. Second, those defining
characteristics ensured that the occupants had sufficient wealth to purchase a home there. In
effect, every suburb and residential neighborhood was “class-ified”—identified by the social
class of the individuals who could afford to live there. As Robert Whitten preferred, the “bankers
and leading business men lived in one part of town, storekeepers, clerks and technicians in
another, and working people in yet others where they would enjoy the association with neighbors
more or less of their own kind.” A zone plan ensured neighborhoods homogenized by wealth
and, by proxy, class and race. It provided a legal mechanism to maintain exclusivity and bar
undesirables.383
Atlanta’s zoning system employed neither subterfuge nor euphemism when it came to
skin color. Racial classification was an explicit component. The 1922 plan created, within
residential areas, three race districts. R1 was “white;” R2 was “colored;” and R3 was
“undetermined,” meaning that neither race comprised a majority of the occupants. It claimed to
provide additional space for the housing areas of both white and “colored” groups to expand
without encroaching upon each other’s territory (see population distribution map below).384
Lands notes the progression marked in Atlanta’s introduction of racial classifications into
its comprehensive land-use plan. In the race zoning efforts of the previous decade, whites had
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Figure 33. Racial distribution of Atlanta’s population, 1924.
attempted to protect only their own neighborhoods from objectionable persons. In the new plan,
they had moved “to formally sort the entire city.”385
The map above shows the racial distribution of Atlanta’s population, with the African
American areas highlighted in light red, and the city limits in green. The two largest
concentration of African Americans are in the two areas north of the east-west rail line: Auburn
Avenue to the east; Atlanta University Center to the west. South of that rail line are Summer Hill
to the east, and Mechanicsville to the west, with the Clark University neighborhood south of
both. The clustering shows how compact and discrete the space for Blacks was in the city.386
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“Preserving property values” was one of the main goals of zoning, as Atlanta’s plan
frequently asserted. But the report did not, nor did it need to, utilize that phrase explicitly when
discussing residential segregation. Whites universally believed that the presence of African
Americans depreciated property values, except in servants’ quarters located at the back of the big
house. That assumption provided the most direct and effective argument for race-based zoning,
according to Johnson, who recites this common example. “When Negroes move into a block,
there frequently follows a rapid exodus of white residents who put up their property for forced
sale and accept the loss as inevitable.” By not allowing Blacks to move in at all, zoning
maintained higher property assessments for whites.387
Johnson asserts that, when it came to property values, African Americans were more
often the symptom rather than the cause of their depreciation. Other factors undermined land
values which bore no relation to the actual character and traits of African Americans. Much of
affordable Black housing was situated in unattractive and unhealthy areas. He calls special
attention to the negative effects of the automobile. Its display shops, garages, and filling stations
dragged down the appearance and functionality of a residential neighborhood. The car itself
made escape from the deteriorating conditions possible for wealthier families, while the poor had
no option but to endure in place.388
Isenberg notes that in the 1920s and 1930s, most of the real estate community believed
that racial mixing to any degree led to depreciated properties. The early decades of the twentieth
century had brought an immense movement of African Americans off the farms, into the cities,
and out of the south. This unprecedented and unregulated mobility of a population once confined
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to plantations as slaves or to white-owned farms as sharecroppers or tenants troubled many white
leaders. Increased African American consumer activity, and the achievement of upward mobility
and higher social status (some of them even owned automobiles!) heightened white concerns
and contributed directly to the institution of race-based zoning regulations. That the U.S.
Supreme Court had ruled those ordinances unconstitutional did not stop Atlanta or other cities
from continuing to enact racially-segregated neighborhoods.389
No one debated whether or not Atlanta needed a zoning plan. A building boom, sparked
by postwar pent-up demand, created new in-town neighborhoods, outlying suburban residential
areas, and an expanded downtown district. Skyscrapers proliferated to the degree that the period
1918-1930 won the designation as Atlanta’s second skyscraper era. An editorial spoke out about
the failure of the city to meet the modern standard of governmental service to its inhabitants:
“Everybody knows, and must admit, a situation that is patent: That Atlanta is suffering, every
day of its existence under present conditions.” Mayor Key stated, “A zone plan is very essential
to the city. It will prevent a vast amount of waste and destruction which has been going on
account of the unrestricted and unrestrained power in each individual to build without regard to
the welfare or development of the neighborhood.”390
Uncontrolled growth and traffic congestion, coupled with the opportunity to implement a
zoning solution, led directly to the creation of the city’s first legal planning commission in July
1920. A myriad of problems confronted the six-man commission: increasing population, high
demand for city utilities, gridlocked downtown streets, and random building construction. The
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commission decided to tackle streets and buildings first. But, as Robert Otis, real estate
developer and acting commission chair, observed, “zoning became such an all-absorbing
question” that a separate sub-committee had to be formed just to deal with it.391
The commission hired Robert H. Whitten, “perhaps the most influential zoning adviser in
the United States,” as the city’s
planning consultant in May 1921.
His work on the city traffic plan was
important, but he had a greater
impact and augmented his national
renown with his Atlanta zoning
plan. Whitten studied the city while
also embarking on an intense
promotional campaign to explain the
concept of a zoning system and its
success in other major U.S. cities.
He spent a substantial amount of
time meeting with influential civic
and professional groups to explain

Figure 34. Atlanta un-zoned and zoned, 1922.

how a zoning plan would affect real
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clubs of ordinary citizens to educate them about the work of the city planning commission. The
local press greatly assisted his advertising efforts. News reports, editorials, and cartoons (see
figure above) boosted the zone plan.392
Whitten diligently courted the most powerful city leaders. At lunch meetings with the
Atlanta Rotary Club in the posh Capital City Club dining room, he discussed depreciating
property due to lack of zoning, and predicted ruinous results if the city’s haphazard building plan
continued. At Chamber of Commerce forum luncheons, he reassured members about the
constitutionality of zoning laws.393
In December 1921, Whitten capped off his public relations efforts with an article in the
Chamber of Commerce’s journal, the City Builder. This final appeal went to Atlanta’s business
community just before his presentation to the planning commission. Using New York City as his
prime example, he described residential blocks invaded by garages, stores, and apartment
buildings, and downtown skyscrapers which blocked the air and light on downtown streets,
reducing the rental values of lower-rise buildings. In 1916, New York had instituted
comprehensive zoning—a plan, not incidentally, devised by Whitten.
He previewed the general outline of the Atlanta plan, explaining the concepts of the use
districts (residential, business, industrial), and the height and area zones superimposed over the
use districts. He also introduced the big innovation—racially segregated residential districts. He
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justified race zoning as essential to public peace, order, and security. It would, he insisted,
promote the welfare and prosperity of both races without discrimination.394
Atlanta’s planning commission, all members of the growth coalition, adopted the plan on
January 2, 1922, and sent it to the city council’s ordinance committee for consideration. The prozoning campaign continued, with five thousand copies of the report and maps printed and
distributed. Whitten embarked again on the luncheon circuit for the hard sell, assisted by
planning chair Robert R. Otis and H. D. Cutter, Jr., the commission’s engineer.395
On Thursday, February 16—the day before the ordinance committee’s vote on zoning—
Whitten and his surrogates shifted into high gear. He lunched with the local chapter of the
American Society of Civil Engineers at the elegant Winecoff Hotel, while Otis and Cutter
attended the meeting of the Atlanta Real Estate Board at the Peacock Café. Whitten joined them
later that afternoon. Both realtors and engineers voted to send delegates to appear before the
ordinance committee in support of the zoning plan.396
While Whitten met with realtors he, significantly, did not meet with any of the city’s
Black real estate men. The term “realtor” applied only to white men, and was the designation
given only to those affiliated with the National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB).
That group had formed in Chicago in 1908 as the National Association of Real Estate
Exchanges, but changed their name in 1916. At the same time, they adopted the term “realtor” to
identify white real estate professionals who were members of their organization and subscribed
to its strict code of ethics. They would register the terms “REALTOR” and “REALTORS” with
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the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in 1949. In 1947, Black real estate agents would form their
own national organization, the National Association of Real Estate Brokers (NAREB), adopting
the slogan “Democracy in Housing,” and copyrighting their own professional designator,
“REALTIST.” Meanwhile, Atlanta’s white power structure completely omitted any Black real
estate professionals from the discussions about zoning the city.397
At the meeting of the city council ordinance committee on Friday, February 17, 1922,
opposition to the zone plan arose from Atlanta’s city attorney, J. W. Mayson, and Judge E. C.
Kontz, who said zoning was unconstitutional and declared that it would strip citizens of their
legal rights. Endorsements for the plan came from elites such as eminent developer Forrest Adair
for the realty board, builder Victor H. Kriegshaber for the civil engineers, architect P. Thornton
Marye representing the American Institute of Architects, realtor Benjamin D. Watkins, and the
Ansley Park Civic League.
A number of groups and individuals urged modifications of the plan where it affected
their particular interests. Thomas H. Connally requested an exception for his new building, then
under construction at the corner of Whitehall and Alabama streets. It had been designed to be 16
stories, which exceeded the 12-story, 150' height limit in the proposed zone plan. As construction
technologies improved, buildings in this time period were reaching new heights, sometimes
eliciting outcries of dismay from local citizens or next-door property owners. The Building
Owners and Managers’ Association, a national group, represented large and powerful real estate
interests—including brokers, builders, investors, and property owners; Atlanta’s local chapter
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was no exception. The group, sometimes called the “skyscraper men,” led the fight against any
height limits, claiming that such restrictions threatened property values. The city council would
grant Connally a variance for his tall building in 1922, and in 1929, would raise the downtown
building height limit to 325' with no setbacks required, effectively demolishing the height
restriction.398
With all the controversy, the ordinance committee tabled their vote, pending further
study. The battle for Whitten’s zone plan continued in the pages of the local newspapers, with
much of the opposition coming from real estate men. Some saw zoning as a threat to their private
interests while insisting publicly that it would throttle city growth. Adair admitted the
disagreements, but emphasized that the Atlanta Real Estate Board unanimously indorsed the
plan. Ward Wight, board president, said that no more than 10% of realty dealers opposed zoning,
and the ones who did owned properties which might be adversely affected. As in the on-street
parking dilemma, the divided members of the growth coalition did not hesitate loudly and
actively to disagree when a policy might hamper or harm their personal financial interests.
Unlike the never-resolved curbside parking problem, however, a clear majority prevailed in the
zoning dispute.399
Generally, zoning in Atlanta met with less resistance than that encountered by other
cities, despite three spirited public hearings and some bitter fights in the ordinance committee. At
one of the hearings, Judge Kontz declared that racially segregated neighborhoods had already

Fogelson, Downtown: Its Rise and Fall, 1880-1950, 172-74. Atlanta’s BOMA chapter was well
organized, very pro-active, highly influential, and against height restrictions. The city hosted the national
association’s convention in 1923; and in 1926, Thomas Connally served as the group’s president. Atlanta
Constitution: “Changes Urged in Zoning Plan,” February 18, 1922; “Building Owners Will Meet Here,” January 7,
1923; “Building Height Limitations Hit,” January 16, 1923; “Boosting Atlanta,” December 26, 1926; “Skyscraper
Men to Heart Palmer Report Today,” June 10, 1928.
399
“The Atlanta Zoning Plan,” 114. Atlanta Constitution: “Real Estate Men Denounce Zoning Plan for
Atlanta,” March 10, 1922; “Adair Declares Zone Plan Will Stabilize Values,” “City Zoning Plan Praised and Hit by
Civic Leaders,” March 11, 1922.
398

227
been found illegal, and predicted the overturn of Atlanta’s plan. Mayor Key pointedly asked him,
“Are you opposed to separation of whites and blacks?” In an artful dodge, Kontz replied that he
was simply stating the law, and did not care to indulge in personal views. On March 31, by a
vote of 4 to 1, the ordinance committee approved the law, and sent it to the city council.400
On April 10, 1922, the city council adopted the zoning system ordinance, by a vote of 24
to 3. Alderman J. L. Carpenter attacked the ordinance, calling it one of the most vicious laws the
city had ever passed. He criticized the experts from “up north” whom he held responsible, and
vowed to “fight ‘em to the finish. I’ll build to the moon if I want to.” Mayor Key signed the
ordinance the next day.401
Most zoning laws tended to fix the already-established development patterns, and
Atlanta’s did the same. Major shifts in the building and commercial activities over the previous
twenty years had already altered the city’s central business district, where older residential streets
such as Peachtree, Whitehall, and Washington were gradually giving way to business and
industrial uses. Whitten’s plan introduced no major changes, but followed the existing
trajectories where business extended north along Peachtree Street, and industrial enterprises
expanded south and west along Peters, Lee, and Whitehall streets. His only real innovation in the
Atlanta plan was the explicit racial zoning.402
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When the city adopted Whitten’s zone system, it won the dubious distinction of being the
nation’s first “to embody in an outspoken form segregation along the line of social composition
of the population.” Silver maintains that Atlanta’s plan was the most celebrated post-Buchanan
v. Warley residential segregation plan. The 1922 plan’s race zone section did not differ greatly
from the city’s 1913 and 1917 racial zoning ordinances, both declared unconstitutional, except it
employed the professional language of zoning and was part of a city-wide plan. The lack of
substantive change in the framing of the racial segregation portion of the plan should have
alerted the planning commission to the coming rejection of the ordinance.403
Notable by its almost total absence
was any controversy over the racial
component of Whitten’s plan—at least in
the white press. Leaders of the white real
estate community already agreed that any

Figure 35. Real estate ad, Atlanta
Constitution, May 31, 1924.

African American property constituted a bad risk and should be kept segregated. However,
whites often owned the properties rented by Blacks because, as the ad above said, “For an
investment it can’t be beat.” A national journal observed, “The Atlanta plan is the first which
makes a distinction concerning type of residents as well as types of residence. To judge from the
support it has received from the local newspapers and organizations of citizens, it seems to
answer the prevailing desire of the white Atlantans.”404
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The outcomes of the zone plan on Black Atlantans elicited a different response. Despite
their already crowded living conditions, the new plan provided no overall expansion of Black
residential areas. The zoning ordinance map virtually deconstructed one eastside African
American neighborhood, and segregated the majority of others on the west side of the city.
Whitten claimed that there were “very few buildings of any value” in that eastside space, and
opportunities existed for its improvement. His so-called valueless buildings primarily housed
African Americans and their small shops. The plan called for their wholesale removal and
replacement with white commercial and apartment house districts. Despite Whitten’s assertion
that sufficient area for extending housing space for both races, Blacks found themselves more
closely circumscribed by the plan within the city sectors they already occupied. No new space
existed for them in the outlying suburbs, which were reserved exclusively for white residents.405
In 1923, Benjamin J. Davis, editor of the Atlanta Independent, wrote about other
proposed city actions which, if enacted, would displace African Americans. Zoning, he claimed,
had already drastically reduced where they could live, and their overcrowded residential districts
had little room to spare. The only remaining option was for African Americans to migrate out of
the city to find jobs and space. Davis predicted their leaving would constitute a devastating
economic loss to the city, and most Black leaders agreed. A full year would pass, though, before
relief appeared via judicial authority.406
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On October 12, 1924, the Georgia Supreme Court ruled the racial districting portion of
Atlanta’s zoning plan unconstitutional.407 Two years later, the court ruled the city’s entire zoning
ordinance was unconstitutional, based in part on the unconstitutionality of the state enabling
legislation.408 That ruling basically meant that no zoning anywhere in Georgia was valid. Within
a year, the bad effects of a lack of zoning could be seen in the Atlanta. A local editorial
documented the evidence, with automobile structures mentioned as part of the chaotic, beautydestroying, zone-less infill.
Since the zoning law in Atlanta was killed, the suburbs of Atlanta—even the
close-in residence districts—have become a hodge podge with garages, grocery
stores, filling stations, and the like, destroying not merely the old resident sections
but materially damaging the home owners. And yet there is no recourse and
cannot be until a zoning law is enacted.409
The editor called for new zoning which would preserve the city’s aesthetic appeal,
segregate and systematize construction, enhance values, and give new impetus to development.
His words could have been taken from a Molotch growth machine action plan, and might as well
have been. The editorial demonstrated the how the media, itself a member, promoted the goals of
the group. Another zone plan was needed soon; Atlanta was suffering.
A “prominent realtor in Atlanta” described the enormous injury to the city by the sudden
revocation of all zoning restrictions. Builders and developers had moved quickly to construct
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whatever they could wherever they pleased before another new zone plan emerged. He estimated
that, between 1926 and 1928, the damages from the lack of zoning amounted to $15,000,000.410
This scale of economic loss did not accord with the goals of the pro-growth advocates,
nor did the harm to both Atlanta’s and Georgia’s reputations. Efforts immediate began to
remediate the damages, as city councilmen worked to create a sustainable city zoning law. In
addition, the mayor, council members, and county and state officials met to seek a state
constitutional amendment to enable zoning. Their endeavors ultimately succeeded.411
The General Assembly in 1927 created a new City Planning Commission as part of the
Atlanta’s city charter, giving it very broad powers, including the power to regulate streets and
sidewalks, relieve traffic and congestion, develop housing, and establish zones or districts to
promote the public interests, health, morals, safety, comfort, convenience, and welfare of the
city. In the 1928 November election, an amendment to the state constitution gave Georgia cities
with populations of 25,000 or more the authority to pass zoning and planning laws, and on
December 21, Mayor Ragsdale signed the new zoning ordinance approved by city council that
same day.412
The new law did not include a racial segregation component, but that did not mean that
race was no longer a consideration for guiding Atlanta’s growth. Other invidious means of
excluding specific populations from certain residential sectors remained available: required
minimum lot and building sizes, along with prohibiting apartments effectively ensured the
exclusivity of higher-end neighborhoods. As Lands notes, white elites “created a collection of
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cultural constructions around property that effectively stood in for one another.” Class zoning
substituted for race zoning; language about tenants and rentals took the place of racist rhetoric;
and the phrase “preserving property values” never lost its power to persuade.413
Amsterdam estimates that “by 1930, roughly 60 percent of Atlanta’s eighty-five thousand
African Americans would live in just three of the city’s wards. Those three were also the city’s
most populous.” Although all three of Atlanta’s racial zoning ordinances were declared
unconstitutional, racial segregation continued in practice, and the city maintained its tightlycircumscribed African American residential districts, adhering to its conception of two separate
Atlantas.414
6.3

Black Atlanta in the 1920s
Dana White observes that “Biracial is the qualifier that best describes the history and

geography of Atlanta. There have always been . . . two Atlantas—one white, the other black.”
Before Jim Crow, the city was racially divided. Clusters of Black working-class communities
sprouted around factories, warehouses, stockyards, and railroad maintenance shops. As a result,
ninety percent of the city’s Black population lived within a radius of two miles from the business
center.415
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Most of the city’s African Americans dwelt in these racially-defined and overcrowded
locales. Although their numbers increased during the first three decades of the twentieth century,
they declined as a proportion of the total population (see table below). The 1920 census showed
that the state experienced

Table 11. Atlanta’s Black & White Populations, 1890-1930

only a 0.4% overall
population growth, much
of it due to the loss of
more than 11% of its

Census
Year
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930

Population
65,533
89,872
154,839
200,616
270,366

White % of Total
37,416
57%
54,090
60%
98,451
64%
137,785
66%
180,247
67%

Black
% of Total
28,098
43%
35,727
40%
51,902
34%
62,796
31%
90,075
33%

Black inhabitants. The decade began with plummeting cotton prices, part of the national
economic and industrial malaise. Adding to the state’s woes, the boll weevil devastated the
cotton fields. Increasingly, the mechanization of farming replaced laborers, horses, and mules
with motorized equipment.416
Many people abandoned agriculture altogether, hoping to find jobs in southern towns and
cities. Even more African American farm workers left the state as part of the Great Migration.
Newspaper articles downplayed the exodus of Georgia’s African Americans, but unquestionably
a northward movement was underway. Bishop Joseph Simeon Flipper (1859-1944), former
Chancellor of Morris Brown University and head of the A. M. E. Church of Atlanta, maintained
that African Americans left the south because they sought “equal protection of life and property
and equal justice in the courts.” The remedy for Black migration, Bishop Flipper asserted, lay in
the hands of the white man. But no such relief was forthcoming; equality and justice remained
elusive; and thousands of African Americans continued to leave the state. The 1920 census
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showed Atlanta with only a modest 2% increase in its Black population as whites outnumbered
Blacks more than two to one.417
Atlanta’s Black pro-growth advocates, however, remained committed to improving local
conditions as well as sustaining their own commercial enterprises. They worried about
overcrowding in African-American neighborhoods, the lack of housing and jobs, and they urged
a more equitable distribution of government services. Like their white counterparts, they saw the
city as an economic generator, and they did not encourage their communities—or customers— to
relocate up north; rather, they sought to halt the exodus. The Black press also discouraged
migration as bad for business.418
By 1930, the percentage of Blacks to whites in the city had slightly increased. In accord
with Du Bois’ 1911 principle of internal integration, Atlanta’s African Americans embraced their
sense of solidarity and self-reliance. They patronized Black businesses and grew their civic
organizations such as the Neighborhood Union and the Atlanta Urban League. They expanded
and enhanced their educational institutions. Women’s clubs and religious groups strove to
improve neighborhood living conditions. The African American community and its leaders also
continued to protest lynchings, resist the terroristic Ku Klux Klan, call for full enfranchisement,
and demand revocation of Jim Crow laws. To the eternal shame of the United States of America,
another hundred years would pass before Congress finally passed a federal anti-lynching law.419
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African American businessmen, along with their white counterparts, sought continuous
expansion for Atlanta. They applauded Mayor Key’s 1920 goal of a city population of 500,000
by 1930, although their model metropolis would include social justice and exclude racial
discrimination—two items absent from the white leaders’ formulation. The Atlanta Independent
urged, “Let us build the greatest city in the south where race relations are most cordial and
employment most abundant for every man who is willing to work; where the enforcement of all
laws is the slogan of every citizen without regard to race, color or previous condition of
servitude.” Common goals of increased commerce and growth led Black and white elites to
occasionally do business together, but in their disparate visions of the ideal city, the two different
Atlantas endured.420
The geographic boundaries of those two Atlantas did not remain entirely static. Two
shattering events in the previous two decades, the 1906 race riot and the 1917 great fire, caused
large numbers of African Americans to relocate away from the city center. The riot led many to
congregate in the Eastern Business District, effectively creating an African American equivalent
of the city’s central business district. It centered on Auburn Avenue. The fire destroyed large
numbers of homes in the Fourth Ward, the elite residential section for African Americans. Many
sought housing around the Atlanta University Center, the west-side cluster of Black institutions
of higher learning.421
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The twenties saw the continued concentration of African American enterprises on and
near Auburn Avenue. A profusion of banks, offices, real estate companies, stores, restaurants,
civic and professional associations, social groups, and entertainment venues joined the longestablished churches. Black leaders located their businesses and office buildings there. The
Atlanta Urban League, with offices on Auburn, persuaded the city to repave three blocks of the
“black” portion of the street in time for the 1921 meeting of the National Negro Business
League. That same year, the city’s only public library for African Americans opened at the
corner of Auburn Avenue and Courtland Street. The Butler Street Y.M.C.A., often called
Atlanta’s “Black City Hall” because it was home to so many influential African American
organizations, opened its new facility in 1920 at 22 Butler Street [Jesse Hill, Jr. Dr.], half a block
south of Auburn Avenue. Wealthy entrepreneurs Alonzo Herndon and David T. Howard made
substantial contributions to the building fund, and Alexander Hamilton (1870-1944) was the
African American builder who implemented the Y’s design by noted architectural firm Hentz,
Reid & Adler.422
The Prince Hall Masonic fraternity, which welcomed Black men from the upper and
middle classes, had its temple at 330-334 Auburn Avenue. Between 1908 and 1924, its
membership grew from 82 to 24,000, and the building provided a gathering place. The Masons
published the weekly Atlanta Independent, the first Black newspaper in the city. It had offices on
the fifth floor of the Odd Fellows Building at 228-250 Auburn Avenue. The editor, Benjamin J.
Davis, the Masonic Imperial Potentate, was considered one of the city’s most powerful African
American leaders. In 1928, William Alexander Scott started the Atlanta Daily World newspaper
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in a former print shop at 145 Auburn Avenue. Initially a weekly, by 1932, it was the only
African American daily in the United States.423
Entrepreneur extraordinaire Heman Edward Perry (1873-1929) also expanded his
business empire on Auburn Avenue. To his 1909 Standard Life Insurance Company, he added
Citizens Trust Bank in 1921, the second bank established by Blacks in Atlanta. His remarkable
advertisement of the stunning achievement of the bank’s inception appeared on page six of the
Atlanta Constitution (see advertisement below424). His 1917 Service Company expanded into an
umbrella corporation. Standard Life, Citizens Trust, and the Service Company were housed in
Perry’s three-story building at 210 Auburn Avenue, while his many subsidiary enterprises were
located on or around the avenue. Henderson accurately asserts that, with these various
enterprises, “Perry initiated a substantial part of the business foundation of the modern black
community in Atlanta.”425
Not until the 1930s did John Wesley Dobbs bestow the name “Sweet Auburn” on the
street, but well before then, the avenue had the reputation of housing the largest concentration of
African American financial institutions in the nation. Numerous explanations for Dobbs’
selection of the term “sweet” exist. Most compelling is Calloway’s assertion that Dobbs gave it
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that name after hearing the expression, “there’s nothing sweeter than money,” an
acknowledgement of the consolidation of Black wealth and commerce there.426

Figure 36. Heman Perry’s ad, Atlanta Constitution, October 31, 1923.
Whatever motivated its selection, the name “Sweet Auburn” stuck, and partly because of
it, Auburn Avenue became and remains, the second most famous street name in Atlanta.427 The
street’s physical space, as well as its name, emblemized Black Atlanta. In a time of lynchings,
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disfranchisement, Jim Crow restrictions, and daily humiliations, it endured as a palpable
presence—a place— which enabled as well as displayed the strivings and successes of the
community. Their limited access to space in Atlanta forced African Americans to focus their
attentions and concentrated energies within their defined enclaves. Territorially and
psychologically, Auburn Avenue emerged as a space which projected and protected Black
culture and identity. It exemplified Lefebvre’s complex concept of global social space: a
geographical location, a generator of social structures, a place of production as well as a
commodity itself, a political instrument, and a means for and facilitator of creative expression.428
In the 1920s, the avenue was not entirely occupied by Black entities. Around Piedmont
Avenue stood a side-by-side racial mix of businesses. Farther east was solely African American.
On the west end of the street, however, some well-known white enterprises resided, including the
very exclusive Atlanta Athletic Club, Haverty Furniture, J. K. Orr’s shoe company, and Alvin L.
Belle Isle’s garage and taxi service. Ironically, even the Ku Klux Klan had an Auburn Avenue
address for a time. The two Atlantas might be separate, but sometimes they were not very far
apart.429
During the decade, another Black enclave, ultimately larger than the Auburn Avenue
district, emerged. Heman Perry did not limit his vision to the Eastern Business District, but
looked west. Since the 1890s, a Black residential section had clustered around the African
American institutes of higher learning in Ward One: Morehouse College, Spelman College, and
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Atlanta University.430 But these all adhered to the dictate of the acknowledged east-west racial
dividing line, Ashby Street [Joseph E. Lowery Blvd.], which limited Blacks to sections east of
Ashby. Perry, through his many business affiliates, broke that residential color line by
purchasing land west of Ashby, building houses, and offering financing to prospective
homeowners. He opened Atlanta’s western suburbs to African Americans for the first time.431
Technically, the city had already crossed the line in 1919. First, the Atlanta Board of
Education voted to make the white Ashby Street School (on the west side of the street) into a
grammar school for African American children due to changing demographics in the area. Later
that year, the city created Washington Park by accepting a land donation from a group of white
churches. That first city park exclusively for Blacks was technically also on the “wrong” side of
the color line; the former barrier was slowly being erased through multiple transgressions.432
In 1920, Heman Perry purchased seventeen acres of land near Atlanta University, hoping
eventually to develop it into an African American residential neighborhood, even though it lay
literally on the wrong side of the street. In 1922, he persuaded the school board to buy some of
that land for the city’s first Black public secondary school. Booker T. Washington High School
was constructed with bond money from the 1921 Spring Street viaduct referendum, and opened
in the fall term of 1924.433
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The city’s establishment of public facilities for African Americans beyond an established
racial divide in no way indicated that officials were moving to integrate the west side. The
balkanizing of African Americans into geographically distinct enclaves remained the policy in
spite of necessary boundary adjustments. Dana White states that “controlled segregation was the
accommodation arrived at.”434
The nearby locations of these amenities—a grammar school, a combination junior-senior
high school, and a public park—proved successful draws for middle-class African Americans.
Perry purchased some 300 additional acres west of Ashby Street [Joseph E. Lowery Blvd.] for a
new development in the area known today as Washington Park. His earliest subdivision opened
in the two blocks east of the high school, beginning with homes along C Street [Whitehouse
Drive]. In 1924, he had West View Park under construction farther north.435 Understanding that
the city usually skimped on public resources in Black neighborhoods, Perry successfully pushed
officials to extend paving, electricity, water, sewer, and gas lines to his developments.436
African Americans in the Washington Park area were primarily middle-class white collar
or skilled workers. Many owned their own homes and could afford some modern household
conveniences. But fewer African Americans owned automobiles than whites in comparable
suburbs. Even by the mid-1930s, less than 12% of the homeowners on Ashby Street had cars.
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Most had to rely on the streetcars for transportation around the city—for work, church, shopping,
or recreational activities. 437
If west siders needed to get anywhere in the Eastern Business District, they could easily
hop a Route 3 trolley at the corner of Ashby [Joseph E. Lowery Blvd.] and West Hunter [M.L.K.
Jr. Dr.], passing through Five Points and continuing the length of Auburn Avenue as far as
Boulevard. The 2.85-mile trip connecting the city’s two major African American enclaves
supported the Beeler Report’s claim that ninety percent of the Atlanta’s Blacks lived within a
two-mile radius of the central business district. Although the line terminated at both ends in
densely-populated Black neighborhoods, it also travelled through the heart of downtown. Whites
would certainly have ridden Route 3, especially on the central part of the line, and they would
have encountered African Americans there.438
6.4

Semi-Segregated Streetcars
Streetcars remained a flashpoint for confrontations between the races. In a 1920 public

speech, Ku Klux Klan Imperial Wizard W. J. Simmons directed some of his ire at Atlanta’s
streetcars which, he claimed, violated Georgia’s mandatory segregated transportation laws. He
urged racially distinct trolleys, not just separate seating sections. Despite the Klansman’s fiery
demand, the traction company retained its long-held economic decision not to provide raciallydefined individual streetcars. Whites and Blacks continued to share each trolley, with whites
sitting in front while African Americans stood or sat in the back. For Georgia Railway & Power,
financial considerations could transcend the dictates of Jim Crow.439
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On two levels, Atlanta’s streetcars regulated and reflected the spaces open to African
American occupation within the city. Inside the trolley car, Blacks were relegated to the back
sections at all times. If the streetcar became crowded and whites needed more seating, African
Americans had to give up their seats and stand farther back. Outside the trolley car, some
streetcar routes ran to the segregated Black enclaves, while others ran to nearby white residential
sections. The geographies of the streetcar routes themselves often demarcated the boundaries of
Black communities, while simultaneously providing a means of escaping beyond those
boundaries.440
This spatial ordering of African American travel, whether defining which line to use or
dictating where to sit, reflected and protected the hierarchy of race. The traction company did
have limits in how far it would go to accommodate Jim Crow. As in its refusal to provide
racially-separate trolleys, the company built race-based, geographically-separate routes only
when there was sufficient traffic to bear the expense of two lines; in other words, only if both
were profitable.441
In its catalog of Atlanta streetcar routes, the Beeler Report made a point of noting which
lines carried which races. The Route 4 line served a “high-class white section” on the north
(Emory University), and a “mostly white” territory on the south (Grant Park). But in between the
two, it had to pass through “a colored section.”442 Similarly, the document reported that the
Route 1 Decatur Street-Marietta Street line had an African American district on its eastern end
and passed many Black retail shops on Decatur Street. It made no mention of race when
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describing Marietta Street—an indicator that that street’s buildings housed primarily white
enterprises. It did comment that the road’s expansive 60'-90' street width attracted “much
automobile parking.”443
The Beeler Report did more than just describe streetcar routes. It also suggested ways to
minimize contact between the races, insofar as it was economically feasible. Route 13 began just
west of Joel Hurt’s white—and exclusive— Inman Park neighborhood. It ran through mostly
Black Fourth Ward, into downtown, west through the Black Atlanta University district, then
south into the white West End. However, few white riders from West End took that trolley. The
report recommended eliminating that section, and initiating a new route to connect West End
directly to the Alabama Street commercial district. Besides giving whites a convenient
connection to downtown shopping, the changes would “stop an essentially colored line from
operating unnecessarily into white territory.” The authors of the Report understood the
undesirability of race mixing on streetcars, and suggested ways to reinforce the separation
between racially divided communities.444
Atlanta’s older two-man trolleys had the entrance at the back and the exit in front. With
the motorman driving the vehicle, the conductor stood at the rear entry collecting tickets and
fares. White passengers complained about having to walk through the crammed Black section at
the back to get to their seats up front. In 1925, the traction company introduced new one-man
streetcars, in which the driver doubled as the conductor. The trolley entrance door was moved to
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the front end of the vehicle, so Black passengers now had to traverse the length of the trolley to
get to their area (see figure below).445
Inevitable close encounters, especially on the mixed-race smoking platforms at the rear of

Figure 37. A front-loading “one-man safety car,” 1925.
the trolleys, quickly escalated into physical violence, frequently with weapons and often fatal.
Newspapers printed sensational accounts of the many racially-charged altercations, fights,
injuries, and deaths. Every such instance underscored for the traveling public the sometimes
objectionable or even dangerous nature of a streetcar ride. No wonder individuals and families,
whatever their race, purchased a car as soon as they could afford one. An automobile freed them
not only from the geographic and scheduling constraints of mass transit, but also from the
anxiety and stress of a likely uncomfortable, possibly perilous contact with a stranger in a
streetcar.446
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One such confrontation happened on the smoking platform of a streetcar on where a
white man, M. V. Ragsdale, was standing. A Black man, Ernest Williams, hopped on the running
streetcar between stops, stepping on the white man’s toes in the process. An argument broke out.
Another African American man struck Ragsdale with a billy club, and Williams pulled out a
knife. Ragsdale drew a gun and shot him. The unnamed Black man jumped off the trolley and
fled. Williams was taken to Grady Hospital and was not expected to live. Jumping on and off
moving streetcars was illegal, but common. The incident underscored the fraught nature of even
incidental physical contact between the races, and demonstrated how, literally, a trivial misstep
quickly escalated into armed conflict and death.447
In another fatal encounter, the African American man was not even riding on the trolley.
On January 8, 1920, Sergeant Ernest Casey, a 17-year Army veteran, was shot and killed around
8:00 p.m. on Auburn Avenue near Ivy Street [Peachtree Center Ave.]. Casey had been walking
down the street, and apparently exchanged words with the conductor on a passing trolley. The
motorman stopped the empty streetcar and the conductor got off and fired four shots at the
unarmed Casey, who was running away. None of the witnesses got the trolley number, and
Georgia Railway and Power Company filed no report of the incident. Police authorities said they
believed the conductor shot the Black soldier in the back because of something he said. Military
police at Camp Gordon, where Casey was stationed, said he had two previous arrests, and had
been something of a trouble maker. In twenty-first century parlance, Casey was another victim of
“living while Black.”448
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Atlanta police were apparently stymied, but Coroner Paul Donehoo proved to be a
Holmesian in his relentless investigation. The unidentified streetcar, out of service and heading
to the car barn, carried no passengers at the time of the shooting. However, it had a driver as well
as the conductor—an obviously reticent motorman who had not come forward. Comparing
streetcar schedules with witness accounts, Coroner Donehoo tracked down all the out-of-service
trolleys heading to the car barn between 7:30 and 8:30 p.m. on the date of the incident, and
subpoenaed every motorman and conductor on those streetcars. During those interviews, he
identified motorman J. W. Gibbs, who admitted that his conductor, J. T. Thrasher, did the
shooting. A murder warrant was issued, but when police arrived at his home, Thrasher had taken
his belongings and disappeared.449
The incident provides yet another example of the hair-trigger reactions of whites when
they felt challenged or threatened by an African American man in public or on the streets of
Atlanta. The encounter could be verbal or physical, no matter how accidental, or trivial. Violence
often resulted, whether or not the Black person had a weapon. A third encounter, echoing
modern headline events, demonstrates how the perception that an African American man might
be reaching for a weapon could lead to his death.
Streetcar conductor Claud B. Hulsey shot and killed Will Randolph, an African American
passenger, on Sunday night, March 30, 1924. The story that eventually emerged in conflicting
news accounts stated that four noisy and drunk Black men boarded the streetcar on its route
between Atlanta and Decatur. Hulsey was collecting their fares with the assistance of a helpful
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white passenger, H. P. Williams. When the conductor attempted to quiet the group, one of the
Black men, Will Davis, cursed him, and Williams slapped him in the face. Another Black man,
Will Randolph, butted in, and the conductor threatened to eject them all from the trolley. Both
white men asserted that Randolph then made a motion as if to reach for a revolver in his hip
pocket. They claimed to have seen the pistol, but Davis, the man who had been slapped, said
Randolph did not have a weapon. No gun was found on Randolph or in the streetcar. Later,
witnesses stated that a revolver had fallen out of Randolph’s pocket, and one of the Black
passengers picked it up, rushed off the stopped streetcar, hid it somewhere, and then got back
on.450
Despite the fact that Randolph was unarmed at the time and was shot in the back, Hulsey
claimed he fired in self-defense. An all-white DeKalb County Superior Court jury, after
deliberating less than two hours, acquitted Hulsey of the murder charge. The incident
demonstrates how friends and bystanders eagerly jumped in to support the person of their same
race who was involved in the fracas. Again, a commonplace, unremarkable encounter almost
instantaneously erupted into violence. The escalation of the use of force was rapid and excessive,
and completely predictable—then as now.451
African Americans were not always the victims; they perpetrated some of the violence in
the streets and on the streetcars. A dispute over seating on a trolley sparked one such episode.
Around noon on Friday, October 21, 1921, Conductor Giley O. Phillips was working the
Piedmont Avenue line. At Five Points, two white women entered the car, and he forced a “surly”
Black man to give up a seat near the front of the trolley so white women could sit there.
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According to the conductor, the man said, “I’ll get you for this,” when he exited the streetcar at
the next stop.452
That evening, Phillips’ trolley made its regular stop at Piedmont Avenue and Fifteenth
Street in front of the Piedmont Driving Club [near Piedmont Park today]. When Phillips opened
the door to admit passengers, he recognized the Black man from earlier in the day, waiting on the
sidewalk. The man fired four shots, all of which struck the conductor, then fled on foot. Phillips
was in critical condition but survived, and the African American remained unidentified. Streetcar
employees created a reward fund to catch the perpetrator, with Georgia Railway and Power
Company pledging an additional $200. Eight months later, Willie Brown was arrested, based on
information “furnished by other parties,” and jailed in the Fulton County Tower. He was charged
with the assault on Phillips, whose wounds had left him disabled.453
A noticeable difference marks the approaches taken in the cases of the wounded white
conductor (Phillips) and the fatally shot-in-the-back Black army sergeant (Casey). In the Casey
case, Atlanta police basically gave up on apprehending the white conductor or determining
which streetcar he worked on. Georgia Railway and Power Company filed no report. Only the
remarkable diligence of a city coroner led to the identification of the motorman, who, under
interrogation, admitted that his conductor had killed Casey. The guilty man was not
apprehended.
In stark contrast, the motormen collected money for a reward to find the shooter of white
conductor Phillips; the traction company filed a report and contributed handsomely to the
reward. The Atlanta police did not give up on the investigation, and within six months, the
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perpetrator was behind bars. Both incidents had initially unidentified perpetrators. Based on the
reactions of the police and the streetcar company, and the time and effort expended to solve the
crimes, one could reasonably conclude that the greater crime was the serious wounding of the
white conductor, and the more trivial incident was the fatal shooting of a Black soldier. As with
all other municipal resources, Atlanta police investigations were unequally distributed.
6.5

Race-Based Policing of Atlanta’s Streets
In 1930, George S. Schuyler wrote that there was “no more trying state . . . than being

simultaneously a Negro and a traveler.” He urged all African Americans to buy a car as soon as
possible to be free from the discomforts, discrimination, segregation, and insults they received on
trains, buses, and streetcars, in the north as well as the Jim Crow south. An automobile meant
freedom. It might also bring a modicum of equality, as service stations and garages, even in the
south, treated Black customers with some courtesy. That civility, however, was primarily due to
the stiff competition between rival oil companies.454
Just owning a car could be problematic for African Americans. It took some years for
whites to become accustomed to the sight of a Black man driving his own automobile, not
merely chauffeuring the white owner of the vehicle. Police frequently stopped African American
drivers on the suspicion that the vehicle they were driving had been stolen. Schuyler recounts the
experience of an acquaintance in an undisclosed Georgia location.
I know a prominent Negro politician in Georgia who was forced to stop his
limousine in a backwoods village and be questioned by some ignoramus as to its
ownership. He managed to get away all right by saying that the car belonged to
“Mister _________ of Atlanta” (giving his own name). The use of the term mister
convinced his interrogator that the automobile must belong to a white man.455
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All of Atlanta’s policemen were white and armed. In 1922, the union of African
American ministers considered petitioning city council for Black policemen to work in the
African American sections of town. When Mayor Key heard of the proposed petition, he stated
that it did “not fit the plan of the police department and would not meet the approval of council
or the police board.” It would be another 26 years before Atlanta would hire an African
American patrolman.456
Like the police, all of Atlanta’s streetcar drivers and conductors were armed white men.
The state of Georgia gave them police powers, so they carried weapons while serving in a dual
capacity as both employees of the traction company and as agents of the city. As Brownell notes,
there existed at that time an “unfortunate readiness on the part of white patrolmen and streetcar
conductors to fire on blacks with the least provocation.”457 African Americans found themselves
most often on the receiving end of gunfire, but all-white juries seldom convicted white
perpetrators on the rare occasions law enforcement brought charges against them. The entire
legal system was premised upon a “reasoning world of men”—and all of those men were
white.458
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Atlanta’s arrest statistics display the unequal application of the law on Black and white
citizens. Table 11 (see previous chapter) shows that after 1900, whites in the city generally
comprised slightly more than two-thirds of the population, while African Americans made up
slightly less than one-third of the population. For the purposes of comparison, two representative
years, 1906 and 1929, were selected to demonstrate the disparity in numbers of total arrests
based on race and gender. The number of traffic arrests are compared with the number of total
arrests, as they help explain changes in the race and

Table 12. Total Arrests by Race and
Gender

gender arrest percentages. The year 1906 was
selected, as that is the first year of available data for
traffic arrests; Atlanta’s first traffic ordinance was
passed in 1904. The year 1929 was selected as it is

Race/Gender
Black Women
White Women
Black Men
White Men
Total

1906
3,194
676
10,317
7,515
21,702

1929
3,951
2,607
13,389
17,277
37,224

the last year of this study.459
Table 12 above shows the number of total arrests in 1906 and 1929, broken down by race
and gender. In 1906, although African Americans comprised less than 40% of the population,
they accounted for more than half of all arrests. That year, arrests of Black men alone made up
nearly half the total, and Black women were nearly five times more likely to be arrested than
white women.
These numbers had changed dramatically by 1929. Atlanta’s population more than tripled
between 1900 and 1930, from 89,872 to 270,366. As expected with a larger population, the total
number of arrests also increased, although the 1929 total was not even double that of 1906. The
significant changes occurred in the number of white persons arrested. Nearly 4,000 more white
men were arrested than Black men, and the number of white women arrested almost quadrupled.

459

Arrest data are from the Annual Report of the Chief of Police for the City of Atlanta for the various
years; population numbers are from the U.S. Census for 1900, 1910, 1920, and 1930.
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Table 13 at right shows arrests by race and gender as percentages of the total number of arrests.
For both Black men and women, the percentage of

Table 13. Percentages of Total Arrests
by Race and Gender

arrests decreased between the two years, while the

Race/Gender
Black Women
White Women
Black Men
White Men
Total

percentages for whites, especially women, saw
notable increases.460
The advent of the automobile in Jim Crow

1906
15%
3%
48%
35%
100%

1929
11%
7%
36%
46%
100%

Atlanta explains the striking new disparities in arrest statistics.461 Table 14 below demonstrates
why. The police chiefs’ annual reports documented that regulation of traffic had become a major
portion of the average policeman’s duties in the 1920s. The table below shows that in 1906,
traffic arrests made up less than 1% of total arrests, while in 1929, traffic arrests accounted for
29% of all arrests. Traffic arrests by race are not
available.
The numbers of whites and Blacks owning
personal automobiles in Atlanta are not known for
the period of this study. However, home ownership
and the values of the homes owned can act as a

Table 14. Traffic Arrests and Total
Arrests

Type of Arrest
Traffic Arrests
Other Arrests
Total Arrests

1906
56
21,646
21,702

1929
10,921
26,303
37,224

Traffic Arrests
% of Total

0.26%

29%

rough proxy for car-ownership. In 1930, 25% of all white families in Fulton County owned their
own homes, and the median value of a non-farm home owned by a native-born white person
there was $5,651. That same year, about 17% of all African American families in Fulton County

460
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owned their own homes, and the median value of a non-farm home owned by a native-born
Black person there was $2,305.462
More white families owned their own homes and those homes were worth more. Those
families likely possessed greater wealth, and therefore a greater ability to afford an automobile.
Fewer African American families owned homes, and those homes had a lower market value.
This suggests that those families might have less disposable income to spend on a car.463
Fewer Black car owners than white car owners would logically account for the greater
number of total arrests of whites in 1929. A greater percentage of arrests were the result of traffic
offenses. More white drivers meant more white traffic arrests, and the vast majority of drivers
were white men.
The enormous jump in arrests of white women can also be attributed to traffic violations.
By the 1920s, more women were driving, using the car to shop and visit, but also for family
outings and picnics and even more extended ventures such as auto camping and cross-country
touring. Conversely, African American women comprised the segment of the population least
likely to be behind the wheel of an automobile—and therefore least liable to commit a traffic
offense. Their arrest numbers bear this out.464
The economics of car ownership produced, for the first time in Atlanta’s history, more
arrests of whites than Blacks. Arrests of white men exceeded those of Black men in every year
between 1922 and 1929, with traffic offenses the primary cause. African Americans, especially
men, were also arrested for moving violations. Many worked as car or truck drivers, as they had
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during the era of horse-drawn vehicles, transporting people, goods, and freight. Despite these
many opportunities to violate traffic laws, arrests of African American men declined as a
percentage of the totals. In the 1920s, automobility, especially the personally-owned vehicle, was
substantially a white domain, and they had the arrest records to prove it.465

Throughout the twenties, more and more Americans—no matter their race—desired to
own an automobile. The number of car sales rose dramatically in the first years after World War
I, but beginning in 1923, sales slumped as the market reached saturation. The novel situation
caused great agitation throughout motordom. At the same time, the Atlanta’s civic and financial
leaders had an additional concern, the Florida real estate boom. Both circumstances threatened a
slowdown in city expansion, and no amount of zoning or new roads would fix either problem. A
number of strategies would, by decade’s end, solve the difficulties of the automotive industry as
well as the city of Atlanta, but they all, to varying degrees, relied on an essential component:
advertising.

465

The numbers for 1920 and 1921 are not available, but it is probable that the tipping point was reached
during one of those years. In 1919, arrests of Black men exceeded whites by 1,405, while in 1922, arrests of white
men exceeded Blacks by 2,191. Traffic arrests began to increase significantly beginning in 1916.
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7

SELLING CITY & CAR

In the 1920s, Atlanta’s civic and commercial leaders employed zoning as an expansion
strategy. New neighborhoods, carefully stratified by race and class, stretched the city limits and
spilled into outlying suburbs, initiating the city’s first official designation as a “metropolitan
area.” A national recession during the first two years of the decade depressed the city’s
commerce and industry, yet did not dampen the boosters’ ceaseless extolling of the city’s
numerous advantages. Many businessmen supported the mayor’s optimistic “500,000-People
City by 1930” campaign, displaying the chimerical number in their advertisements. The
Chamber of Commerce urged businesses to relocate to the city. The Atlanta Convention Bureau
announced plans to acquire more conferences and assemblies each year—an effective way to
promote the city and help achieve the mayor’s goal.466
Atlanta’s retail-trade territory greatly expanded with the increasing use of the automobile.
With nearly two-thirds of Georgians now within easy reach of the city, newspapers advised local
merchants on how to attract a new type of consumer: the out-of-town shopper arriving by car.
“Courteous treatment to automobile customers makes trade and adds to the general business of a
city.” More business translated into a growing city.467
Atlanta’s ten-year growth to a half a million inhabitants, so optimistically predicted by
Mayor Key at the beginning of 1920, never materialized. That year’s census count, 200,616, did
not even come close to doubling. Instead, the population increased by just over a third, reaching
a total of 270,366 in 1930. Yet, between the viaduct-construction years of 1921 and 1929, the
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city added to its skyline and street infrastructure. By mid-decade, Atlanta was well on its way to
consolidating its position as the financial nucleus and central distribution point of the
southeastern United States. A 1923-24 construction boom brought new offices, department
stores, apartments, major hotels, as well as a substantial expansion of one of downtown’s finest
locations, the Hurt Building. Throughout the twenties, Atlanta annexed new territory in all four
directions. By 1930, the city’s area would reach nearly 35 square miles and the Greater Atlanta
metropolitan area would encompass six boroughs.468
However, a regional competitor, aided and abetted by the automobile, threatened the
city’s growth. Florida’s great real estate boom had developed gradually over the first decades of
the twentieth century, but by the mid-1920s, motorists from around the country on their way to
paradise were blithely driving through—not to—Atlanta. A deluge of realty company ads
promised untold wealth to prospective Florida property owners, enticing local citizens and
developers to relocate their cash, and sometimes themselves, to this coastal gold mine.469
In 1925, local investors and businessmen decided they had a true crisis on their hands;
too many people and far too much money were moving south. The Chamber of Commerce
proposed a nationwide publicity campaign to promote the city, the Forward Atlanta movement.
Lyon accurately observes, “Nothing suggests Atlanta’s mood of the twenties quite so well as the
name ‘Forward Atlanta’. . . . This slogan epitomizes the optimistic and expansive attitude of the
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city’s businessmen as they faced the problems of the postwar decade. . . . No problem was
insurmountable if approached with energy and the proper Atlanta spirit.”470
Utilizing modern advertising techniques which targeted specific national markets, the
venture proved incredibly successful, bringing in nearly 600 new enterprises and more than
16,000 workers to the city over a four-year period. One of the operation’s premier acquisitions
was a General Motors regional assembly plant for Chevrolets. The Forward Atlanta movement
collected the city’s financiers, elite and ordinary citizens, elected officials, civic organizations,
and businesses large and small, all working to grease the wheels of the municipal growth
machine. And it worked.471
American industrial production had increased 12% between 1910 and 1920, but exploded
by 64% during the twenties. The automotive industry led the charge; passenger car output more
than tripled over the decade, from 1.5 million in 1919 to 4.8 million in 1929. Motor vehicle
manufacturing spurred the petroleum, steel, tire, glass, lumber, upholstery, and a host of other
supplemental and subsidiary industries. The construction of new suburbs and taxpayersubsidized roads boosted the economy and intensified appetites for more cars. Atlanta’s
Chamber of Commerce declared that “the world today depends to a large extent on the
automobile. Without the automobile practically all industry would stop . . . the progress of the
world would be impaired and retarded.” As early as 1921, many in the business community
began to believe that car companies had become too big to fail, a generally accepted notion
today.472
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Eager buyers mortgaged their futures for new cars—and any other novel and up-to-date
product or venture—as the urban consumer culture entrenched itself in the American psyche.
More and more of the nation’s workforce toiled in cities, and the assembly line rendered factory
jobs rote and uninspiring. Leisure time gained a new importance as it afforded the opportunity
for escape, pleasure, and adventure. Automobiles allowed exploration and brought a wide array
of experiences within easy reach. Popular magazines, jazz, Hollywood movies, and ubiquitous
advertising shaped and stimulated desires as greater wealth enabled greater consumption. The
old-fashioned values, traditions, and economies of the Victorian era disappeared in the rush to
modernity.
Throughout the decade, Atlanta’s growth elites continued to exercise their collective
muscle, moving the city along the path of expansion, gaining more people, larger borders, and
substantial wealth. The group seized on new opportunities to extend the city’s regional influence,
and established Atlanta as the locus of finance, transportation, commerce, and manufacturing in
the southeastern U.S. Embracing the automobile as their vehicle to fortune, they profited as
motordom further entwined itself with national and municipal government, industry, and culture.
They worked diligently to promote automobile use and the auto industry, utilizing
Atlanta’s position as the region’s leading advertiser, publisher, and paper producer. The print
media by this time depended on advertising for the bulk of their revenues. In return, the
newspapers in particular saluted businessmen and corporate leaders for forging the general
affluence, especially for upper- and middle-class urban dwellers.
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In 1929, more vehicles crowded onto city streets. Many Atlantans rode the wave of
prosperity as business boomed, purchasing new or used vehicles, now within reach of even some
in the lower classes due to price-segmented car lines and installment buying. Downtown traffic
congestion grew worse, prompting the city council to undertake yet another traffic survey.
7.1

The Business Cycle
The “Roaring” Twenties did not start out that way. The decade began, not with a bang,

but a whimper.473 The economic boom, launched with the signing of the armistice on November
11, 1918, had shuddered to a halt. Falling stocks started a nationwide recession in October 1919,
which reached its nadir in July 1921. Business owners, who had placed optimistically-sized
orders just months before the new decade began, ended up sitting on excess goods with few
customers. American industries, geared up to a high degree of efficient wartime production,
filled their lots and warehouses with surplus output. In the glutted market, retailers slashed prices
in frantic attempts to liquidate their inert inventories. With orders canceled, manufacturers idled,
and hiring ceased.474
Unemployment became rampant; all the soldiers had by this time returned from overseas
to a dearth of industrial and commercial jobs. Agriculture, too, felt the effects of the economic
malaise, which was exacerbated in the South. During the war, many farmers had taken on large
debt as they expanded and mechanized their farms to increase output. The recession brought
lower prices for agricultural products, and the boll weevil continued to devastate the cotton crop,
the main source of income for much of rural Georgia. Easy credit dried up as market prices fell.
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Land values dropped and farms failed, sending masses of sharecroppers, tenants, hired hands,
and owners out of the fields and into the cities, searching for jobs and swelling the
unemployment numbers. Metropolitan populations rose so much that by 1920, a majority of
Americans lived in towns and cities, and Atlanta reached its new population high of 200,616.475
Labor strikes, pan-handlers in the streets, and rising urban crime had Washington
searching for ways to better industrial relations and put people back to work. Cities like Atlanta
called for the federal government to hire men for public works projects, including road-building.
Newspaper editorials asserted that public construction bested relief as a recovery strategy, and
claimed that employment would reduce crime. President Harding in turn asked municipalities to
expand their workforces to aid the more than 2.3 million out-of-work Americans. Atlanta’s yearround building climate and backlog of public and private construction work should have
provided plenty of jobs. But Mayor Key had to goad businesses into hiring more workers,
threatening to publicly humiliate any reluctant employers.476
One stimulus to the economy came in the form of the 1921 Federal Highway Act, which
would put men to work and improve the nation’s transportation system. The new bill
appropriated $75 million of 1922 federal funding for the construction of interstate and
intercounty roads and bridges. A new component required the paving surfaces to be durable and
adequate for current as well as future needs. The highest level of government again spent
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taxpayers’ money to ensure good roads for automobiles. Without the requisite infrastructure, cars
would never have succeeded as the preeminent transportation mode in America.477
Adding to the economic woes, U.S. railroads faced problems on multiple fronts. In 1917,
President Wilson had nationalized the railways, creating the U.S. Railroad Administration to
temporarily take over their management during the war. The 1920 Transportation Act returned
them to private operation on March 1 in a less-than-smooth handover. Company executives met
in Atlanta, the Southeast’s predominant railroad center, to negotiate the confusion and delays of
the difficult transition.478
Railroad companies found themselves, post-government ownership, in poor condition.
With the country crying out for increased production, the railways lacked sufficient numbers of
freight cars to meet the needs. During the war, many of the usual activities of commerce and the
public had been put on hold, halting building construction and business expansion. As life
returned to normal, pent-up demand exploded. Manufacturers required rail transit for raw
materials coming in and finished products going out, but the railroads could not handle all the
traffic now requested of them. An editorial in Railway Age declared, “The commerce and
industry of the United States would have to stop growing if the expansion of railroad facilities
were not revived on a large scale.”479
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The editor probably spoke too soon. Around the country, motorized vehicles began to
take up the slack created by the inadequacies of the railroads. A bumper wheat crop in the
Midwest forced farmers, during the 1920 freight car shortage, to utilize every available truck and
car to transport the crop to
safe storage. Farmers and
businessmen hailed the
rescue operation as a sign
that “the day of the motor
truck is rapidly
approaching.” During the
1925 Florida freight

Figure 38. Atlanta to Miami trucks; Atlanta Constitution,
October 18, 1925.

embargo, an Atlanta manufacturer would institute a direct shipping innovation in the form of a
small fleet of trucks to carry his beds, mattresses, and box springs to Miami (see photo above).
Two of his trucks could carry the equivalent of one regulation railroad freight car, and had the
ability to stop at points all along the route, delivering goods to small towns as well as large cities.
This “new method of shipping” was hailed as “another example of Atlanta’s undaunted spirit.”480
Throughout the twenties, the trucking industry would rapidly expand its efforts to make
commerce and agriculture independent of the railroads. By mid-decade the railway companies
had awakened to the changing situation. In Atlanta, at the annual meeting of the local chapter of
American Society of Civil Engineers, Hunter McDonald spoke. A former Society president and
chief engineer for the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway, McDonald acknowledged
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that motor vehicles and streetcars had become the most serious contenders for railroad business.
Short-haul passenger and freight was fast becoming a thing of the past as more people took buses
or used their private automobiles for pleasure trips, while trucks and interurban electrics carried
local cargo. Railroads would have to excel in the long haul of both passengers and freight if they
wanted to succeed.481
One executive astutely observed that the capacity of transportation limited all production.
Railroad problems exacerbated the ongoing economic woes, impacting countless industries.
Automobile manufacturing was not exempt from the general business slowdown. High-capacity
factory assembly lines could now build far more vehicles than a nation in recession could absorb.
The industry’s go-to alternative market, Europe, had borne the brunt of the war, and overseas
customers were in short supply. With demand plummeting, a number of car manufacturers went
bankrupt; the rest chose to grit their teeth and endure.482
With the economy in decline, Americans voted with their pocketbooks in November
1920, opting for the promise of Warren G. Harding’s “return to normalcy.” In the past four years,
the nation had lost thousands of lives in a world war and a global pandemic, and had suffered
through the fear and uncertainty of race riots, labor strikes, anarchist bombings, widespread
unemployment, and a president with serious health problems. Harding’s mild demeanor, frontporch campaign, and pledge to restore a regular, steady order led to his landslide victory.
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Republican administrations would govern until 1932, when Roosevelt won his own majority as
empty wallets again directed American voters.
Upon reaching its lowest point in July of 1921, the recession technically ended, but the
nation’s economic distress did not. The slow upward climb began. Not until a year later could
business and industry claim that the danger point had passed. Markets remained uncertain and
most dealers had to let their stock to run low. However, merchants saw glimmers of a rising
demand which they hoped would bring prices along with it.483
In a signal of optimism, Atlanta enthusiastically hosted the Great Southern Automobile
Show in February 1922. The sponsoring Atlanta Automobile Association afterward expressed
great appreciation to the Constitution for the “splendid cooperation” and “generosity in news
space” allotted for coverage of the exhibition. O. J. Willoughby, editor of the paper’s Motors and
Highway Department, effusively praised the show “worth many dollars” to the city as a whole.484
In April 1923, the U.S. Secretary of Labor James J. Davis declared the slump officially
ended, celebrating “empty shelves, plenty of work, no strikes, and both employer and employees
sharing in the general prosperity.” His remark about unstocked shelving referred to the growth in
consumer spending which sent goods flying out of stores. But it could equally have referred to
the unconventional low-inventory strategy just coming into vogue.485
Industry and commerce began to embrace the hand-to-mouth inventory control system.
Better known today as just-in-time (JIT) purchasing, the novel approach featured a policy of
buying for immediate needs only. This style of inventory management marked an about-face
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from the typical “forward buying” of goods months in advance of the time they would actually
be required. As-needed purchasing limited the stocks of merchandise and raw materials carried
by retailers and manufacturers. The unorthodox stratagem reflected the recent extreme economic
conservatism of both producers and sellers, who vowed never again to be stuck with large,
capital-devouring inventories of goods, as they had at the beginning of the decade. The system
promised to reduce consumer prices, bringing buyers into the marketplace.486
An absolutely essential component of successful hand-to-mouth buying was the ability to
re-stock rapidly. The postwar extension of the rail network and eventually-upgraded railway
facilities resulted in greatly reduced shipping times. Heavy trucks carried loads of freight from
terminals to stores and factories, and, with increasing frequency, directly from producer to seller.
Unlike trains, trucks could provide efficient service across town. Altogether, the improved and
expanded national transportation system allowed merchandisers and manufacturers to quickly
and reliably replace sold items.487
The hand-to-mouth inventory system held particular importance for Atlanta. Mandatory
rapid re-stocking ability meant that corporations could no longer concentrate all their factories
and warehouses in a single location. Transporting goods across great distances, even with
improved shipping, produced time lags, higher costs, and lost customers. Establishing regional
headquarters, offices, and distribution centers offered the solution. Atlanta, with its extensive rail
connections to seaports and the interior, found itself uniquely positioned to assume that role for
the southeastern United States.
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7.2

The Florida Boom
Even during the worst of the recession Atlanta heralded itself as the financial center and

distributing point of the Southeast. City boosters exaggerated and promoted its status as the
region’s primary governmental locus, leader in building construction, supreme convention city,
golfing haven, largest advertising center south of Philadelphia, and the regional headquarters for
railroads, telephone service, and film distribution. In addition to taking great pride in its
abundance of professional and manufacturing enterprises, Atlanta also considered itself the most
important automobile center in the South.488
While poised for a quick economic recovery, the city faced a significant new problem—
major regional competition. The Florida real estate boom had its beginnings in the late 1800s
when Henry Flagler completed the East Coast Railway connecting Jacksonville to Key West. A
wealthy industrialist, Flagler had co-founded Standard Oil with his friend, John D. Rockefeller,
in 1870. His next project focused on developing the Florida frontier, already an agricultural
leader, into a magnet for vacationers. He constructed luxurious hotels along the rail lines and
created the city of Miami. By the early twenties, tourism contested farming for the title of major
state industry.
Georgia and Atlanta initially welcomed the volume of Florida-bound motor vehicles
traveling across theirs borders, but had to acknowledge that the southern neighbor had much
better roads. Winter storms often rendered Georgia roads impassable at the height of the tourist
season, forcing many travelers to ship their automobiles by rail from Chattanooga to
Jacksonville. The bypass cost city and state thousands of dollars in lost revenue every year. In an
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effort to promote the Good Roads movement, the state advertised the newly-created Georgia
State Automobile Association, an affiliate of the American Automobile Association.489
In 1920, the Atlanta Constitution’s motors and highways department published an up-tothe-minute map and description of Florida’s major roads, which were “possibly the best in the
South.” A large number of tourists travelled in automobiles and trucks, stopping at the “motor
tourist” camps available at many small towns along the way (see photo below). Compiled with
the help of a local travel and transport bureau, the column provided assistance to private and
commercial motorists. By 1923, the newspaper was sending out its own employee to tour the
Florida routes and create a free-of-charge guide booklet for south-bound travelers.490

Figure 39. Tourist camp in Lakewood, south Atlanta, 1920s.
By 1924, owning a piece of Florida real estate had taken on an opulent mystique, and getrich-quick promises lured thousands to the Sunshine State. On their way to the new goldmine,
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cars from every state passed through Georgia via Atlanta, which had the best roads, hotels,
restaurants, and filling stations. The leisured classes from the Midwest could take the famous
“Dixie Flyer” from Chicago to Miami, to which a special “Atlanta section” had been added.
Travelers of modest means arrived by car or truck on the Dixie Highway which ran through
downtown. Georgia’s state highway engineer documented “the enormous increase in tourist
traffic coming through the state en route to Florida,” which was heaviest in the fall and spring,
with the bulk of the volume concentrated on north-south routes.491
Ads flooded the newspapers, promoting properties across Florida with exotic amenities
such as motorboat harbors and tarpon fishing. One advertiser invited his Atlanta friends to secure
profits beyond their expectations by purchasing a plat in a “restricted” (i.e., whites only) Tampa
subdivision. Leading local realtors got in on the action. The prestigious Adair Realty & Trust
Company, with offices in Atlanta’s Healey Building and on Madison Avenue in New York City,
offered coupon bonds in a Miami luxury apartment hotel overlooking Biscayne Bay.492
Some local advertising agents attempted to counter the stream of Florida promotions and
stanch the flow of money there. Positioning Atlanta as a tourist destination—especially against
swimming, sunning, sailing, seafood, and real estate speculation—was probably not the best
strategy. But the metropolitan area did have a draw which Florida never could, the new Stone
Mountain memorial carving. City boosters stood ready to make the most of it.
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The United Daughters of the Confederacy had persuaded the Venable family, owners of
granite quarries and enthusiastic Klan supporters, to deed the north scarp of Stone Mountain to
the group. As part of the June 18, 1923 dedication ceremony, a great automobile parade wound
through the city, then carried distinguished guests out to the mountain some 14 miles east of Five
Points. Notable sculptor Gutzon Borglum began drilling rock as patriotic songs and speeches
rang out, celebrating the southland’s “immortal cause which rose so white and fair.” In what has
to be one of the most inherently contradictory and ahistorical proclamations in the nation’s
public history, the carving was dedicated both “to the southern Confederacy” and “to the
indissoluble union of the American people.”493
Stone Mountain’s memorial represented a high point in the early twentieth century spate
of statue-building and street re-naming to honor Confederate “heroes.” White southerners,
increasingly distanced from their inglorious defeat, pursued their relentless quest for superiority
to and domination over Black people. With the institution of slavery demolished, they
institutionalized white supremacy in its place. Atlanta had some 40 streets named after
Confederate or Klan leaders; about 30 remain in place today. The very public effigies (now
protected by Georgia state law) and street name changes solidified the whites’ interpretation of
the Civil War re-defined as the noble “Lost Cause.” The frequent use of “Dixie” to describe
anything southern, including south-bound trains and highways, further exemplified the systemic
cultural entrenchment of Jim Crow oppression.494
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Whatever else Stone Mountain might represent, it did epitomize growing automobile
tourism. While a train and a streetcar brought sightseers from downtown to the village of Stone
Mountain, only a car could deliver non-hikers and non-bikers to the base of the carved face.
Promotional booklets and brochures listed it as an obligatory excursion, but the mountain never
really succeeded as a leading tourist destination. It certainly could not compare to the attractions
of coastal real estate to the south.495
Most of the contra-Florida advertising copy championed Atlanta’s municipal growth and
the extension of its residential development into the suburbs. Local real estate offered a safe
investment, which was in rising demand, “as solid as the Rock of Gibraltar” and uninflated by
risky booms. The city’s continuous expansion guaranteed enhanced property values, but
measured reasoning and promises of future security could not counteract the lure of rapid
riches.496
With even the city’s oldest real estate firm now sending precious underwriting dollars
south (Adair was founded in 1865), Atlanta’s business and civic leaders grew more and more
concerned. The state of Florida had a tax-exemption policy and shockingly little regulation.
Despite hopeful-sounding editorials about how much it was an asset to both Georgia and Atlanta,
the boom to the south threatened the city’s status as a premier investment site.497
Beginning in 1924, the Chamber of Commerce began to push back against the Florida
tide. City Builder articles by businessmen and city officials urged a publicity campaign to tell the
world about Atlanta. Mayor Sims with others authored a piece titled, “Why Atlanta Should
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Advertise,” noting that large, progressive cities were advertising themselves as if they were
commodities, and recommended that Atlanta adopt the same strategy (see sketch below). Too
many motorists passed through
without stopping. The city needed
to promote its advantages and
opportunities, letting everyone
know that they would receive a
cordial welcome whether they
came to invest their capital or
establish their home.498
The Chamber itself
pledged that the City Builder
would become the mouthpiece for
Atlanta, with news and stories on
its trade territory. Efforts began to
create a national mailing list, and
upgrades to high-quality paper

Figure 40. Publicity sketch by A. W. Brewerton, for the
Atlanta Journal

with three-color printing on the covers gave the journal a more attractive, up-to-date appearance.
In another thoroughly modern move, the COC took to the airwaves, broadcasting on the Atlanta
Journal’s WSB radio station an invitation to the world to come and see Atlanta.499
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Not content with publicity alone, the city’s power elites sought advantageous laws to aid
local industries. In late 1924, the state legislature ratified a bill which granted municipal and
county tax exemptions for new or expanded factories. The favorable legislation laid the
groundwork for the city’s most successful venture of the decade, the Forward Atlanta Campaign,
launched in mid-1925 and maintained over the next four years.500
Meanwhile, the Atlanta Convention Bureau acknowledged the Florida-bound crowds
and the push for municipal advertising. On January 1, 1925, the organization announced the
addition of new tourist and publicity departments, and changed its name to the Atlanta
Convention and Tourist Bureau. It put greater efforts into destination marketing, ably assisted by
its directors, all prominent men representing the city’s most important businesses: hotels,
railways, automobile dealerships, high-end department and clothing stores, telecommunications,
insurance, publishing, and real estate.501
William Candler’s Atlanta-Biltmore Hotel took the lead in reaching out to Florida
vacationers. In March 1925, as the snowbirds began moving back north, the hotel established a
tourist office in Miami. It offered a number of booklets and pamphlets about Atlanta’s virtues as
a stop-over point, including, of course, specifics about one particularly fine hotel. By June, the
Convention and Tourist Bureau had organized its own outreach strategy. Gathering information
on the approximately 30,000 tourists who visited Florida the previous winter, it planned mailers
to each one at their home address in the fall (before they headed south next winter), inviting them
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to break their journey in Atlanta. The Bureau also worked with the state on highway projects,
recognizing that making Atlanta into a tourist town required good roads.502
The fall of 1925 brought unprecedented numbers of southbound travelers to the city.
Railroads carried larger crowds than ever before. At the time, the city boasted eight railway
systems with fourteen radiating lines carrying 130 trains daily—an average of one train arriving
every eleven minutes. The volume of passengers required additional “tourist trains” on the
southern routes, and the railroads’ liberal layover privileges allowed many vacationers to spend
some time in Atlanta while on their way to Florida. City streets, too, carried heavier traffic
volumes. A reporter noted the great numbers of out-of-state cars in downtown, even from
faraway New York, Massachusetts, and California. He observed that most of them had parked
near a hotel or restaurant, indicating that the visitors were “spending money with local people.”
Clearly, the Florida boom brought a degree of winter-time prosperity to the metropolitan region,
but the big money in the form of real estate development bypassed the city.503
A freight embargo enacted by Florida in 1925 added urgency to the municipal concerns.
Initially applying only to its east coast locations, by the end of October the state had put a
general embargo on all inbound cargo, with a few exceptions. The embargo affected only the
railroads, the sole suppliers of heavy freight transportation throughout the interior. The infant
trucking industry could not yet carry goods in large enough quantities to threaten the state’s
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economy, but, as mentioned earlier, some desperate producers organized small fleets to deliver
their wares. Any railroad failure offered a new opportunity to truckers.504
Thousands of railroad cars were almost literally frozen in their tracks, and sat loaded with
shipments for months in side-yards in Atlanta, Jacksonville, and around the country. A few
enterprising automobile manufacturers devised a clever workaround. With no prohibitions on
incoming cars, they shipped their cars via train to Brunswick, Georgia, where they hired men to
drive them across the border to various Florida destinations. Not until early 1926 did the
Interstate Commerce Commission Florida end the embargo so the freight trains could run
again.505
Writing some years later, Walter C. Hill, vice president of the Retail Credit Company of
Atlanta, described the city’s increasingly-ominous situation this way.
In the summer of 1925, Atlanta, Georgia, faced a crisis. Psychological, perhaps, but
a crisis nevertheless. Many were dismal and discouraged about the exodus of its
people to Florida. They could see a business depression drawing the community
into financial ruin. . . . Something was needed to overcome this psychological
depression. Atlanta needed an awakening to her own resources, needed shaking out
of the inferiority complex that had been induced by high-flown talk about millions
made overnight in the Florida boom. She needed some spiritual stimulant that
would cure this blight of hopelessness that seemed so speedily gaining ground.506
Without some sort of intervention, or until the Florida boom went bust, competitor cities to the
south would soon overshadow Atlanta.
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7.3

Forward Atlanta: Selling the City
Although attracting travelers created some economic benefits and free publicity,

Atlanta’s leadership wanted to attract more substantial and enduring investments. As a tourist
destination, the city could never compete with Florida’s surf, sun, speculation trifecta, and
catering to seasonal, pass-through vacationers only temporarily bolstered sales. Instead of “tin
can” tourists, the growth coalition sought more citizens, commerce, and industry, along with the
new housing that would be needed by incoming corporate executives, office workers, and factory
laborers. The establishment of plants, regional offices, warehouses, and distribution centers
would permanently grow the city’s fabric and population.507
The current president of the Chamber of Commerce, Wilbur Richard Carroll Smith
(1872-1941), decided the circumstances warranted a bold response. He proposed a nation-wide
campaign to advertise the city. Recognizing that Atlanta was “the only metropolitan city in the
entire southeast that is not doing its part to attract in a large way people and capital to it,” he
suggested the Chamber raise $250,000 to publicize the city’s advantages. Dick Smith had
founded and led the W. R. C. Smith Publishing Company, one of foremost publishers of
engineering and technical journals in the South. His business vocabulary comprehended the
concept of “publicity,” as the majority of the revenue for journals, newspapers, and popular
magazines now came from advertisements. He understood the media and methods of effective
publicity. A nation-wide campaign, too, would not appear daunting to someone whose
publications had wide distribution across the country. No doubt the project had the additional
side attraction of possibly bringing more business his way.508
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On September 17, 1925, as COC president, he invited 100 municipal leaders to a
planning dinner at the elegant Atlanta Biltmore Hotel. William Candler, the Biltmore’s builderowner and a well-known civic patron, agreed to chair the venture. The board of directors’
announcement of the fundraising drive sought to arouse community spirit, and solicited the
participation of every business, enterprise, association, agency, school, and religious
organization in one of the city’s “most ambitious forward movements.” Smith declared that once
the world became acquainted with its many opportunities and advantages, Atlanta would “move
forward even more rapidly” to its great destiny. The Forward Atlanta campaign was launched.509
Immediately, the crusade gained momentum. Haverty Furniture volunteered to house
campaign headquarters in its building, providing a ground-floor office whose show windows
soon filled with slogan banners and posters. On the recommendations of trade organizations in
other cities, the Chamber hired the acclaimed American City Bureau, a New York and Chicago
advertising firm, to handle the fundraiser. Ironically, it was the same company which had
spearheaded very successful publicity campaigns for Miami, Daytona, and other Florida cities—
Atlanta’s arch nemeses. Vice President Daniel H. McFarland came to Atlanta to personally guide
the operation. Noticing how everyone he met talked about Florida’s marvelous growth, he
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declared, “Advertising did all that. . . . Florida had something to sell and she advertised for
buyers.” He promised that the same could happen for Atlanta.510
Candler appointed George West, the youthful president of West Lumber Company, to
head the working forces, while Ivan Allen, a former Chamber president and veteran of civic
crusades, led the drive for advance subscriptions from potential big contributors. Businesses
volunteered hundreds of workers to canvass door-to-door. The Atlanta Automobile Association
pledged funding and cooperation, as did dealers, distributors, and other members of the
automotive community. Realtors quickly jumped on board; merchants incorporated “Forward
Atlanta” into their ads; and newspapers devoted countless column inches to promoting the
movement and detailing every step of its progress.511
And progress it did. A “Let’s Go” dinner for more than 700 filled the Ansley Hotel’s
rooftop garden on October 2, 1925, where the volunteers received instruction on salesmanship. A
few days later, an American Legion band led the “army” of campaigners on a parade through the
downtown streets, after which they dispersed to begin fundraising. Cognizant of modern
advertising techniques, the ten-man commission had the event filmed and made sure local
theaters screened it with their newsreels. By October 10, the entire $250,000 had been raised,
and the Constitution declared that the Forward Atlanta campaign was finished.512
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But only the fundraising part of the campaign concluded; now the real work of actually
advertising the city could begin. A new supervisory committee chaired by Ivan Allen consisted
of what was billed as a group of “representative” Atlantans. Not surprisingly, the thirteen were
all power elites: white, successful, well-to-do, and well-known men. The committee had no
African American, women, working- or middle-class members. A large segment of the city’s
population was not merely under-represented, but had no voice at all. The unspoken assumptions
again prevailed—what was good for businessmen was good for Atlanta, and everyone benefitted
when the city grew.513
While a nationally-known ad firm had handled the initial fundraising, the committee
selected a local ad agency to direct the marketing phase. Eastman, Scott and Company had
already achieved regional and national success within a few years of its founding, and had as
clients some of the South’s leading manufacturers and financial houses. Their staff had expertise
in the dual components of cutting-edge marketing: research and advertising. They began by
surveying all of Atlanta’s industrial resources and advantages. U.S. companies required hard data
before making any business decisions, especially momentous changes like opening a regional
headquarters or building a branch factory far distant from the corporate base. The ability to
provide industry-specific documentation in response to any inquiry emerged as a signature
feature of the Forward Atlanta Campaign and one of its greatest marketing tools. Eastman,
Scott’s first task was accumulating and organizing that information, which, at the insistence of
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Chairman Ivan Allen, contained only the facts with no boosterish exaggerations. “The sole
motive of this campaign,” he said, “is to ‘tell the world the truth’ about Atlanta.” Later, a New
York City ad executive would remark that one of the strengths of Forward Atlanta’s ads was
their lack of “blatant bombast.”514
The actual advertising began with a two-page, kick-off spread in the February 20, 1926
issue of the Saturday Evening Post. The campaign targeted specific groups via the types of
media they most often accessed, and tailored advertisements to individual audiences. Business
papers and financial publications carried ads aimed at commerce and industry executives.
Technical periodicals and trade journals reached professionals and the heads of industries best
suited to Atlanta’s territory and amenities. The general public could read about Forward Atlanta
in high-end journals like the Post, or in leading newspapers such the New York Times and
Chicago Tribune. Throughout, the ad copy promoted the city’s dominance in the financial and
industrial fields of the southeast, its transportation facilities, and its central location.515
The diligent research and massive publicity program paid off. In December, the Chamber
of Commerce’s Industrial Bureau reported that, after ten months of advertising, 136 new
businesses came to the city, employing 4,630 people, and bringing in annual payrolls of more
than $7.3 million. The majority of the newcomers came from the East and Midwest (plus one
from London), and most of them had established regional branch offices in town. The consensus
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opinion was that Atlanta’s first year of advertising had been an unqualified success. The mood of
the citizens lifted, business morale improved, bank clearances climbed, retail trade increased,
new buildings sprang up, and an $8 million bond issue passed—including funds to build more
viaducts. Having shaken off the last vestiges of the recession, Atlanta, at least some of it, was on
a roll.516
The Black community had mixed reactions to Forward Atlanta. African American
entrepreneurs saw economic promise in the large numbers of Florida-bound automobile tourists,
but many rejected the city’s big publicity campaign. It completely ignored them and their hopes
for expanded communities and businesses. The Atlanta Independent refused to endorse Forward
Atlanta and denounced the white press’s acclaim of the “Atlanta spirit.” However, it occasionally
published the campaign’s slogans, and reluctantly acknowledged that perhaps Blacks would
benefit somewhat from general city growth.517
City officials, the Chamber of Commerce, and white businessmen united in celebrating
the success of Forward Atlanta. New York ad expert Jesse H. Neal praised their work, claiming
that “no other city in the country is using the business press with the intelligence and foresight of
Atlanta.” In keeping with the dictum of modern marketing that continuous advertising achieved
the greatest benefits, the city’s power brokers decided Atlanta could not afford to take a break.
Eager not to lose momentum and to take advantage of the prevalent civic optimism, they
proposed another fundraiser, this time for $1 million, with an even larger-scale publicity
campaign to run for three years instead of one. In late November 1926, the new drive began,
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headed by the same men and ad agencies who had achieved such sterling results with the
previous effort. On Monday, December 13, a parade of Atlanta’s schoolchildren through
downtown started the subscription drive. By Saturday, the entire sum had been pledged.518
The great enthusiasm and incredible fundraising speed probably had some basis in
Florida’s recent setbacks. By 1926, the boom had subsided somewhat, leaving numbers of
property owners with land they could not sell and mortgage payments they could not make. A
more devastating event in the form of the Great Miami Hurricane brought death, destruction, and
an immediate check on sunshiny real estate promotions. Front-page headlines and photographs
detailing flattened buildings, wrecked cars, overturned boats, and the newly homeless stalled the
Gold Coast rush. Atlantans who once eyed beachfront investments re-focused on opportunities
closer to home.519
New mayor Isaac N. Ragsdale, in his January 1927 inaugural speech, spoke of the power
and value of advertising. If business grew bigger by advertising, so should cities. By April, the
second round of publicity began. Ivan Allen, chair of the Forward Atlanta Commission,
concurred with the mayor’s opinion, and noted that “the Atlanta campaign is considered by
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national advertising authorities as the most successful community advertising ever launched. In
fact, it has started a new form of city advertising, a form that more nearly approaches the
advertising of American
manufacturers.” Besides the actual
ads, editorials in newspapers and
journals across the country
commended Atlanta on its novel
approach, incidentally providing
additional free and positive press for
the city.520
A three-point formula formed
the basis for the campaign’s
publicity. (1) The South was
America’s fastest growing market
and as such warranted careful
attention. (2) Industry could no
longer serve the entire United States

Figure 41. Forward Atlanta ad with the 3-point
formula, 1929.

from any one place, however centrally located. Modern merchandising, with its hand-to-mouth
inventory systems and rapid re-stocking requirements, demanded decentralized distribution. (3)
Atlanta, aka “Distribution City,” provided the point of greatest efficiency from which to serve
the South. Transportation featured heavily in the new series of ads extolling the city’s now
fifteen railroad lines and 70 million people within a day’s run. One of the ads (see figure above),

Atlanta Constitution: “Text of New Mayor’s Message,” January 4, 1927; “Forward Atlanta Contract
Placed,” April 24, 1927.
520
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incorporated the three-point formula in the copy, plus sketches of air, rail, and road
transportation, as well as people working, shopping, at leisure, and having fun.521
The crowning achievement of the campaign occurred during 1928, when General Motors
established its southeastern regional headquarters and a Chevrolet assembly plant in Atlanta.
Chevrolet, an inexpensive car competing directly with the Ford Model T, had experienced record
growth in the past two years, going from sales of less than 20,000 in 1925 to more than to more
than 80,000 in 1927. The factory, located on 32 acres along Sawtell Avenue in southeast Atlanta,
occupied 410,000 square feet of floor space in five buildings, had a loading dock adjacent to the
Southern Railway tracks, and a parking lot accommodating 5,000 cars. Employing close to 1500
men, most from the metropolitan area, it could produce 350 cars a day. As a result of the plant’s
location, adjoining property values increased eight-fold, going from $50 to $400 a square foot.522
The 1929 Forward Atlanta Commission Report documented the step-by-step wooing of
Chevrolet, quoting from company letters. The initial contact in late 1926 produced this
discouraging result, “We have no plans…for any new locations.” Another outreach in early 1927
brought something a bit more hopeful: “We are fully aware of the advantages your city offers as
the location for a car distribution plant…and it is not impossible that one of these days we will
have to come to see you.” The campaign continued to send persuasive data to General Motors,
no doubt mentioning the city and county tax exemption for new factories. In October 1927,
commission leaders received this happy news from GM: “We are thankful for all the information
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we have received describing the facilities of your city. . . . A plant in your city became not only a
possibility but a necessity.”523
The campaign chalked up other wins benefiting the city’s automotive interests. One of
the major ones was the decision, in 1929, by the B. F. Goodrich Company to build a tire factory
north of downtown near Georgia Tech. The plant would initially employ 1,000 workers and
produce 5,000 tires per day.524
By any metric, the Forward Atlanta Campaign was an outstanding triumph. During its
four-year run, the city gained 594 establishments with 16,911 employees and estimated annual
payrolls of $29.2 million. The movement cemented Atlanta’s reputation as a distribution center
and branch office town, and according to one contemporary writer, turned “depression into
progress.” While the campaign ended with the decade, its stunning success virtually ensured a
continuation into the 1930s, a hope dashed by the onset of the Great Depression.525
Forward Atlanta exemplified the power and energy of the united business community. It
took strong, sustained action on a national scale to ensure the city’s position as the regional
leader. The group successfully utilized modern advertising techniques to market Atlanta, and
along the way, also managed to protect their existing business interests as well as create new
opportunities for the city and themselves. With ordinary folk excluded from leadership positions
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(although their subscriptions were welcomed), the campaign epitomized the city growth coalition
in action.
7.4

Atlanta and the Automobile Rollercoaster
During the twenties, Atlanta experienced the downs and ups of recession and recovery,

civic malaise and municipal success. The fortunes of the motor vehicle industry followed a
similarly fluctuating trajectory, although the overall trend was up (see graph below526). Any
market downturn caused great concern and brought a search for quick remedies because, locally
and nationally, the automotive trades held an increasingly important position in the economy.
Table 15. Number of Passenger Cars Produced in the U.S., 1918-1930

Number of Passenger Cars Produced, 1918-1930

6,000,000
5,000,000

4,000,000
3,000,000
2,000,000
1,000,000
0

1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930

The automobile industry and associated businesses had emerged as significant entities
within the city’s physical and economic presence. By 1920, Atlanta boasted 81 car dealers and
255 related businesses, such as garages, paint and repair shops, and parts and accessories stores.
Automobile Row (the section of eight blocks of Peachtree Street between Ellis Street and Ponce
de Leon Boulevard) had grown to include 79 automobile dealerships and related enterprises. In
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1922, the city had 156 garages alone, the high point for the decade. With so many automobiledependent businesses, Atlanta leaders worried greatly about the impact of the recession.527
Late in the first recession year, the Georgia Automotive Dealers Association held a
dealer-banker convention at the prestigious Capital City Club. John Edward Smith (1877-1956),
president of both the Atlanta Automobile Dealers Association and the city’s largest, most
prestigious automobile dealership, helped organize the event which sought to allay widespread
worry. In November 1919, the Federal Reserve Bank had upped the rediscount rate on cars
purchased on installment. The effect raised the down payment required for an automobile bought
on a time plan from the earlier rate (which hovered between 25% and 33%) to almost 50% of the
purchase price.528
The increase had an immediate and obvious dampening effect on car sales. Mayor James
L. Key, in his welcome speech, stressed the significant role of the automobile industry, the city’s
largest, in supporting Atlanta’s economy. He asserted “It does more to uphold the value of real
estate, to keep bank deposits high and for our general and commercial welfare than any other
business.” M. B. Wellborn, governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, spoke to the
standing-room-only crowd of nearly 400 troubled convention-goers. He described the current
financial crisis as typical post-war inflation, and assured attendees that the Federal Reserve stood
ready “to accept automobile paper from our member banks,” as long as they met the
requirements.529
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The automotive trades embarked on a series of actions which, in little over a year, began
to restore their profits. The Ford Motor Company slashed prices, cut costs, and forced very
reluctant dealers to carry excess inventory. General Motors experienced catastrophic losses. Only
a massive cash infusion from affluent patrons like J. P. Morgan and the du Pont family saved the
corporation from the bankruptcy suffered by many other car manufacturers.530
With greater sales volume the goal, automotive entities expanded their advertising
budgets dramatically. Advertisers no longer acted as simple brokers placing ads in the daily
newspaper for in-town customers. Now, large ad agencies served multiple clients across the
country, creating detailed promotional campaigns aimed at national audiences, and utilizing
diverse media platforms. Vastly improved visuals and clever copy sought to break down
consumer resistance to spending, emphasizing both the work utility and leisure possibilities of
the automobile.531
Manufacturers, in their efforts to sustain a year-round production schedule, sought to
coordinate their marketing strategies with local dealerships. Most dealers believed that winter
was a dead time for car sales, and waited until spring to place orders and begin promotions. The
manager of the Southern Oakland Company, headquartered in Atlanta, encouraged his fellow
retailers to take advantage of their brand’s nationwide publicity programs, calling them “the road
to prosperity.” The massive efforts bore fruit, eventually engineering “one of the most
phenomenal business recoveries of 1922,” a triumph which would extend throughout the
following year.532
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The growing popularity of “closed” cars contributed to the success. Before the twenties,
manufacturers mainly produced the
less expensive “open” cars, i.e.,
convertibles, with folding fabric
tops which had to be maintained or
replaced (see ad at right). Only the
well-to-do could afford the more
costly hard-tops, commonly called
“sedans.” Sales for open cars were
seasonal, but the increasing demand

Figure 42. Ad for car tops; Atlanta City Directory,
1923, pg. 6.

for sedans eliminated the dealerships’ usual winter slowdowns. With the automobile now a
necessity rather than just a vehicle for pleasure rides, motorists required an improved year-round
utility.533
George Babbitt himself drove an open-roofed, hand-cranked Model T Ford, while his
family militated for a sedan: his wife, because it was cleaner and didn’t muss her hair; his son,
because it had more class; his daughter, because her friend’s father had one. As Sinclair Lewis
observes, the family’s discussion of their dream car represented “more than a study of
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transportation. It was an aspiration for knightly rank.” In America, the omnipresent automobile
was emerging as a highly visible and very precise indicator of social rank.534
Motordom’s surge continued, and in 1923, a Constitution lede triumphantly proclaimed:
“Ladies and gentlemen, the automobile—America’s most valuable manufacture today.” That
year’s biennial manufacturing census ranked motor vehicles first among U.S. industrial products,
outstripping steel (#2), meatpacking (#3), and petroleum (slipped from #2 in 1921 to #7). Over
13 million cars, trucks, and buses now travelled the nation’s roadways.535
The automobile industry’s #1 position provided a huge boost to railroad traffic, yet also
aroused significant concerns within a railroad community only just shaking off its post-war
doldrums compounded by the recession. The production of vast numbers of motor vehicles
required massive rail shipments of raw materials to factories and parts to assembly plants like
those in Atlanta. Trains also carried the finished vehicles to terminals across the country.
Atlanta’s railroads, and the city’s reputation, benefited from greatly from the automobile
freight. A solid train called the “Automobile Special” ran from Cincinnati, leaving there at 12:30
a.m., and reaching Atlanta at 4:45 a.m. the following day. The early morning arrival allowed
locally-destined vehicles to be unloaded and inside city dealerships by the start of business,
while the rest continued their journey to other locations in Georgia and Florida. The magnitude
of traffic necessitated a daily run of the Special.536
To accommodate the volume, the Southern Railway in Atlanta constructed a new
terminal, just west of its mainline tracks on North Avenue. The location was within easy reach of
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the automobile district, which had spread considerably from Peachtree Street’s original
“Automobile Row” onto West Peachtree and Spring streets. Fifteen railroad cars at a time could
line up at the 592-foot-long platform. A ramp allowed trucks and cars to drive directly from the
platform to dealer showrooms via North Avenue, a route which avoided the most congested
downtown streets. The combination of the Automobile Special and the new terminal contributed
immensely to Atlanta’s designation as one of the leading automobile centers in the U.S.537
Although happy about their expanding heavy-freight traffic courtesy of the motor vehicle
industry, the railroads feared their new competitors driving on the roadways. As early as 1923,
the rail carriers began to complain about federal subsidies of highways and roads. Thomas H.
MacDonald, chief of the Bureau of Public Roads, spoke reassuringly, “The highway will never
be a competitor of the railway. It will be a supplementary servitor. . . . Far from being a danger to
the railroads, the highways we are building will be their faithful allies.”538
Buses and trucks, however, increasingly usurped the railroads’ passenger and freight
short-haul traffic, so much so that in 1925, the railways claimed that they had lost nearly 3,800
miles of track to motorized challengers. MacDonald testified before President Coolidge’s
National Transportation Committee, insisting that highway transportation caused only a very
small percentage of the abandoned trackage. As Goddard flatly states, MacDonald, that relentless
pro-highway propagandist and promoter of the government-motordom coalition, flagrantly lied
to the committee. Interstate Commerce Commission annual reports bear out Goddard’s assertion.
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The documents show that the majority of track abandonments were the direct result of motor
vehicle competition. Railroads had good reason to fear.539
Motordom’s relentless momentum appeared unstoppable. As traffic increasingly clogged
downtown streets and the numbers of auto-related fatalities swelled, the Chamber of Commerce
applauded the great automobile industry which had done so much for the state and the city. In
Georgia, more than 500 buses carried children to and from schools in rural as well as urban
areas. Motorized tractors transformed agriculture and trucks allowed farmers to transport their
goods to market more efficiently. The automobile had considerably extended Atlanta’s retail
territory; customers now drove from 50 to 150 miles to shop in city department stores. It also
redefined retail geography at the city boundaries as merchants established branch stores adjacent
to the new suburban neighborhoods. Some 5,000 local automobile workers received decent
wages, most of which they spent in town. The Chamber enthusiastically credited the automobile
with securing Atlanta’s position as the financial center of the South.540
A similar sentiment prevailed nationally, as many hailed the booming automobile
industry as the backbone of Coolidge prosperity. Allen notes, “The phenomenal activity of this
one part of the body economic—which was responsible directly or indirectly for the employment
of nearly four million men—pumped new life into all the rest.” The rising tide of motordom may
have lifted other industries, but the Republican administrations of Coolidge and Hoover greatly
assisted business generally, and the car industry specifically. Reduced regulatory oversight, noninterference in business affairs, the lack of anti-trust actions, hostility to labor unions, and tax
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policies which favored corporations and the rich—all gave confidence to the business
community.541
Throughout the twenties, government and business became more intertwined, particularly
through the efforts of Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce for both Harding and Coolidge.
Under his direction, Commerce grew from a small department with little control into a powerful,
multi-agency organization. Acting with the trade associations, he brought corporate leaders and
federal officials into public-private coalitions for the benefit of business. Each industry within
multi-faceted motordom had its own trade group to participate in the quasi-governmental
commissions and studies, to lobby and to secure policies and legislation advantageous to
themselves.542
The Highway Education Board stands out as an example of a government agency whose
constituents represented various sectors of motordom, and whose actions had a direct impact on
Atlanta’s streets. In 1920, the head of the Bureau of Public Roads, the president of the Hudson
Motor Car Company, and an executive from the National Automobile Chamber of Commerce
together urged the appointment of a Highway and Highway Transport Education Committee.
Renamed the Highway Education Board in 1922, its members all had vested interests in
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furthering the construction of new roads, nurturing engineers to build them, and instructing the
public on their proper use. A principle tenet of the Board was its insistence that all citizens
should subsidize building and maintaining highways, whether they owned a motor car or not.
Since everybody benefitted, everybody should pay.543
The Highway Education Board wrote road safety curricula for public schools, produced
popular booklets and scientific bulletins, created traveling exhibits of properly constructed
highways and bridges, and sponsored school good roads and traffic safety essay-writing contests.
Atlanta’s public school system adopted the federal agency’s curriculum and approaches, and its
students participated in the national essay contests. The city’s future citizens would be well
indoctrinated into the promise of the Board: that the scientific regulation of streets, highways,
and traffic would promote the prosperity, welfare, and domestic happiness of American
communities.544
The federal government, with its national educational programs and helpful regulatory
stance, created a friendly operating environment for carmakers and their products. In 1922 and
1923, the industry produced record numbers of vehicles. But in 1924, they faced a thoroughly
unfamiliar and distressing situation: their home market had reached saturation, something many
thought would never occur. Virtually everyone in the country who could afford a car had by this
time already purchased one. Many American families simply did not have enough money to buy
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even a low-priced Model T Ford, no matter how much they might wish for one. They would
remain trolley-riding “straphangers” for the foreseeable future.545
Those who already owned cars saw no need to replace them. Mazur documents the
tremendous, often insurmountable reluctance of the average buyer to replace a heavy item like a
car while it retained usefulness. Manufacturers could not wait 6.75 years (the average lifespan of
a motor vehicle at the time) until an automobile started to wear out, and the owner began to think
about shopping for a replacement. Slowing down production was far too costly; instead,
automakers needed to surmount the wall of consumer resistance and increase sales volume to
match their tremendous output.546
The industry had just unexpectedly entered into a new period of its history: competition
rather than growth. The era of peak profitability, the 1910s, had ended; the period of peak
production capacity had begun. Prior to World War I, the problem had been for factories to make
enough cars, not to sell them. Dealers did not have to hone their marketing skills; instead, they
just pleaded with manufacturers to send them more and larger shipments quickly.547
That time had passed. The challenge now was not selling someone their first car; rather, it
was getting the current car owner to purchase a new one, and make sure it was one of yours
rather than one of the other guys’. The growing presence of a price-friendly used-car market
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complicated matters and threatened new car sales. More and better advertising helped bring
motordom out of the recession.
7.5

Advertising the Automobile
The novel situation encountered by automakers in 1924, a saturated marketplace,

demanded an immediate response. The many technological innovations in engineering and
manufacturing inaugurated by the Ford Motor Company’s moving assembly line had
dramatically expanded the ability to make record numbers of automobiles. Routinized and
progressive assembly tasks, heavier machinery, specialized tools, parts-sharing across car lines—
all combined to reduce costs and speed up production. By the mid-twenties, the other carmakers
had followed Ford’s lead with significant re-design and re-tooling of their shop floors.548
Automakers understood that, to sell all the vehicles they now produced, they needed to
market to new and returning customers, and to nurture an easy buying experience for everyone.
Both continuous demand and a constantly increasing demand were necessary to handle their
expanded production capacity, which grew from less than 2 million cars in 1920, to nearly 5
million in 1929. Through various persuasive methods, manufacturers could, as Leach observes,
forge a new consumer consciousness, and create a culture of desire.549
By the mid-1920s, an entire field of marketing had emerged, peopled by professionals,
the graduates of business schools. Harvard led the country, establishing its School of Business in
1908, and offering the first master’s degree in business administration. By 1920, numbers of
colleges and universities had established graduate programs in retailing.
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Atlanta’s business school began at the Georgia Institute of Technology in 1913, with
Wayne S. Kell as dean. Officially named the Evening School of Commerce in 1914, it offered a
three-year Bachelor of Commercial Science degree, and its classes met at night. Dean Kell
oversaw the move off the Georgia Tech campus into a building on Walton Street in downtown to
facilitate access by the non-traditional students, who made up a large part of the school’s
attendees. These “irregulars” consisted primarily of men employed full-time, who could only
attend classes after working hours. In 1917, to offset the declining enrollment due to the wartime draft, the dean began admitting women students. The school, which eventually morphed
into today’s Georgia State University, grew rapidly during the twenties under the guidance of
director George M. Sparks. A 1921 Constitution article credited the prominent place of women
in the city’s business life to their attendance at the Evening School. They took classes in
accounting, office management, finance, and commercial law, but “the alluring field of
advertising” was one of the most popular courses of study.”550
Modern, scientific marketing had two distinct components: research and advertising. Ad
agencies as well as large corporations created their own research departments to gather facts and
figures about specific industries. The data included surveys of consumer needs and preferences
as well as statistical studies of sales and trends, taking account of seasonal fluctuations and
regional differences. The information fed into corporate forecasting and planning, and enabled
better coordination between the divisions responsible for ordering, manufacturing, shipping, and
sales. According to Isenberg, “industry experts well understood those who researched and
Stantec and Georgia State University, “Campus Historic Preservation Plan,” (Atlanta: Georgia State
University, June 6, 2014), 3-4. Georgia State buildings were named for two of the early leaders: Kell Hall (the
former Ivy Street Garage, now demolished), and Sparks Hall. The war generally proved a great boon to women who
wished to enter business; Atlanta Constitution: Bessie Kempton, “Atlanta Women Prominent in Advertising Work,”
June 12, 1921; “Women Enrolling in Commerce School,” September 18, 1921. The evening school was considered
a great asset by and for Atlanta businesses; James A. Hollomon, “Just in Passing,” Atlanta Constitution, June 12,
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defined markets often had the power to create them.” In the twenties, the obvious goal was to
create a new market.551
The advertising side of marketing involved the promotion of commercial products and
services in public media outlets. Trachtenberg notes how the earlier manifestations of
advertising, which merely provided product information to potential customers, now assumed a
different configuration. The modern advertisement supplied facts, but also described how the
consumer required the product to meet a specific need—“a need incited and articulated by the ad
itself.” As early as the late nineteenth century, department stores, the great innovators in
advertising, had introduced this type of “story-telling” ad (a descriptor which aptly captures both
its narrative and deceitful characteristics). Automakers, in this as in other aspects of selling,
lagged behind the early merchandising geniuses, but caught up quickly after World War I.552
Allen describes the new approach this way:
The advertisers met the competition with better design, persuasively realistic
photographs, and sheer volume. . . . They met it . . . with a subtle change of
technic. The copywriter was learning to pay less attention to the special qualities
and advantages of his product, and more to the study of what the mass of
unregenerate mankind wanted—to be young and desirable, to be rich, to keep up
with the Joneses, to be envied. The winning method was to associate his product
with one or more of these ends, logically or illogically, truthfully or cynically.553
Each ad created its own portrayal of promise and aspiration, not just with words, but
increasingly with images. The printing industry’s lithograph departments had progressed from
the simple line sketches of the late 1800s. By the 1920s, they could photograph anything, transfer
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it onto a zinc plate, and print between 6000-7000 impressions per hour. The higher-end national
publications offered four-color printing to their advertisers, and pictures crowded the Sunday
rotogravure supplements of large city newspapers, including Atlanta’s three dailies.554
The city’s printing industry had emerged as the South’s leader. In addition to the
newspaper companies, by the mid-twenties, nearly 100 printers, binders, and engravers worked
in Atlanta, employing more than 2,000 workers and supplying the largest payroll of any single
business, after the cotton mills. They produced telephone and city directories, books, catalogs,
commercial forms, direct mail advertising, and agricultural and religious newspapers. Their
leading outputs were the class journals—magazines of all types—which had nationwide
circulation. Every major regional industry had its own class journal, many of which were
published in Atlanta. It consumed more paper and printers’ ink than any other city in the
southeast due to journal production. Local postal authorities recorded higher receipts than any
other city of comparable size in the U.S. due to the print mailings originating in Atlanta.555
Fortunately for the printers and publishers, Atlanta also stood at the center of the South’s
paper trade. Samuel P. Richards started the first paper mill in the city in the late 1800s, and in the
early 1900s, multiple companies from the northeast and Midwest established branches in Atlanta,
along with local entrepreneurs. By 1920, the city was the wholesale and distribution center for
papers and paper goods of all kinds for the southeastern U.S.556
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Advertisements did not only appear on paper. Signage of all types and sizes publicized
products, businesses, special sales, and promotions. Electric signs, introduced in Atlanta in 1902,
had grown in size, numbers, and colors. After 1912, panoramic and moving signs appeared. In
1921, the just-opened Howard Theater on Peachtree Street installed on its rooftop the city’s
largest flashing-light sign. Even the Chamber of Commerce, located one block east of Five
Points, erected a big electric sign—visible from Peachtree Street—so visitors could easily find
the building.557
Another type of sign, roadside billboards, aimed to capture the attention of the motorist.
These had to be large enough to be easily seen and read while traveling at some speed. Earlier,
outdoor signs in cities and small towns had been affixed to fences and buildings. With the
coming of the automobile and the greatly improved streets and highways, advertisers preferred
side-of-the-road locations. One of the country’s first national out-of-home advertising groups,
the Associated Bill Posters’ Association, formed in 1891. By 1900, they had standardized sizes,
allowing national brands to mass-produce posters that would reliably fit onto any billboard
anywhere in the nation.558
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Atlanta’s own St.
Elmo Murray
Massengale (1876-1929)
established the South’s
first outdoor bulletin
system in 1910 (see
Figure 43. Ad for Massengale Bulletin System, 1923.
figure at right). The
company, an outgrowth of the successful ad firm he created in 1896, was one of the first in the
nation to hire landscapers to plant grass and care for the grounds beneath the lighted outdoor
signs. Massengale, one of the city’s elite businessmen, was called the “dean of southern
advertising.” He founded the Atlanta Ad Men’s Club, the first association of ad agents in the
South, and helped create the Associated Advertising Clubs of the World. His firm was one of
Coca-Cola’s first ad agencies.559
In 1925, the billboard industry established the Outdoor Advertising Association of
America to protect its interests. That year, a merger between several firms created the gigantic
General Outdoor Advertising Company, which had a strong presence in Atlanta. Large car
manufacturers utilized the outdoor ad firms to place their displays on billboards across America,
so Atlantans saw the same product promotions as people in New York, Chicago, and Los
Angeles.560
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Over the decade, the city earned the reputation as the leading advertising center in the
Southeast, offering the region’s most extensive promotional facilities. Local auto dealers utilized
every medium available to advertise their biggest event of the year, the Southern Automobile
Convention. The Atlanta Automobile Association, which sponsored the annual show, placed ads
in newspapers and posters on billboards. They also printed and distributed 100,000 pieces of
direct mail for dealers to give to prospective customers. In 1924, for the first time, they also
advertised on radio from the Atlanta Journal’s station, WSB.561
In the early 1920s, few radio stations had on-air advertisements (the term “commercials”
meaning broadcast product advertisements did not come into common usage until the 1930s). By
decade’s end, most sold ad time just like newspapers sold ad space. Calvin Coolidge became the
first president to campaign on the radio when he addressed an estimated 20 million listeners on
Monday, November 3, 1924, the night before the election he won. Edward L. Bernays, noted
publicist and promoter of advertising techniques to create and control the desires of the masses,
found the new medium a superb way to influence a large consumer audience.562
In 1928, Bernays orchestrated a promotional campaign for the new Dodge automobile,
the Victory Six. It included the “Victory Hour,” a one-hour national radio broadcast, involving
multiple performers contributing live from Detroit, New Orleans, Chicago, and New York,
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emceed by Will Rogers in Hollywood (see ad below). Called “the most intricate engineering feat
thus far attempted in radio broadcasting,” 33 stations, including WSB in Atlanta, aired the NBC
program. The entire country learned at the same moment about the newest Dodge motor car.563
A retired ad man, writing of his years
in the industry during the first decades of the
twentieth century, called it the “golden era of
advertising-merchandising history.” Many
strategies and media had been introduced or
reached maturity during the time period.
Improved transportation and communications
supported the profusion of promotional
devices. From the classified newspaper ads
and streetcar posters of the early 1900s,
publicity now reached audiences via directmail pieces, colorful magazines, sponsored
radio programs, tabloids, telephone surveys,
electric signs, half- or full-page newspaper

Figure 44. Ad for 1928 Dodge radio show;
Atlanta Constitution, January 1, 1928.

display ads, lighted highway billboards, mailorder catalogues, and even the movies.564

563
The NBC one-hour broadcast cost Dodge about $67,000; “Radio In the Home: Dodge Hour Costs More
Than $60,000,” Atlanta Constitution, January 1, 1928. Starting in 1927, the newspaper carried a special “Radio In
the Home” section. The Victory Hour had another broadcast in March 1928. Walter Chrysler would buy Dodge
Brothers later that year, and rename the car the “Dodge Brothers Six.”
564
Harden Bryant Leachman, The Early Advertising Scene (Wood Dale, IL: H. B. Leachman, 1949), 247;
White, "Hand-to-Mouth Buying," 136. Leachman does not include movies in his summary.

304
Motion pictures brought advertisers multiple merchandising opportunities, such as
product placement within a movie or product endorsements by movie stars. Film provided an
excellent way to display motor vehicles and tell stories, as Charlie Chaplin brilliantly did in The
Kid (1921), where he utilized cars to underscore his tale of class and wealth inequality. But one
did not have to go to Hollywood to shoot an ad. Atlanta’s Graphic Films Corporation produced
motion pictures for sales or publicity purposes, which local theaters screened ahead of the feature
film. As the company’s own ad copy read, movies had the ability to attract, entertain, interest,
explain, and above all, convince.565
Despite the variety of promotional venues available by the end of the 1920s, newspaper
and magazine advertising still led the field. Car manufacturers utilized every possible medium to
plug their products, while local dealers continued to place their ads in print publications whose
readers lived within Atlanta’s retail territory. Newspapers in particular won commendations from
the Chamber of Commerce for their optimistic boosting of the city through their publicity about
new businesses, enterprises, citizens, and buildings. The Chamber claimed that the papers had
“contributed more to Atlanta’s upbuilding and progress than any other one factor.”566
Automakers spent heavily for newspaper and magazine advertising. In 1924, the national
print ad dollars for passenger cars alone reached nearly $9 million, making it the third largest
class of merchandise advertiser in the U.S., after foods and toiletries. It was money well spent.
Market research proved conclusively that people read ads and bought advertised merchandise.567
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Census data (see table below) shows the increase in revenue received by newspapers and
periodicals from advertising. In 1900, ad revenue provided just over 50% of the total revenue for
the two print classes. Neither papers nor magazines relied on subscriptions and sales for the bulk
of their earnings. By 1929, just over 70% of their $1.5 billion total revenue came from
advertisements.568
Table 16. Advertising Revenue of Newspapers and Periodicals, 1880-1929

Year
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1929

Revenue from
Advertising
(1000)
$39,136
$71,243
$95,862
$202,533
$528,299
$1,120,238

Total Revenue
(1000)
$89,009
$143,586
$175,789
$337,596
$806,305
$1,580,565

Advertising
Percentage of
Total
43.9%
49.6%
54.5%
59.9%
65.6%
70.9%

% Increase in
Advertising
Revenue
----82%
35%
111%
161%
112%

Atlanta had more ad agencies than any other city in Georgia. The 1920 city directory
listed 39 different entities under the “Advertising” category. That number grew to 58 by 1929.
The Atlanta Ad Men’s Club, founded in the early 1900s, had 350 members at the beginning of
the decade. While the club retained “Men” in its name, women advertisers could join and had
equal privileges, a privilege rarely accorded to women in this time period. The local organization
was a member of the Associated Advertising Clubs of the World, and successfully lobbied to
bring the international group’s annual convention to the city in 1921.569
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Prominent publisher and one of the city’s most influential power elites, W. R. C. Smith,
led the campaign to bring the international convention to Atlanta. Possessing a knack for
advertising, he took an active role in the Ad Men’s Club, whose members included businessmen
as well as advertisers. The local club had a significant and self-proclaimed role in promoting
activities leading to city expansion. The group described itself as “one of the most progressive
civic forces engaged in the upbuilding and betterment of Atlanta,” and boasted that “hardly any
local movement of any responsibility is inaugurated without the support, advice and
encouragement” of the ad women and men.570
The Atlanta Ad Men’s Club’s stated goals included: (1) working for truth in advertising;
(2) educating the public as to the economic benefits of advertising; and (3) working to secure
favorable legislation and blocking laws that might harm the industry. Concerning goal #1, while
the industry might not actually produce honest ads, it did succeed in spreading the idea that ads
conveyed accurate and reliable information. Frederick, writing in 1929, admitted that she and
others, especially women, saw ads as a great source of knowledge. By the twenties, goal #2 had
been met. Every merchant understood the financial impact of ads, and every consumer paid
attention to ads, if not fully cognizant of their impact. Goal #3 was a work in progress, but had
already achieved a consequential victory in the federal income tax law, which categorized
advertising as a deductible business expense. In some tax brackets, companies could actually
make money by expanding their ad budgets. Leachman attributes some of the massive post-war
growth in the industry to this novel fiscal benefit. Manufacturers “seized upon the windfall—
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glad to have Uncle Sam pay their advertising bills.” Ad men found it easy secure orders in such
an environment.571
The automotive businesses of Georgia and Atlanta thoroughly appreciated the importance
of advertising to their financial security. The Georgia Automotive Dealers’ Association had
formed in 1919, with the goals of increasing service to customers and advancing dealers’
interests. They held their first annual meeting in early 1920, hosted by the Atlanta Automobile
Association at the Capital City Club. The keynote speak addressed some 400 dealers on the
important topic of “Selling and Keeping the Customer Sold.” He praised the state’s advertisers as
knowledgeable and well-versed in their art.572
The Atlanta Automobile Association, among its various activities, provided advertising
assistance to members. One of their more memorable efforts was the “Buy Something for the Car
for Christmas” campaign in 1924. They placed numerous display ads (see ad below) in the city’s
three big daily newspapers, and utilized other forms of publicity to maximize their results. The
promotion appealed to everyone in the Association—car dealers, accessory retailers,
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wholesalers, and members of the other allied automotive trades. Charles V. Hohenstein,
executive secretary of the group, declared that 50,000 car owners lived within a 25-mile radius of
Five Points. Most used their vehicles for pleasure or a combination of business and pleasure.
Their families would appreciate
useful accessories. However, for
some fortunate few, there was only
“one supreme gift—a new car.”573
During the 1920s, Atlanta’s
motordom industries were not the
only ones investing in advertising
and taking note of the changing
buying habits of the American
consumer. At a quarterly meeting of
the Atlanta Retail Merchants’
Association in 1928, executive
secretary Charles V. Hohenstein
described the changes in marketing

Figure 45. Atlanta Auto. Assn. ad, Atlanta
Constitution, December 3, 1924.

over the past 20 years. R. A. Kline, a local department store executive, spoke about the new
consumer. He described the passing of the old era of necessities-only purchasing to “the present
age of prosperity and widespread buying of luxuries.” The high wages of American workers, he
correctly claimed, had given them the best standard of living in the world. While not applicable
to everyone (especially farmers), per capital disposable income in the U.S. did rise 50% between
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1922 and 1928, as industrial productivity almost doubled. The average wage of working
Americans was the highest in the world, and automobile workers’ typical earnings exceeded that
average. Coolidge prosperity had made possible the widespread spending on non-essentials,
purchasing based wants, not needs.574
More and better advertising helped bring motordom out of the recession; but it could not,
on its own, overcome the challenge of market saturation. Eventually automakers adopted three
additional approaches to the problem, which together enabled them to dispel forever the
saturated market specter. Besides more sophisticated marketing to generate customers for the
mass of new cars, their strategies included: establishing diversified, price-segmented car lines to
reach shoppers with different wallet sizes; introducing new annual models; and offering
installment purchase plans to enable even marginal buyers to acquire an automobile. Should
these all prove insufficient, government assistance in the form of additional spending for
highways and bridges could provide a backstop. Economists asserted that public expenditures
reliably bolstered business whenever consumer demand was low. But that was unlikely to be
needed because American culture had become a culture of consumption.575
Most auto manufacturers, led by General Motors, embraced the idea of the annual model
release—a new re-designed (more or less) car every year to stoke society’s craving for the latest
thing. Henry Ford was having none of it. In his opinion, advertising based solely on stylistic
changes constituted an immoral form of consumer manipulation. He derided any ornamentation
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on cars and amenities, having in 1909 famously asserted, “Any customer can have a car painted
any color that he wants so long as it is black.” While the “black only” option did not apply to the
Model T until 1914, his resistance to new business strategies (price segmentation and planned
obsolescence) and to offering superficialities (a choice of colors and accessories) cost him
dearly.576
A number of consumers, especially women, rejected the monochrome Fords. One writer
remarked, “The Model T was a wonderful car, but it certainly did not flatter your pride of
ownership.” The company lost market share precipitously in the mid-1920s. General Motors,
meanwhile, had introduced the new DuPont lacquer paint in a bright blue color on its 1924
Oakland Six. Duco, specially formulated for the automobile industry, dried quickly, was durable
and scratch-resistant, and only required one coat. Car manufacturers would use it for the next
thirty years.577
Faced with shrinking sales, in 1926, Ford prepared for the production of his first new
passenger car in nearly twenty years. He officially stopped manufacturing Model T’s on May 27,
1927, closed plants for retooling, idled workers, and watched his market share collapse. The first
Model A rolled off the River Rouge plant’s assembly line on October 21. Ford gave the fully
updated vehicle, which came in four standard colors and nine body styles, an extravagant debut,
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spending $2 million on advertising. Branch plants across the country each received one display
model, to be revealed to the public on December 2. Atlanta’s seven Ford dealers had received
Model A photos and data for distribution that day, but only the showroom of the Ford factory on
Ponce de Leon Avenue had an actual vehicle. In less than a week, some 50,000 Atlantans came
to view the Model A (see photo below), and by late December, Beaudry Motor Company, the
city’s leading Ford dealership, had its own display model. Deliveries began in the new year.578
In 1929, a
marketing academic
wrote about the growing
national emphasis on
style, and held the
automobile responsible.
Not only did the industry

Figure 46. Crowd views the new Ford, Atlanta Constitution,
December 18, 1927.

highlight new models
with splashy publicity campaigns, but the automobile itself, as a transportation vehicle, had
increased social interactions which made people more conversant with current events. Rural
dwellers had access to many of the same products as urbanites, and could now (aided by
federally-funded roadways) travel longer distances “to satisfy their style requirements.” Other
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industries, especially radio, adopted the carmakers’ profitable “new annual model” regimen as
the national appetite for style over substance grew.579
Lears labels planned obsolescence as so much “advertising bait,” but underscores its
success. Manufacturers might make only small, cosmetic changes to a product, but consumers
found the novelty compelling and rushed to make their next purchase (and still do). The quest for
happiness and escape from the humdrum of daily living might motivate the culture of
consumption, but the personal dissatisfaction and promise of freedom were both fabricated
notions, creations of the ad agencies and their employers, the American manufacturers. Yet, to
guarantee that customers would act on the feelings and beliefs generated by the ads, sellers
needed to ensure that prospective buyers had the means to acquire the goods. Automakers in
particular facilitated credit buying, navigating the final hurdle on their path to greater profits.580
Mazur explains the rationale for installment purchasing, which came to play such an
important role in how American businesses did business.
Obsolescence has been a vital ingredient in American business prosperity. One
step beyond, however, was still necessary in order to ensure as large a consumer
demand as American business desired and needed. The consumer was already
exhausting a good deal of his purchasing power, which was a serious impediment
to increased sales. It was therefore necessary that increased consumer purchasing
power should be created. And this was done by the extraordinary extension of
instalment purchasing, the plan which enables American consumers today to
satisfy many billions of dollars’ worth of their needs and desires. . . . The purpose
of the instalment plan is to convert future earning power into present purchasing
power.581
Most people could not afford to buy a car, except by saving up for a long time, or by
borrowing money. On an installment plan, they could make a down payment, followed by
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periodic payments of a set amount (including interest) over a set period of time until the debt was
discharged. Once considered a chancy maneuver to which only the feckless or the beleaguered
resorted, “buying on time,” especially for large-ticket items like houses and cars gradually won
acceptance. By the end of the decade, the Big Three carmakers had established entities to finance
sales of their own vehicles to both dealers and retail customers. General Motors, naturally, had a
head start, having in 1919 established the General Motors Acceptance Corporation (G.M.A.C.),
with an Atlanta office in the prestigious Hurt Building. Not until 1928 did Ford charter his
Universal Credit Corporation, which had a local office on Marietta Street.582
For many city dwellers, however, a vehicle was not absolutely critical for daily
transportation. The great need for an automobile often lay not in its utility as a transportation
device, but in the status it conferred upon the owner. A profusion of new status-indicators
abounded in the 1920s, such as an electric refrigerator, a radio (or two), an electric washing
machine. But these were all indoor items. Besides your house and the neighborhood in which
you lived, nothing could match the high visibility of the car parked in your driveway or on the
street in front of your home. That vehicle announced to every neighbor and passerby your fiscal
status, and consequently your social status. Ownership of a new model from higher up in the
price brackets indicated greater wealth and conferred higher social standing.
In 1899, Veblen claimed that to gain and hold the esteem of one’s fellow human beings,
one had not only to possess power and wealth; one had to display power and wealth. The
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automobile provided the perfect vehicle (no pun intended) for conveying one’s socio-economic
position to the world. In a consumer-oriented culture, people make assessments based on
appearances and possessions. A constant calculation ensues, comparing one’s own stuff to that of
others, and trying to figure out how to rise through the ranks. The popular comic strip, “Keeping
Up with the Joneses,” ran from 1913 until 1938. It documented the travails of a social-climbing
family, constantly and unsuccessfully trying to copy their neighbors (the Joneses, who never
actually appeared in the strip). By the 1920s, the phrase was entrenched in the common idiom, a
metaphor for the imitative striving of Americans to equal or best each other in the exhibition of
their possessions. A 1924 op-ed piece in the Constitution deplored people trying so hard to keep
up with the Joneses, who owned expensive, “high-powered cars.”583

The automobile owned the decade of the 1920s. No other industry grew so rapidly to a #1
ranking among U.S. products. In ten years, car manufacturing vastly expanded, accompanied by
its many supporting industries and subsidiary businesses. Even railroad freight car production
had to be enlarged to meet the shipping demands of automakers—an example of a hidden,
ancillary branch of motordom, whose tentacles became ever more interwoven into the fabric of
daily life.584
The automobile industry expanded and solidified the entrenchment of the consumer
culture which department stores and others had inaugurated decades earlier. Unprecedented
manufacturing output, marketing advances, and the quest for an ever-growing number of buyers
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combined to transform not only consumers, but also the culture. Mazur, writing in 1928,
observes,
The American consumer has been a product of evolution. The average consumer
of the middle nineteenth century who struggled for shelter and necessities has
been left far behind by the great twentieth-century middle class of America riding
in its seventeen million automobiles, and worrying primarily about its luxuries.585
Commercial stratagems now shaped the daily lives of U.S. citizens with the promise that
one could achieve happiness through acquisition. By the end of the decade, the culture of
consumption had become America’s culture. People eagerly assumed debt to purchase a car so
they could “acquire prestige in the present and pay for it in the future.”586
Atlanta’s growth coalition had firmly embraced the automobile as its vehicle to fortune,
and it profited as motordom further entwined itself in American—and Atlantan— government,
industry, and ethos. The group continued to exercise its collective power during the twenties,
pushing the city along the path of expansion, gaining more people, wider borders, and greater
wealth. Every member understood that the automobile provided easy and essential access to the
stores and offices in the central business district. Any disruption to the smooth flow of vehicles
could have disastrous consequences on city and suburb. Unfortunately, with more cars on the
roads, traffic congestion frequently gridlocked downtown streets. Large retailers began to
establish branch stores in the suburbs—an early warning sign of the eventual decentralizing
exodus. Life at the city’s heart was at risk. By 1929, Atlanta’s business and civic leaders knew
they had to take swift and definitive action. Naturally, they decided the time had arrived—for
another survey.
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8

THE STATE OF THE STREETS 1929

The 1920s have popularly been called the first “decade of the automobile.” With air
transport still in its infancy, cars and especially trucks began to threaten the powerful railroad
companies. Motordom, that complex web of interdependent entities which produces, supports,
and enables motorized vehicles—grew exponentially, further entwining itself into the fabric of
American society. Atlanta’s growth coalition of realtors, financiers, publishers, lawyers,
businessmen, and elected officials embraced it all. They privileged the automobile, their vehicle
to greater fortune, to such a degree that the public roadways became mere car conduits with all
other street users restrained or forbidden. An 1899 city dweller would not recognize the smoothsurfaced, regulated, and dangerous streets of downtown in 1929. The amount of gridlock and
congestion would stun them; current inhabitants themselves found it pretty intolerable.
In April 1929, Atlanta undertook another traffic survey, this one guided by experts from
the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company in New York. Few of the actions city leadership had
taken since 1920 to makeover the streets had achieved the desired effects. The new viaducts and
traffic regulations had not eliminated congestion; automobile-related fatalities had almost
doubled over the decade; and the business community remained divided over one-way streets
and on-street parking. And all the time, more vehicles appeared in the roadways as automakers
succeeded in expanding America’s consumer culture. Through their sophisticated marketing,
non-stop advertising, and savvy business strategies, they had made the automobile the number
one product in the country. City leaders thought perhaps another study of the situation might
yield definitive answers to the city’s apparently intractable traffic problems.
Mayor I. N. Ragsdale’s traffic commission claimed to represent everyone in the city with
an interest in street traffic. Members came from state and local government, the big newspapers,
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the major labor group, professional and civic organizations, and numerous business and
automobile associations. The railroads had only one representative as the viaducts had rendered
their input less important to traffic discussions. Georgia Power had two representatives; it
supplied the city’s gas and electric power as well as the streetcar and bus services.587
Most of the entities taking part in the study had strong automotive interests, so the report
understandably had a pro-car slant. But the traffic survey deliberately omitted streetcar
movement from the study. Refusing from the start to investigate the daily transportation of
thousands of Atlanta citizens through the public streets would, and did, yield a distorted view of
city traffic patterns. The flagrant omission also unequivocally favored the automobile.
The commission’s final report called for the re-routing of pass-through traffic around the
central business district, and the removal or relocation of numerous trolley stops. It
recommended that Atlanta adopt the federal Model Municipal Traffic Ordinance, and ensure that
all traffic control devices conformed to the standards of the American Engineering Council. The
report called for more men on the police traffic squad, but it most strongly urged the city to
create a permanent city Traffic Commission.588
The 1920s saw the consolidation of the automobile as the defining element on Atlanta’s
and America’s streets. At the beginning of the century, the principle that all users had equal
rights to the public roadways prevailed. By the end of 1929, the conquest of the street by motor
vehicles was nearly complete, with only streetcars providing any sort of competition. But the era
of trolley supremacy had passed. Laying new track to the outskirts of town was costly and timeconsuming; most of the company’s efforts during the decade consisted of double-tracking the
busy and more lucrative downtown routes. Instead of extending streetcar lines, the traction
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company served the nascent residential suburbs with buses which fed into the street railway
system. Free use of the roadways by those on foot had disappeared. Instead, regulations corralled
pedestrians between painted white lines at intersections with traffic lights, and jaywalking
violators faced fines and a good chance of injury or death. Moving vehicles had the right of way;
increasingly speedy motor vehicles intimidated pedestrians and most cyclists. The “shared road”
was not.
Over the decade, motor vehicles had acquired new forms and features. In the twenties,
the earlier tall, boxy, hand-cranked, and open-top cars had given way to low-slung, elongated
sedans with electric starters and lights, available in an array of colors. They increasingly
resembled their later twentieth-century counterparts. The paving on downtown streets and
sidewalks gradually conformed to uniform standards, with asphalt and concrete the preferred
road surfaces. The apparatus of street regulation and traffic control incrementally matured. Civic
authorities and citizenry tried to come to terms with streets full of cars which could travel farther
and faster.589
The municipal code began to address the adjustments in the physical and psychological
environments necessary to survive in what was proving to be a dangerous new world. While
conflicts between pedestrians and vehicles festered, a more significant rivalry grew into the
unresolved contest of the decade: parked versus moving cars. Whether stationary or in motion,
however, the car retained top priority in discussions about city street. The 1920s established the
supremacy of the automobile and the solidification of its position as the sole legitimate consumer
of road space.
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8.1

Traffic Study Overview
By 1929, Atlanta’s streets had become more congested than ever before. The automaker’s

business strategies and the now-dominant consumer culture had combined to put more motor
vehicles on the roadways. The twin goals of ever-increasing production and acquisition of
automobiles dictated that the situation would only grow worse, unless city leaders took drastic
actions to accommodate a future of forever more cars.
At a 1928 meeting of the Atlanta Retail Merchants’ Association, Sam E. Levy spoke
about the effect of the automobile on the city, especially traffic congestion. Levy had co-founded
Prior Tire Company, the “Don’t cuss, call us” gas, oil, tire, and accessories company located in
the Automobile Row section of Spring Street. He recounted the heavy commercial losses
suffered as a result of the consumer’s dread of braving the downtown traffic tangle. A large rural
population within a few hours’ ride of city amenities only added to the “general snarl” on the
streets. Businessmen, Levy prophetically declared, would have to accept rigidly-enforced
parking laws, or else they would see merchandising “decentralized and scattered in communities
all over the city,” which was already happening with certain types of small stores. The intelligent
merchant, he said, would provide parking for customers which would encourage them to come to
town to patronize his business.590
Levy’s talk echoed the conclusions of the 1926 “Vehicular Traffic Congestion and Retail
Business” pamphlet published by the U.S. Department of Commerce. The federal study
identified four factors causing vehicular traffic congestion, in order of most egregious: (1) faulty
traffic regulations; (2) lack of parking facilities; (3) narrow streets; and (4) the streetcar. At the
same time, the study contradicted itself by admitting that the vehicle most involved in the
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widespread traffic congestion was the automobile, but never suggested that reducing the number
of cars in city centers might bring some relief. It did warn that, “If merchants do not do
something to relieve the present traffic situation, within 15 years there will be no down-town
shopping districts of any importance.” Large cities were decentralizing, and residences had
already been pushed out of downtown interiors. Business might depend on traffic, but traffic
could also detract from business.591
Atlanta was not alone in suffering from gridlocked streets. Every large U.S. city had its
own tale of traffic woe, and a number had already undertaken studies in search of solutions to the
widespread predicament. The state of New York in 1926 had authorized the Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company [MetLife] to research Albany’s crowded streets. The company’s Safety
Service division began investigating traffic as an offshoot from its workplace studies to reduce
accidents and injuries. The insurers developed procedures to systematically scrutinize urban
traffic conditions, including what areas to study, which organizations to involve, and who should
lead the effort. A comprehensive, sophisticated report with concrete recommendations resulted.
Atlanta, always lagging a little behind the streets curve, eventually took advantage of their
process.592
McShane describes how engineers provided the expertise to analyze traffic congestion
and offer mechanisms to control the chaos. The word “survey,” a term borrowed from civil
engineers, described the quantitative methodology employed by practitioners in the growing field
of traffic engineering. Numbers and measurements lent factual certainty to their solutions.
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Drivers and pedestrians, however, did not easily acquiesce to survey proposals, so the
professionals learned to solicit community input. Motor clubs and transit companies had special
importance due to their active involvement in city governance. Having an educational
component in the form of a public hearing proved essential to adoption of the final report.593
Gudis concisely captures the hows and whys of the universal acceptance of the traffic
survey during the 1920s this way:
The traffic survey quickly gained support as a most popular tool for the promotion
of automotive- and business-friendly urban planning and traffic transportation
schemes. Businessmen and politicians had come to a full realization that the
streets of a city are the most important element in its economic usefulness, and
sought to record how it functioned, and how its traffic flowed or bottled it up.
Traffic flow studies became a numerical, easily visualized means by which
coalitions of engineers, planners, and business leaders in metropolitan areas could
identify and communicate to the public the unfavorable effects of urban growth
and congestion, and seek support for their solutions that would accommodate the
frictionless traffic of automobiles.594
Early in 1929, Atlanta’s civic and business leaders realized they had to take action to
tame the mass of automobiles. Motor vehicle registrations in Fulton County had increased 376%
over the past ten years: from 12,065 in 1919 to 57,445 in 1929. The vast majority (80%) of those
vehicles were registered in the City of Atlanta. Few changes could be made to the city’s horseera downtown streets to meet the volume of traffic, besides constructing viaducts, and those were
already finished.595
City zoning laws accounted for some of the traffic problems. They had concentrated
business in certain sections, which also increased the number of cars and pedestrians in those
places. Greater density allowances in commercial and industrial areas meant that a parcel which
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20 years ago might have held a low-rise building could now hold a skyscraper with thousands of
occupants during the work week. Residential areas also added to traffic. The new suburban
neighborhoods had no streetcar lines, and while buses provided transit service, many preferred to
use their cars to travel to and from work or shopping. Some housing sections also permitted
multi-family apartments, which only added to the density. Meanwhile, street widths generally
remained the same, except where sidewalks had been reduced or eliminated. Widening was
prohibitively expensive, especially in the central business district. Property values there had risen
astronomically over the decade, making it impossible to acquire more land for public roads or
walkways. Atlanta would have to find other ways to manage traffic.596
A local editorial helped prepare the public for the traffic survey contemplated by the
mayor and council. The writer celebrated the recent opening of the twin viaducts which had
already brought some congestion relief. He warned, however, that a lasting solution would
require severe and unpopular measures, especially curtailing on-street parking, a move
merchants continued to fight. Everyone would have to acquiesce for the greater good.597
On April 16, 1929, two days before the editorial appeared, Mayor I. N. Ragsdale had
written to James L. Madden, a vice president of Metropolitan Life, requesting their assistance in
conducting a fact-finding survey of Atlanta’s street traffic. Not for the first time, the city turned
to national experts. Within two weeks, Madden confirmed that the Director of Safety Service, W.
Graham Cole, and his staff would be happy to work with Atlanta. Local leaders were
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enthusiastic, and unrealistic expectations abounded; the survey would relieve congestion, speed
up traffic through downtown, and eliminate accidents.598
The mayor appointed a 42-member commission to conduct the survey. It was chaired by
Charles C. Whitaker, a
Table 17. Groups Represented on the Traffic Commission
construction engineer and
vice-chair of the Atlanta
Safety Council, the local
motoring club devoted to
reducing automobile
collisions. Mayor Ragsdale

Affiliations of Traffic Commission Members
Categories
Count
Businesses and business associations
23
City departments, commissions, committees
6
Professional organizations (architects, engineers, etc.)
5
Civic organizations (Boy Scouts, two civic leagues)
3
Automobile associations
3
Georgia Public Service Commission
1
U.S. Postal Service
1
Total
42

said he had selected commission members from groups “having an interest in traffic matters.”
That broad descriptor could have applied to every Atlantan. But, despite the mayor’s
claim that the survey would be conducted “with the best interests of the citizens of Atlanta in
mind,” many of them, especially African Americans, had no voice on the commission. Its
members represented white-led state and municipal governments, the city’s largest labor group,
professional and civic organizations, and numerous businesses and automobile associations (see
table above). The railroads and the streetcar company each had representatives, as did the daily
newspapers, but no members of the Black press participated. The all-white makeup of the
commission effectively proclaimed that Black citizens and their use of the public roadways did
not matter.599
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Metropolitan Life supplied engineers who did the design, implementation, and analysis.
The survey was divided into ten aspects of Atlanta’s traffic problem, with a committee for each.
Three additional committees provided generalized assistance: Steering guided the group; Review
assessed the individual studies for inclusion in the final report; and Publicity, with the aid of the
three daily newspapers, prepared press releases to keep the public informed as the project
progressed. Prominent white businessmen chaired every committee.600
The ten study committees furnished information and facilitated access. They did much of
the groundwork, under the guidance of the engineers, distributing questionnaires and tabulating
data, assisted by volunteers from 66 local stores and businesses. The Atlanta Police Department
provided men to the Parking Committee, and automobile dealers donated vehicles and observers
for making time-study runs over twelve designated routes. Even the Boy Scouts took part,
counting parked cars, and handling the travel-to-work survey. The commission, however, made
and approved all recommendations. The seven-month study focused on the traffic problems in
central business district and on its main thoroughfares.601
Automotive concerns featured prominently, as one would expect in a traffic study, but the
interests of other users of the public roadways, such as cyclists and street traders,602 are glaringly
absent (see Table 17). Streetcar riders, which included thousands of Atlantans, played no part in
the survey. An early newspaper report had declared, “Every phase of Atlanta vehicular and
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pedestrain [sic] traffic activity will come under the scrutiny and observation of members of the
commission.” This, unfortunately, did not happen. A disingenuous sentence in the final survey
report stated, “As the operation of the electric railway system of Atlanta is under the jurisdiction
of the Georgia Public Service Commission (GPSC), a state body, the Mayor’s Traffic
Commission, which was appointed by the city administration, did not feel that it was in a
position to consider the effect of street car operation upon traffic.” The report suggested a
different study be done for the trolleys.603
That disclaimer ignored the fact that the GPSC and Georgia Power both had
representatives on the mayor’s commission. Worse, it completely disregarded the fact that the
traffic survey actually did evaluate the effect of streetcars on city traffic. In multiple sections of
the final report, committees faulted streetcars as a major source of low speeds and traffic delays
on downtown streets. One entire committee (Passenger Loading) concerned itself exclusively
with streetcar stops in a complete contradiction to the commission’s stated policy. That
committee took no notice of trucks, buses, taxis, or indeed private autos which also impeded
traffic flow whenever they stopped to load or discharge passengers or freight. The report stated
that streetcar riders, once they exited the trolley, “significantly impacted the continuous flow of
traffic by their disregard of the rights of vehicular traffic.” The committee chose not to
acknowledge that everyone eventually exited their vehicle and became a pedestrian, even people
who parked their cars at the curb. 604
To speed things up, the committee wanted mid-block trolley stops completed removed,
and a number of other streetcar access points eliminated or relocated. The Peachtree Street stop
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just south of Five Points (immediately past the Marietta-Decatur streets intersection) received
special condemnation for its “serious interference” with traffic. The committee acknowledged
that removing access would inconvenience streetcar users, but would greatly facilitate the
movement of “vehicular” traffic. That one statement made their priorities crystal clear.605
The commission did not study the streetcar moving; it did study the streetcar stopped,
when it loaded and unloaded passengers. Only the traffic-impeding aspects of trolley use
interested the surveyors, not the massive numbers of citizens it moved through the city daily. The
survey report contained this assertion: “The public streets are provided for the use of the public.
The suggestions embodied in this report are not offered with a view to curtailing their use but to
making them more serviceable to those who require them most” [emphasis added].” The
commission made obvious that, for its members, and by extension the city of Atlanta, those who
required the public streets most were motor vehicle drivers. It focused on actions to make the
public streets more serviceable to that group and no one else, and it did so by curtailing street use
for all others.606
The entire survey based its counts on the vehicles, not the people using the public streets.
The city’s 1924 Beeler Report had conclusively demonstrated that a single streetcar carried more
passengers within a defined amount of road space than multiple automobiles taking up the same
amount of road space. For the commission, however, only the vehicle counts mattered. It should
have considered, but never did, what would happen if everyone riding trolleys one day decided
to drive cars instead. The resulting gridlock would have gained the attention and anger of
everyone involved.
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Such a situation had already occurred once in Atlanta during the 1920 trolley workers
strike. The Constitution’s automotive reporter, O. J. Willoughby, described the enormous influx
of cars into downtown, and the (apparently unanticipated) extraordinary congestion they brought
with them. He admitted that the common belief, that “our streets would take care of the traffic if
it were not for the streetcars,” was completely untrue. Everyone caught in the rush hour mess
could confirm it. That a mass transit option actually relieved traffic was knowledge quickly
forgotten post-strike, and not soon re-acquired.607
The commission’s anti-trolley omission guaranteed some biased conclusions before the
survey even began. The one-sentence, don’t-blink-or-you’ll-miss-it dismissal of the daily
transportation mode for thousands of citizens resulted in a report which did not accurately
portray city traffic patterns. In so doing, it positioned the automobile as the sole and rightful
proprietor of Atlanta’s streets.
8.2

The Parking Committee
The Traffic Commission concerned itself with more than streetcars. Its Parking

Committee undertook three types of parking counts in Atlanta: on-street parking spaces within
the Central Business District (2,665), parking spaces in garages (4,482), and parking spaces on
surface lots within or adjacent to the business district (6,000). The city had adequate parking. But
paid spaces, especially on lots, remained empty, while the no-cost, curbside spaces stayed
continuously occupied throughout the day.608
With sufficient paid parking available, reducing or eliminating on-street parking on a few
of the busiest streets would free up entire lanes for moving traffic. Eureka! This was the street-
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widening solution city leaders desired but despaired of, staring them in the face. A glance at
virtually any contemporary photo of Atlanta’s downtown streets clearly shows how road space
might double without on-street parking (see photo below609). But curbside parking had two

Figure 47. Forsyth Street, view south from Carnegie Way, 1926.
inarguable advantages. First, it could often get the driver closer to their destination, assuming
one found an open space nearby, or cruised around until such a space became available. Data
confirms that cruising for parking in downtowns was commonplace by the 1920s. Second, and
perhaps most importantly, on-street parking was free. As Donald Shoup and George Costanza
demonstrate, free parking is a powerful imperative for most American drivers, one that had
already entrenched itself by the 1920s.610
In “The Parking Space,” an episode of the popular 1990s television sitcom, Seinfeld, two
characters are driving around Manhattan’s Upper West side looking for a place to park.
Passenger Elaine Benes urges George Costanza, the driver, to just park in a garage. The ensuing
dialogue describes cruising technique and underscores the mandate for many that parking be
free.
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George: Look, I have my system. First I look for the dream spot right in front
of the door, then I slowly expand out in concentric circles.
Elaine: Oh come on, George, please put it in a garage. I don’t want to spend
an hour looking for a space.
George: I can’t park in a garage.
Elaine: Why?
George: I don’t know, I just can’t. Nobody in my family can pay for parking,
it’s a sickness. My father never paid for parking; my mother, my brother,
nobody. We can’t do it.
Elaine: I’ll pay for it.
George: You don’t understand. A garage. I can’t even pull in there. It’s
like going to a prostitute. Why should I pay, when if I apply myself, maybe I
could get it for free?611
Some people will not pay to park, preferring—then and now—to waste time and spew
carbon into the atmosphere just to get a free even if less convenient parking spot. Proximity to
the final destination matters somewhat; time spent cruising seems to matter not at all; cost-free is
the true imperative. “Free parking” of course does not exist, as Shoup has unequivocally proved.
Everyone pays, just not always at the point of sale.
The refusal of Atlanta’s leadership to progress beyond the nineteenth century hitchingpost, tie-your-horse-in-front-of-the-saloon practice eludes comprehension. In the 1920s, traffic
engineers documented the efficiency of mass transit modes, and argued in favor of widening
streets by eliminating curbside parking—the great usurper. Their data and recommendations
went unheeded, and many ceased to make the argument at all. More engineers began to work for
the automobile industry, with Miller McClintock exemplifying the traffic scholar-cum-industry
spokesman transition. Once in that position, no one would suggest removing any motor vehicles
from the streets, moving or stationary.612
The Parking Committee conducted one of the more unusual studies of the entire survey,
the “how you came to downtown today” count. Boy Scouts handed out “ballots” (see image and
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table below) to pedestrians entering buildings, instructing them to select one of the six choices to
describe how they got there: on foot, by car (including where they parked), by bus, or by
streetcar. Balloting sites included major department and chain stores, drugstores, and a number
of large commercial firms. Each person was asked to vote just once. The final tally showed that
only 11% walked, and less than 5% took a bus, while over a third drove. The greatest number of
respondents, nearly half, arrived in downtown via the streetcar—proof, if any were needed, of
the streetcar’s importance to a large percentage of Atlanta’s citizens. Based on this survey, which
counted people not cars, one would conclude that trolley-riders required the public streets
most.613
Method of Arrival
By Street Car
By Automobile*
Parking Method
On Streets
In Garages
On Parking Lots
On Foot
By Motor Bus
Miscellaneous or Unknown
*38.0% total.

Percent
44.9

14.8
13.8
9.4
11.0
4.7
1.4

Figure 48. How You Came To Work form and results; 1929 Traffic Survey, pgs. 37,
39.
The major disappointment of the Parking Committee’s section of the survey final report
was their reluctance to offer any solutions to the parking problem. Curbside parking took up
traffic lanes, but few wanted to surrender personal convenience and/or no-charge parking.

613
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printed ballots were handed to all patrons with the request that they tear off and deposit in the ballot box the stub
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Atlanta Constitution, July 9, 1929; Atlanta Mayor’s Traffic Commission, 35, 37, 39.
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Retailers insisted that customers be able to park close to their stores. Police seldom enforced noparking restrictions on the few downtown streets where partial bans were in effect. More and
more cars drove on Atlanta’s streets every year. With congestion out of control, the chief aim of
the survey was to find remedies. In this, the committee dramatically failed.
The Traffic Commission’s Parking Committee could not agree on what recommendations
to make, so Mayor Ragsdale, in mid-October, named a special committee to come up with a set
of downtown parking regulations to be given directly to the city council. Members of this new,
special parking committee included Charles Whitaker, consulting engineer and chair of the
Traffic Commission; and James L. Wells, president of Sloan Paper Company, chairman of the
city council’s traffic committee and on the Traffic Commission’s steering committee. Other
members included a real estate agent, a city councilman, two Georgia Power executives, and
three men representing the Atlanta Retail Merchants’ Association—the owner of a high-end
women’s clothing boutique, the president of a furniture company, and the manager of a car
dealership.614
This special committee was charged with reviewing the report of the Traffic
Commission’s Parking Committee and making recommendations to council. Because the
members of the new special committee also could not agree, they produced two separate reports
containing diametrically-opposed parking recommendations for the city. The Whitaker faction
favored expanding downtown’s no-parking zones. These zones were not extensive, consisting
only of sections of North Pryor, James, Fairlie, and Poplar streets, as well as viaducts in the
central business district. The other group contained the merchants who argued vehemently
against any additional parking restrictions. That faction actually called for more, not less parking,
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asserting that “There is such a thing as regulating traffic and trade to death.” Whitaker’s group,
however, believed “The free movement of traffic and the convenience of the traveling public
should receive first consideration, as in so doing many times the number of people may be
served than are accommodated by street parking.”615
The stubbornness of both sides led the survey’s Parking Committee to adopt the common
Atlanta leadership approach: suggest further study. The impasse exemplified what happened
whenever the growth coalition divided against itself—nothing; they chose instead simply to
maintain the status quo, whatever that happened to be. Traffic would eventually ease when
congestion forced many stores to move to accessible outlying areas; some already had.
Decentralization was probably not the solution the downtown merchants envisioned, but by their
intransigence, they contributed to their own demise. They failed to heed the Commerce
Department’s prediction, or the prophetic warning of Sam Levy, one of their own.616
8.3

Pedestrians
In strong contrast to the parking group, the Pedestrian Study Committee did not hesitate

in its recommendations to rein in foot travelers in the streets. It lamented unruly pedestrians who
crossed intersections against traffic lights, exited trolleys at the incorrect curb, or jaywalked.
They created hazards and seriously interfered with “the free and efficient movement of vehicular
traffic.” Pedestrians should make brief appearances in the streets, and then only at the direction
of a police office, a traffic signal, or white lines painted on the roadway. Proper enforcement and

“Traffic Officials at Odds on City Parking Problem, Atlanta Constitution, October 22, 1929.
Ibid.; Preston, Automobile Age Atlanta: The Making of a Southern Metropolis, 1900-1935, 129-30;
Atlanta Mayor's Traffic Commission, Traffic Survey, City of Atlanta, Georgia, 9, 39. Sam Levy’s speech to his
fellow downtown merchants about accepting no-parking zones appears earlier in this chapter.
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a program of continuous public education would better control those who walked and keep them
from slowing traffic flow.617
The committee tallied the number of pedestrians at eight major intersections in the central
business district on normal business days. The counts took place during the periods of heaviest
traffic, the three rush hours: Morning 7:30–9:00 a.m.; Noon 11:30 a.m.–1:30 p.m.; and
Afternoon 4:30–6:00 p.m. Noon experienced the heaviest foot traffic, when office workers on
their lunch breaks mingled with shoppers and visitors. To no one’s surprise, Five Points had the
greatest number of pedestrians, 59,390 in one day, more than double the number at any of the
other seven intersections surveyed. Remarkably, it also had the fewest number of pedestrian
violations, which the committee attributed to the savvy of those using the popular, dangerous,
and intensively-policed crossroads.618
The committee wanted to facilitate pedestrian movement on city sidewalks, but admitted
that downtown walkways did not have enough capacity for the volume of foot traffic. Sidewalks
could not be widened by pushing back building fronts (obviously impossible) or by reducing
street widths (obviously unthinkable). The opposite had already occurred in Atlanta, as city
officials ordered some sidewalks trimmed to make roads wider. Aside from recommending the
removal of sidewalk obstructions, the committee had no remedies to offer pedestrians to ensure
efficient sidewalk use.619
The Physical Conditions Committee, which also addressed pedestrian flow on the
sidewalks, acknowledged that within the central business district, the narrow sidewalks could not
Atlanta Mayor’s Traffic Commission, 58-59, 65-66.
Atlanta Constitution: “Count of Pedestrians Will Start Today,” May 9, 1929; “Reports Due Soon on
Traffic Surveys,” July 24, 1929; Atlanta Mayor’s Traffic Commission, 58-59, 61, 64-66. The Five Points
intersection was defined as the crossing of Peachtree and Whitehall streets with Marietta and Decatur streets. The
Edgewood Avenue intersection with Peachtree to the northeast was not included.
619
Atlanta Mayor’s Traffic Commission, 58, 65; “Plan Widening of ‘Bottle Neck’ On Marietta St.,”
Atlanta Constitution, February 18, 1922.
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be widened. To increase space, it recommended new legislation to prohibit retailers from using
the sidewalks to display merchandise. The sidewalk area should be retained “entirely for public
rather than private use.” In keeping with that policy, beggars and vendors of miscellaneous small
items (e.g., chewing gum, pencils, matches) could be classified as “sidewalk obstructions.”
These people irritated the public and, as charities existed to help them, the committee felt they
did not need to beg or sell on the public walkways. It recommended that the city revoke all
permits for such activities, and issue no new ones.620
8.4

Traffic
Vehicle counts accounted for most of the work of the Traffic Flow Committee, and its

report contained a variety of detailed tables, charts, graphs, and maps. Spring Street, the major
north-south arterial (which included the city’s longest viaduct over the railroad tracks), carried
downtown’s heaviest traffic load, followed by Peachtree and Marietta streets. The city’s busiest
traffic intersection was at Marietta and Spring streets, where 22,347 vehicles crossed in one 11hour period (6:30 a.m.-7:30 p.m.).621
Additional counts revealed the different types of vehicles using the streets and where they
concentrated. More than three-quarters of all vehicles on the downtown streets were automobiles
(77%), followed by trucks (15%) and streetcars (less than 5%). Buses, motorcycles, and horsedrawns of any kind (e.g., carriages, carts, wagons) each accounted for less than 1% of all
vehicles traveling through the central business district. Peachtree Street carried the most
streetcars, while the few horse-drawn vehicles mainly travelled mainly the Decatur-Marietta
corridor.622
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Despite the large amount of traffic on Spring Street, the most motor vehicle wrecks
occurred on Peachtree Street, followed by Marietta Street, Fair Street [Memorial Dr.], and
Piedmont and Ponce de Leon avenues. Although the total area of the business district comprised
less than 2% of the entire city, more than 16% of all crashes occurred there. The Accident Study
Committee showed that drivers caused two-thirds of all traffic collisions [emphasis added];
pedestrians, the remaining third. As volume of traffic increased, so did the frequency of crashes.
Failing to signal and speeding accounted for two-thirds of all driver-caused wrecks. Jay-walking
and crossing at intersections with no traffic signals caused more than 50% of all pedestrian-atfault crashes, while playing in the street came in third.623
The Accident Committee recommended more rigid enforcement of the ordinance
requiring a correct report of every collision, but made no mention of stricter application of the
moving vehicle laws or prosecution of violators. It absolutely failed to chastise drivers, suggest
greater penalties for infractions, or advocate for the adoption of more stringent driver licensing
requirements. Nowhere in the entire survey report are remedies suggested to correct the unlawful
behaviors of motorists, despite the fact that drivers caused the majority of “accidents” (twice as
many as pedestrians), and the majority of the fatalities. Elsewhere, the report’s authors have no
hesitation in calling out pedestrians for illegal actions like crossing the street incorrectly and
interfering with the rights of vehicles. Beyond insipid appeals for more education and support for
safety regulations, the drivers of cars and trucks got a pass.624
The Enforcement Committee scrutinized the Atlanta Police Department. Of the
department’s 337 personnel, only 48 were assigned to traffic duty, although additional patrolmen
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helped direct traffic during rush hours. Twenty-four officers in the traffic squad rode
motorcycles, too few to adequately enforce speeding and reckless driving ordinances throughout
the city’s 34.8 square miles of territory. The committee recommended hiring more officers in
general as well as motorcycle officers in particular. Within the past three years (1927-29),
Atlanta motor vehicle registrations increased nearly 20%, and motor vehicle wrecks increased
156%, yet the number of police had remained constant. The National Safety Council
recommended that a traffic squad should have 3-4 men per 10,000 inhabitants. By this metric,
Atlanta’s traffic force should have 70 men.625
During the first six months of 1929, Atlanta police worked 6,410 traffic cases. Parking
infractions led the list (2,364), with “driving past stop sign” violations second (1,023). The report
found that the public had a negative attitude toward stop signs, and thought the city had too
many. The committee actually blamed the “excessive” number of stop signs for the violations
and collisions at those locations. Removing many of the city’s stop signs would “help
enforcement and tend to decrease accidents.”626
The Signs and Signals Committee had a similar opinion of Atlanta’s traffic signals and
signs in general, saying that the city had an excessive number (see map on next page). The
effectiveness of traffic control devices depended on the cooperation of drivers, and too many
signs and signals only bred contempt for the law. The committee studied the American
Engineering Council (AEC) report on street signs, signals, and markings, and urged that Atlanta
adopt their standards.627
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The committee also followed the AEC’s lead by suggesting that Atlanta discontinue the
use of a yellow light following both red and green lights—a practice which caused numerous
accidents. The yellow light should show only following the green light. This change could be

Figure 49. Traffic signal locations in Atlanta's CBD.
implemented whenever the city adopted the “flexible progressive” type of traffic control system,
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which had integrated signals, allowing variable timings to meet traffic conditions at each
intersection.628
8.5

Survey Recommendations and Impacts
Chairman Whitaker presented the Traffic Commission’s final report to Mayor Ragsdale

at the end of November. It was eventually published, with copies distributed to the city council
and made available to the public. The survey report divided its conclusions into two categories:
(1) physical changes, and (2) traffic control measures and devices.629
No large physical changes to Atlanta’s narrow streets could be done, though intersection
curbs could be cut back to improve turning radii to accommodate trucks and larger automobiles.
This would obviously reduce sidewalk size, but here as elsewhere in the report, pedestrians needs
were of little concern. However, providing alternate routes to truckers and pass-through
motorists had the potential to benefit travelers and relieve congestion in the Central Business and
Retail District.
The Vehicle Routing Committee created a map of the entire city indicating proposed
routes for through traffic. To further ease traffic movement, obstructions in the roadways and on
the sidewalks should be removed, and streetcar stops re-located to less busy streets. Due to the
refusal of the Parking Committee to make any concrete recommendations about on-street
parking, the Commission simply endorsed their suggestion for further study. Apparently no one
in the business community or municipal government had the fortitude to deal with the parking
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dilemma. This leadership failure would consign Atlanta citizens to an ongoing purgatory of
traffic congestion for decades.630
For traffic control measures, the Commission recommended that the city adopt a new
traffic ordinance based on the Model Municipal Traffic Ordinance proposed by the Second
National Conference on Street and Highway Safety. It urged the city to gradually replace the
existing traffic control signals to a system meeting the AEC’s standards, and called for a
reorganization of the Traffic Division of the Atlanta Police Department. Its signature
recommendation, however, requested that the city create an official body to take charge of traffic
in Atlanta.631
The “safe and expeditious handling of traffic” had become one of the city’s major
problems, affecting both business and social life. The solution to traffic problems had five major
components: (1) a traffic control plan; (2) the alteration of streets and sidewalks as demanded by
traffic and permitted by business and financial considerations; (3) a program for the future
development of roads to handle more traffic; (4) the development of popular support for street
regulation; and (5) strict and impartial law enforcement. Only an officially designated group,
with the appropriate authority and engineering staff, could adequately undertake these tasks and
meet the persistent demands of city traffic. The survey strongly urged that the city council create
a permanent Traffic Commission to study Atlanta’s traffic and make recommendations.632
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Initially, the survey report received acclaim from leading citizens and the press. Some
businesses quickly utilized its data in promotions and advertisements. Rich’s department store
instituted its “Follow the Crowds to Rich’s!” campaign. One of the survey pedestrian counts
showed that its store at the northeast corner of Alabama and Broad streets was the shopping
center for 150,385 people every day (so the ad claimed), and urged other shoppers to follow the
crowd.633
A Georgia Power ad
claimed that cars carrying only
six people took up as much road
space as a single streetcar
carrying fifty passengers. It
included a clever sketch, showing
what an automobile would look
like if it were built in proportion
to the average number of
customers it carried in downtown
(see ad at right). Ad copy

Figure 50. Georgia Power ad; Atlanta Constitution, May
29, 1930.

accurately cited the Traffic
Commission’s finding that cars made up 78% of all street traffic; streetcars, only 4.7%. Yet
Atlanta’s streetcars carried 275,000 passengers a day, more than the population of the entire city.
The ad concluded, also accurately, “Obviously street cars don’t cause traffic congestion, they
reduce it. Without them to do the biggest part of the job in city transportation, traffic conditions
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would be insufferable.” It invited motorists to give the streetcar a try, but most would not until
the gas rationing during the next world war restricted driving. Americans in general have
difficulty surrendering personal freedoms for the greater good.634
The first three months of 1930 passed, and nothing had come of the traffic survey’s
recommendations. In that year’s annual state-of-the-city speech, Mayor Ragsdale commended
the survey commission, recommended that all members of council study the report, and urged
the city council’s traffic committee to create a permanent traffic commission. Although the city
council formally endorsed the survey, the traffic committee refused to take the requisite initial
step of creating a permanent traffic commission, which was the most important and most
strongly urged of all the survey recommendations. After all, establishing a select committee
devoted to meeting traffic needs would have been an indictment of themselves for not doing their
job. In truth, council’s traffic committee had continuously failed to deal with the traffic
congestion which had only grown worse over the last ten years.635
In August 1930, the Atlanta Safety Council sent a petition to Mayor Ragsdale, urging the
city to establish the permanent Traffic Commission. The petition noted that few of the survey
recommendations “have been either remotely considered or put into effect.” The group had
received assurances that such a commission would be appointed once the survey was completed.
The mayor presented the petition to council, but to no effect.636
Charles Whitaker, the former chair of the traffic survey commission, began making the
rounds of civic and professional groups, seeking their support for the “traffic improvement
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movement.” Speaking to the Atlanta’s Builder’s Exchange, he discussed the proposals of the
survey’s voluminous report based on seven months’ of study. No progress had been made in
implementing any of its recommendations. The intransigence of the city traffic committee
remained absolute. They failed to follow Herbert Hoover’s operative principle for improving
traffic conditions: after finding the remedies, you had to apply them.637
In late March 1931, exactly two years after Mayor Ragsdale had inaugurated his survey,
Mayor James L. Key named members to another commission to study traffic conditions. He
charged the group with ascertaining “the best method to solve what is one of our most vexing
municipal problems.” Though council did act to make the traffic commission “permanent” (it
wasn’t), Key ignored the earlier study as if it had never taken place. A newspaper editorial
reported the events, and with more than a little bitterness recalled the 1929 survey.
Only a few years ago a similar commission, headed by C. C. Whitaker, an
outstanding expert in traffic control, spent many months in analyzing traffic
conditions in every part of the city. It filed a report, replete with graphs and
accompanied by full recommendations. No more intelligent study was ever made
of a municipal problem. This report was cast aside and the time and energy
expended by the prominent citizens who composed the commission was effort
thrown away.638
The writer highlighted the typical modus operandi adopted by Atlanta’s leaders when
faced with difficult civic dilemmas during the twenties: (1) appoint a committee to undertake a
fact-finding study; (2) disregard its recommendations; (3) repeat as often as necessary. For proof,
he cited a just-completed investigation of sewer system difficulties, which council was in the
process of steadfastly ignoring. The editorial somewhat dejectedly concluded: “It is to be hoped
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the report of the new traffic commission will not meet the fate of its predecessor and that of other
commissions appointed to study and report on municipal problems.”639
The editor had uncovered an ongoing pattern of action/inaction adopted by the Atlanta
city council. Hunter found an identical operational process in place in Atlanta during the late
1940s-early 1950s. City leaders hired outside specialists to make plans, but put so many
restrictions on them that most citizens never even knew about their work. He found city files full
of expert advice on what to do to fix various municipal problems, but on which no measures had
ever been taken. “Action results when a plan fits the relatively narrow interests of the policymakers, but on many issues there is community paralysis and inaction.”640
Morris Opler, noted American anthropologist, also noted the general phenomenon,
describing it this way:
Often it is the social scientist’s presence and prestige, rather than his knowledge,
that are wanted. There are powerful men of affairs everywhere who give lip
service to a “scientific age” but who do not propose to alter their habits of mind or
action one iota in response to it. . . . This type of executive or administrator is
willing and even eager, in deference to the new age, to have a social scientist in
the background . . . to have him put the seal of approval on what is proposed.641
Mayor Key, like his predecessors, reacted to the congestion, crashes, and casualties on
the streets caused primarily by motorists precisely as his predecessors had done, by more datagathering. Elected officials as well as influential decisionmakers knew that hiring experts to
conduct a much-publicized investigation and publish a seldom-read report would satisfy most
Atlantans that at least something was being done, even if nothing was actually getting done. The
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ritual had been followed, saving city leaders from having to make difficult decisions to actually
fix problems.642
The practical impact of the 1929 traffic survey did not extend beyond the eventual
establishment of a citizen traffic commission. However, the survey served several valuable
purposes. It gathered voluminous data about Atlanta’s downtown streets and sidewalks, their
various users, and the types of traffic control measures and devices employed by the city. In so
doing, it documented the tremendous impact the automobile had made on the city’s streets and
the people using them. It recorded the inarguable primacy of motor vehicles over all other forms
of transportation in the city, and made clear the preferential treatment given by Atlanta’s leaders
to those vehicles and their drivers.
The survey’s committee chairs consisted primarily of elites from the city’s pro-growth
coalition, a group concerned about the effect of traffic congestion on their businesses and
Atlanta’s reputation as a business-friendly city. However, when the survey ended, they failed to
implement its proposals. Coalition members passionately disagreed about parking, and the group
ultimately took no actions to relieve congestion, beyond continuing to restrict non-vehicular
street users, a task they undertook with enthusiasm. An obvious conclusion is that city leaders
really did not want to solve congestion, because doing so would require dealing with its primary
cause, too many cars.
In the first three decades of the twentieth century, Atlanta’s powerful growth advocates
had chosen the automobile as their preferred transportation mode. From the successful effort to
win the national automobile show in 1909, through the auto-centric 1929 traffic survey, the
group had championed the car, reconfiguring and re-defining city streets to extend its presence.
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The survey, in its methodologies and conclusions, discounted the chosen transit option of the
majority of Atlantans, streetcars. Its recommendations focused on restricting anybody or
anything which might hinder the free flow of automobiles on the streets, except parked cars.
Perhaps a more important conclusion to draw from the survey than its preferential
treatment of the car was the mindset giving rise to that preference. The report’s underlying
assumption held that the public streets served as traffic channels, and satisfactory service meant
the optimum movement of vehicles, not persons. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the
principle that everyone had equal rights to the public roadways prevailed, but the 1929 traffic
survey officially finalized the primacy of motor vehicles over all other means of transportation
on Atlanta’s streets. It highlighted the changed understanding of the roadways. No longer shared
spaces, the streets had a new and simpler definition: car conduits.
8.6

State of the Streets – 1929
Atlanta’s streets had undergone a remarkable transformation in ten years. They were

much busier, especially in the central business district where close to 186,000 pedestrians a day
jostled on the sidewalks of major downtown intersections, while nearly 200,000 vehicles of all
types jammed onto the narrow streets. Thousands of cars now parked along the curbs, effectively
cutting the size of many downtown streets in half. Three new viaducts, two exclusively for auto
traffic, tied the north and south sectors of the city together. Over the decade, miles of streets had
been graded and paved, usually with concrete, and the traction company installed elevated
platforms in wider streets to provide safe access for streetcar passengers.
The entire public space from building line to building line was crowded with traffic
control instruments including signs, lines, and overhead wires holding signal lights. Non-trafficrelated devices included an extensive white way, trash receptacles, postal collection boxes, and
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more overhead wires for telephones, telegraphs, and trolleys, plus supply lines to newlyelectrified buildings. Service stations had gas pumps, pressurized air dispensers, and water hoses
on the sidewalks to provide curb service to drivers. By 1930, however, many of these had moved
out of the congested district to the suburbs where rents were cheaper.
The buildings lining downtown streets had changed. Churches sold their valuable in-town
properties and moved farther out, giving way to tall office buildings and department stores.
Once-fashionable mansions became boarding houses or were demolished to make room for
hotels, movie palaces, and apartment buildings. Their wealthy former owners sold out at a profit
and decamped to Buckhead or Druid Hills. A few of the original structures remained, serving as
the headquarters for local clubs or art and history organizations. The establishments of motordom
claimed a large swath of territory along Peachtree Street, popularly called Automobile Row,
which by 1929 spilled onto West Peachtree,
Spring, and Ivy [Peachtree Center Ave.]
streets.
Not only downtown streets had
changed; residential neighborhoods, especially
the new suburbs looked different. Cars still
parked along the street, but beginning in the
1910s, driveways were added to individual
homes to provide off-street parking. By the
Figure 51. Ad for house with drive and
garage; Atlanta Constitution, December 10,
1929.
asphalt or “cement” (actually concrete) drives (see image above).
1920s, ads for new bungalows mentioned
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In the early 1900s, the word “garage” applied to a building for motor vehicle storage, or
the act of storing a vehicle. At that time the garage might be new built, but most often was a
converted stable as cars gradually replaced horses. By the late twenties, many new home ads
featured garages (always detached at this time), taking for granted that of course one had an
automobile to park in it. George Babbitt had a concrete driveway; also a corrugated iron garage
which he wanted to replace with a framed structure as the old metal one was not up-to-date. The
automobile, whether moving or stationary, demanded plenty of land, on and off the streets.
Motor vehicle traffic also changed the nature of policing. In 1921, the city installed its
first traffic tower holding two officers who worked the hand-operated signal indicators. More
towers quickly followed in the congested district. But by 1929, the rapid advance of technology
had replaced these now-dated structures with three-color, electric traffic signals mounted on
poles or wires. A sophisticated system allowed central timing of the lights to react to changing
traffic conditions.
After two short-term experiments, the city council finally authorized a permanent traffic
squad in 1929. Its cornermen directed traffic and ticketed jaywalkers, while the motorcycle cops
chased down drunk drivers and speeders. Pistols replaced billy clubs. Bicycles, the great
innovation of 1897, were eliminated, and most of the horses were gone.643 As the decade ended,
the department was even asking for small, speedy automobiles to replace motorcycles. Policing
in Atlanta had entered the modern era, where the majority of a patrol officer’s time is spent
dealing with motor vehicles while driving in a car from call to call.
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The laws police enforced had multiplied to meet the vastly changed functioning of city
streets and sidewalks. Pages and pages of new ordinances defined who could be in the public
roadways, what they could do while there, how long they could take up some street space, and
the penalties for any infractions. Rules of the road, rules of the sidewalk, licensing requirements,
regulations for every moving vehicle—a vast legislative superstructure overlay the city’s public
spaces, exempting no one.644 Even schoolchildren had to learn about traffic safety and how to
correctly cross the road.
As Wiebe notes, a massive administrative bureaucracy at every level of government
emerged to enforce, manage, and maintain the regulatory environment, and most Americans
passively accepted the new regime. The multifarious departments, offices, and bureaus were ably
assisted by local councils and clubs as well as representatives from the national trade groups,
professional associations, and automobile organizations. The underlying urge for greater
continuity, regularity, and functionality led to the creation and subsequent universal adoption of
uniform traffic codes and devices, and a nationwide system of highways.645
In Georgia, the motor vehicle department, created in 1916 as a division of the Secretary
of State’s office, had grown so large with expanded responsibilities that by the end of the decade,
the Secretary begged the legislature to establish it as a separate department. His request was well
founded. In 1920, Fulton County had 20,363 registered passenger cars; by 1929, that number
almost tripled to 56,416. Trucks in the state of Georgia saw an even more spectacular increase,
from 12,000 in 1920 to more than 50,000 in 1929.646
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until 1939; Table DL-230 “Year of First State Driver License Law and First Driver Examination,” U.S. Department
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The railroads worried as the trucking industry began to compete for short haul freight just
like streetcars and automobiles had already purloined short-distance passenger travel. The
Atlanta and West Point Railroad’s daily suburban trains from downtown to College Park were
long gone. Concentrating on long-haul freight and passengers would keep the rail lines in good
financial shape until the construction of the interstate highway system in the 1950s. However,
during the twenties, the railroads carried an enormous amount of automotive freight into and out
of the city, benefitting not only themselves, but also their direct competitors. Ironically, the
railroad industry had a significant role in contributing to the reputation of Atlanta as a leading
automobile center.
The business sections of the city directories demonstrate how far Atlanta had come in its
embrace of the auto industry. The table below compares the number of entries related to the three
transportation modes: horse; bicycle, and automobile.647 The horse category included items such
as the makers of wagons and carriages, blacksmiths, stables, wagon yards, repairs. Bicycle
entries included sales and repair shops. Automobile entries included parts, accessories, repairs,
gas stations, parking lots, parking garages, dealerships, used cars, cars for rent, tires, and many
more. The percentages of the totals are

Table 18. Horses, Bikes, Cars, 1900-1929

for the three modes combined. Rail
travel is not included.
Bicycle counts remained fairly
stable, but as a percentage of the totals,
declined by more than half. The golden

Year
1900
1920
1929
1900
1920
1929

Number of City Directory Entries
Horse
Bicycle Automobile Total
147
12
0
159
48
19
303
370
26
12
349
387
Percentage of Total Entries
92.5%
7.5%
0.0% 100.0%
13.0%
5.1%
81.9% 100.0%
6.7%
3.1%
90.2% 100.0%

for the State of Georgia (Atlanta: Franklin, 1898-1932); U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway
Administration, “Highway Statistics Summary to 1995, Section 2: Motor Vehicles.”
647
Atlanta City Directory (Atlanta: Foote & Davies/Byrd/Atlanta City Directory, 1899-1930).
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age of the bicycle as a popular form of adult transportation occurred in the late nineteenth
century. By 1929, cyclists made up only a small portion of all the vehicles riding the streets; it
was far too dangerous. The huge swing occurred between the horse and the automobile, which
basically switched places. In 1900, the only non-rail competitor to horse-drawn vehicles was the
bicycle, but by the end of the twenties, the automobile had completely replaced the horse, not
only in numbers on the streets, but also in impact on the local economy.
Atlanta began 1929 with the Southeastern Automobile Show, which opened on January
14. A crowd of more than 10,000 attended the show on the first day where eager buyers placed
25 orders for the latest offerings from Detroit—both record one-day totals (at that time) for any
auto show in the South. Beautiful women promoted the new cars while an orchestra played.
Twenty manufacturers, including motordom’s biggest names, exhibited 127 different models
with new designs, colors, and features. One reporter said the pageant was enough to make a man
“trade in his old bus for a swanky new speedster,” which, he observed, was why they held this
event in the first place. The six-day show drew record crowds and sales. Atlantans did love
Automobile Week.648
They also loved their cars, as the 1929 Traffic Survey demonstrated. The volume of cars
on downtown streets far surpassed any other vehicle on the road, even besting the pedestrian
counts at the busiest intersections. While merchants often griped about the congestion, the
majority actually welcomed the mass of potential customers who traveled to the business district
every weekday.

Atlanta Constitution: Loyd A. Wilhoit, “Attendance of 10,000 Is First Day’s Record at Automobile
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But one Five Points merchant famously disagreed. Countless historians and history buffs
have referenced or recited the words of Tom Pitts, owner of a cigar store and soda fountain at
Five Points. In his 1926 interview with Elinor Hillyer, a reporter for the evening daily
newspaper, the Atlanta Journal, Pitts lamented the automobiles rushing through downtown, not
stopping to patronize small businesses. But he was not just any shopkeeper. As a Constitution
reporter observed in 1924, “The story of Tom Pitts is the story of Atlanta.”649
Thomas H. Pitts (1872-1938) was born in Boston, Georgia, a tiny town in Thomas
County just north of the Florida border. He never attended school, but at the age of 23, came to
Atlanta. With very little capital, he managed to open a cigar stand in the prestigious Norcross
Building, on the southwest corner of Peachtree and Marietta at Five Points. Within four years,
Pitts had become a prosperous businessman, acquiring a partner and opening a branch in the
popular Jacob’s Pharmacy (of Coca-Cola fame) at the intersection of Whitehall and Alabama.
Newspaper accounts from the 1890s praised his stock of cigars and tobacco goods, and claimed
that everybody in town knew Mr. Pitts, “one of the jolliest, best fellows in town.” More
newspaper articles early in the new century relieved Tom Pitts of the necessity of advertising—
reporters were his best publicists (possibly his best customers, too). By their accounts, his was
one of the most elegant cigar stores in Atlanta.650
When the Norcross Building burned in 1902, Pitts moved across the street into 21
Peachtree, with a second location around the corner at 3 Decatur Street. He soon opened cigar
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stands in the new skyscrapers, the Fourth National Bank and the Candler Building. His centercity locations guaranteed him plenty of walk-in traffic.651
In 1911, Pitts received notice from his landlord that his lease would not be renewed. In a
daring move, Tom took out a five-year, $100,000 lease on the old Collier Building, located just
across Decatur Street, at the confluence of Edgewood, Peachtree, and Decatur. The location
today is the site of a Walgreen’s pharmacy chain store continuously patronized by students at
Georgia State University. In 1845, George Washington Collier, one of Atlanta’s pioneer citizens,
built the original wood-frame grocery store on the site. In 1858, Collier replaced the wood store
with a three-story brick
structure, which he also had to
rebuild after it was destroyed
by Sherman’s troops in 1864
(see photo at right). Pitts
undertook a complete
renovation before taking
occupancy, installing a large,
marble counter as the soda
fountain side of his business

Figure 52. Future home of Tom Pitts cigar & soda shop, ca.
1890.

was expanding.652
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The cigar and soda shop at Five Points stood on one of the prime retail properties in the
city, perfect for a smaller business which depended on foot traffic. It had frontage on Peachtree,
Edgewood, and Decatur. It became a known gathering place, and Atlantans would often tell their
friends to “Meet me at Tom Pitts.” His location soon earned the title, “Pitts’ Corner.” In 1920, he
had a major increase in his annual lease to more than $32,500 a year—a record figure in the
Atlanta real estate market at that time. In 1923, Pitts gained membership in the esteemed Capital
City Club.653
In 1924, the Constitution conducted an in-depth interview with Tom Pitts about his life
and business acumen. He acknowledged taking advantage of the growing demand for tobacco
products, transitioning from pipes to cigars and more recently, cigarettes. He started offering ice
cream sodas as Georgia considered state-wide prohibition, and expanded to soft drinks and
flavored milks as the national temperance movement gained influence. Pitts told the reporter that
he had always considered a central location essential for his type of business, which required
thousands of sales of mostly low-priced items in order to turn a profit. It explained why he paid
enormous rents to be at Five Points, the business heart of Atlanta.654
It came as a shock to many when Thomas Pitts closed his famous soda and cigar stores,
retiring from business at age 54, on October 1, 1926. In his famous, often-quoted interview in the
Journal, Pitts recounted how downtown had changed; how Five Points, once a gathering place at
the center, was now a thoroughfare people dashed through on their way to somewhere else. He
did not hesitate to assign blame.
I think the real thing that did it was automobiles, and more automobiles. Traffic
got so congested that the only hope was to keep it going. Hundreds used to stop;
653
“Record Rental Paid by Thomas H. Pitts,” Atlanta Constitution, October 28, 1920; Garrett and Martin,
Atlanta and Environs: A Chronicle of Its People and Events, 2:821-23; Bryant, Capital City Club: The First One
Hundred Years, 1883-1983, 200.
654
“City’s Progress Told in the Story of Pitts’ Success,” Atlanta Constitution, October 12, 1924.

354
now thousands pass. . . . New traffic rules have made it impossible to park an
automobile within two or three blocks of Five Points, and the traffic signals keep
everything moving. Street cars do not take on and let off passengers at the old
junction corners, but rush past to the block beyond. . . . For years and years Five
Points was the best retail spot in the city. . . . Five Points has become more like a
Wall Street business section. . . . The place where soda fountain trade is, is where
automobiles go, and one must have wide spaces for curb service.655
In a complete about-face from his 1924 assertion, he somewhat wistfully added, “A
central location is no longer a good one for my sort of business” (emphasis added).656 Tom Pitts,
like a few other keen observers, acted on the evolving decentralization of downtown, for which
the automobile certainly bore some responsibility. He precisely described the street changes
instituted during the twenties: traffic signals; on-street parking restrictions; the elimination of
streetcar stops at congested corners. He presciently perceived that his type of store now needed
plenty of space where cars could drive up and either get curbside service or drivers had only a
short walk to shop inside.
Tom Pitts’ store could be likened to the canary in the coal mine, a signal that changing
conditions in downtown would no longer sustain a successful business enterprise of a certain
type. Many would eventually move out to the suburbs, while others simply retired from the fray;
meanwhile Atlantans arranging a downtown rendezvous would no longer tell each other to
“Meet me at Tom Pitts.” During the remaining years of the decade after Mr. Pitts’ departure,
Atlanta’s traffic congestion would only get worse as more cars crammed onto downtown
streets.657
Tom Pitts’ abandonment of Five Points presaged Richard Sennett’s discussion of modern
“dead public space” by fifty years, but the ideas area the same. The intersection called Five
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Points, Atlanta’s closest thing to a town square and once a communal meeting place, had become
a pass-through space, “an area to move through, not be in.” Sennett asserts that the public square
had lost its essential nature—a space where a variety of persons intermixed and a diverse array of
activities took place. It had become a dead space, a space contingent upon motion. City streets,
and even the spaces around them, like sidewalks, plazas, and squares, have become functions of
motion. “Their design concept merges with the technology of transportation, losing any
experiential meaning of their own.” People no longer gather in the street, and seldom stop or
gather on the sidewalks—the street and the sidewalks have only one valid raison d’être—to be
spaces where motion is the only acceptable activity. Keep moving or be run down.658
Throughout the twenties, Atlanta’s power elites continued to exercise their collective
will, moving the city along the path of expansion, gaining more people, wider borders, and
substantial wealth. They seized on every chance to extend the city’s regional influence, and
secure Atlanta’s position as the southeastern locus of finance, transportation, commerce, and
manufacturing. As early as 1909, they had chosen the automobile as their vehicle to fortune,
confident it would bring customers to downtown, open up the hinterlands for new homes and
businesses, and provide economic opportunities not only by making and selling cars, but also
through the many subsidiary industries of motordom. Local newspapers publicized motor
vehicles, with special “traffic talks” and “motor pep” columns and detailed stories about car
races, auto shows, and the latest models. Auto ad sales generated considerable revenue for paper
and magazine publishers. Realtors benefited from the automobile as an expansion tool, bringing
new enterprises in and helping residents live further out. The coalition assisted, and profited
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from, the greater involvement of automotive interests in Atlanta’s government, industry, and
culture.659
Over the course of the decade, automobiles became incredibly popular and increasingly
essential, broadening horizons physically and experientially. Members of the pro-growth
coalition were hardly the only ones privileging cars over streetcars. The rapid and allencompassing embrace of the motor vehicle brought many benefits, but also an array of
unanticipated, unintended, and sometimes horrific consequences. Atlanta’s leaders, like those in
other cities, failed to address all the problems. During the 1920s, they never developed a
comprehensive city plan for land use and traffic control, but instead implemented sporadic,
unsystematic, partial measures. “The result, of course, was that cities, and the life-styles of their
inhabitants, were increasingly altered to meet the demands and opportunities created by the
automobile.” The car had won the road.660
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CONCLUSION

On January 5, 1928, the Detroit Rapid Transit Commission presented a report to the
mayor and city council entitled The Relation of Individual to Collective Transportation. The
commission consisted primarily of esteemed engineers in the automobile industry and was
chaired by the vice president and general manager of Packard Motor Company. The purpose of
the report was to show the growth in private automobile use (“individual transportation”) and in
public mass transit (“collective transportation”). It detailed the facilities needed to accommodate
both along with plans to provide for an efficient and economical future city.661
The committee’s name, Rapid Transit Commission, might lead one to think their major
concern was efficient travel by mass transit. Not so. The report’s second paragraph amply
demonstrated the group’s pro-automobile stance. It asserted the universality of the effects of
automobility, claiming everyone wanted wide roadways so they could travel by car freely in any
direction. The economic feasibility of meeting that desire was the only real question confronting
the city.662
The Commission acknowledged the right of the individual to occupy the public roads,
which previously had not presented any real problems. Historically, only a small percentage of
the population possessed private transportation, and that only over limited distances. In urban
areas, the more economical approach had been to collect individual rights into a public transit
option available to the entire community. But “the introduction of the automobile, and its
corollary, the hard surfaced road” had changed everything, giving to individuals freedom and
range of movement never seen before. Within the past twenty years, the right of the private
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individual to use the public road had gained a new significance. Upon that right, the entire
automobile industry, the U.S.’s number one producer, had been constructed. Any effort to
remove or abridge that prerogative could not be attempted or even considered; it would result in
a “social revolution.”663
The resulting quandary, to which the report would supply multiple solutions, was how to
affordably accommodate both individual and collective transportation modes. Not surprisingly,
the Commission’s answers involved building more and bigger roads and highways. They did
acknowledge that the car had its most economical use and greatest value in low-density, longdistance travel (i.e., suburbs and hinterlands), while mass transit was the most practical and
efficient travel mode in areas with high concentrations of people (i.e., cities). The report cited
statistics similar to Atlanta’s Beeler Report, how trolleys and buses transported 72% of the
passenger traffic in only 5.4% of the vehicular traffic. It even went so far as to say that, in central
business districts, mass transit should be given preference over the automobile.664
However, the rest of the report provided various ways to enlarge and enable greater
automobile use. It suggested that mass transit for trips from outlying areas into the city center be
relegated to elevateds or subways, freeing up street space for everyone else. While insisting that
mass transportation was the only solution to traffic problems in cities, the Commission
contradicted its own assertion by advocating and providing for even greater use of cars in cities,
citing the following reasons.
In spite of the fact that individual transport in automobiles costs nearly twice as
much per passenger-mile as any form of rail transport, its use has increased until
it is now more important in point of national expenditure than all other forms of
passenger transportation put together. Of still greater consequence and social
significance is the fact that this represents almost entirely new business developed
in the last two decades. In other words, a new national riding habit has been
663
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created which requires for its satisfaction nearly five times the amount of money
per annum that is spent on all the other elements of passenger transport combined
(emphasis added).665
In other words, cars cost twice as much as trolleys to operate. Five times the total amount
of money spent on all other passenger travel modes went into expanding and maintaining the
requisite infrastructure for motor vehicles. The economics made no sense; but, apparently, the
Commission found it too hopeless or incomprehensible that any sort of resistance to this
relatively new phenomenon be mounted. Building public streets to accommodate private cars—
at enormous taxpayer expense—was really the only solution offered in the report. Clearly
someone somewhere had made and was continuing to make a great deal of money off their
creation of the “new national riding habit,” the demanding automobile, which cost so much and
took up so much space.
Basically the Detroit Rapid Transit Commission gave the roads to the cars, which is what
happened in Atlanta. The Commission’s report only twice mentioned in tandem the words
“automobile” and “hard-surfaced road,” but it was clear that they understood the necessity of
good roads to the car. Without that “essential corollary,” the automobile could not have provided
the freedom and ease of movement which made it universally popular and indispensable.666
The importance of a hard-surfaced roadway to the automobile was instantaneously
apparent to anyone riding in one. The early horseless carriages frequently overturned when
hitting a bump or dip in the road, and easily became mired in mudholes. Cartoonists found
fodder in the frequent, usually-harmless mishaps (see image below). Prominent Atlanta
physician, Dr. Ludwig Amster, complained to a Constitution reporter about the “abominable”
state of the city’s streets. Utilizing the nomenclature of the day, the doctor said that good roads
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(out in the country) were fine, but wanted to know why the streets (inside the city) were

Figure 53. The horse-drawn horseless, 1910.
“unpaved, rough, filled with gullies.” A frequent motorist thoroughly familiar with the city map,
Dr. Amster observed that the Whitehall-Peachtree corridor provided the only good stretch of
pavement, and once off it, anyone riding in a car could tell the difference. “As long as you walk
or ride in a street car or even ride in a carriage, the condition of Atlanta’s streets are not so
noticeable, but once you get into an automobile you will jolt with indignation not only mentally,
but also physically.”667
Cars require hard, smooth, durable surfaces on which to travel; without a network of
paved roads, its range would be limited. The modern first-world motorist can scarcely
comprehend a time when this was not universal knowledge. During the 1920s, Atlanta regularly
spent vast sums on paving suitable for automobiles. In the prior two decades, the combined
business interests, pro-growth advocates, and elected officials of Atlanta promoted automobile
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use and advocated for motorists rights. In the twenties, they re-legislated and reconfigured the
city’s streets, but all of it took place before the majority of Atlantans even owned a car.
“Inequitable” perhaps best summarizes in a word the problem with the growth-machine
coalition. Other descriptors—hegemonic, unfair, unjust, discriminatory, preferential, noninclusive—also apply to the way any urban pro-growth urban alliance functions. The complete
exclusion of any African American from the dominant white association provides the largest,
most egregious example of the inequity of the system in the time period of this study. However,
all working-class and most middle-class whites also had no representation in the city’s most
powerful decision-making body. As Hunter observes, the ordinary person has no voice in policy
determination, where the decisions are handed down from above. “These individuals are the
silent group…. The flow of information is downward in larger volume than it is upward.”
Despite loud claims about addressing community problems and concerns, only narrow interests
inform the workings of Atlanta’s “unrepresentative set of power wielders.”668
The top men had little understanding of the important issues confronting all of the Blacks
and most of the rest of Atlanta’s citizens. At least some of their blindness resulted from their lack
of connection to the lives of average folks. One’s operative milieu has great effect on one’s
views of society, as the following transportation example demonstrates.
The segregated existence of many of Atlanta’s pro-growth, car-centric individuals left
them unaware of or unconcerned about the difficulties faced by ordinary people who rode the
crowded streetcars to work daily. If one never had to take a trolley, one could not comprehend its
strategic importance to the thousands who did. That lack of awareness made it easier to label
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trolleys as the enemy of freely-flowing traffic and demand they be curtailed or eliminated, giving
no thought to the hardships such actions would place on those dependent on mass transit.
The extreme short-sightedness of the anti-streetcar position, which resulted in hordes of
new automobiles choking the streets beyond what any number of trolleys ever did, underscores
the same bias toward the automobile by Atlanta’s power elites demonstrated by Detroit’s Rapid
Transit Commission. The expense did not really matter; taxpayers would cover that. The slicing
up of the city by new arterials and later interstates did not really matter; only the poor in the rundown neighborhoods, invariably the sites of the new roadways, would be discommoded. Even
traffic congestion did not really matter. Eliminating or reducing cars in downtown might hurt
business, and, as Brownell notes, many downtown merchants had concluded that traffic
congestion was preferable to isolating the central business district by limiting cars.669
The disconnect between the pro-growth policymakers and the masses had the potential to
create conflicts leading to protests and violence. It did happen in Atlanta, as seen in 1914-15 at
the Fulton Bag and Cotton Mills, where workers struck, unsuccessfully, for better conditions,
higher wages and the right to unionize. Generally, however, during the time period of this study,
the overwhelming wealth and power of the top men, greatly assisted by Jim Crow legislation,
made significant pushback against their authority virtually impossible.
The city’s growth alliance did nurture relationships with labor leaders. Walter Cobb
Caraway (1876-1937), a linotype operator for the Atlanta Journal, was also president of the
Atlanta Federation of Trades and head of the Labor League. He was selected by the mayor to
serve on the influential Spring Street viaduct commission. Attorney and former tailor, Louie
Philip Marquardt (1876-1935), had represented workers during the Fulton Bag and Cotton strike,
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and headed both the Atlanta and Georgia labor federations. He was selected as a member of both
the city’s planning board and the Forward Atlanta Commission.
The inclusion of these two into the lower tiers of the coalition, however, did not
counterbalance the lack of representation of most Atlantans on policy-making bodies. The vast
majority of the citizenry were not self-governing; they had little to no control over their urban
environment. Even the city council represented narrow interests, rather than those of the greater
community. As Hunter remarks, “This situation does not square with the concepts of democracy
we have been taught to revere.”670
This is the great problem with the growth-machine alliance. Recent studies underscore
the anti-democratic nature of the coalition, and demonstrate that, in some places, governments
are beginning to respond to the demands of ordinary citizens, especially homeowners, regarding
zoning and land-use regulation. Molotch discusses the environmental and economic costs of
growth, unequally borne by the non-elites, and the emergence of counter-coalition groups.
Strategies including historic district overlays, assertion of Native rights, and community benefits
agreements are resulting in more representative, use value-conscious growth; not just growth
benefiting the few.671
The coalition’s policies of continuous growth and non-stop expansion of car-crowded
roads have had massive environmental impacts and contributed enormously to the existential
climate crisis humanity now faces. Today, a plethora of efforts are underway to displace the
single-rider, petroleum-powered motor vehicle, create shared and non-car streets, densify cities,
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reduce carbon emissions, and keep the earth habitable. Any successful attempt to alter the
dominant position of the automobile in society must be prefaced by an understanding of how that
preeminence was established. This means recognizing that the rise of the automobile was
accomplished through a years-long series of deliberate policy choices made at every level of
government. Those choices transformed physical and legislative systems, re-organized the city
itself, and even altered the architecture of its buildings. To comprehend how such policies were
formulated, one must understand the power structure which conceived and enacted those
policies. I have attempted to show how this dominance was established in one city, tracing the
steps of its emplacement by those in power, i.e., the pro-growth coalition.
By understanding what happened—and how—in a single place, one can find specific
ways to counter inequitable and destructive trends that may be applicable regionally and
nationally. It was not Atlanta’s love affair with the automobile that established the car’s
supremacy on the roadways, nor was it democracy in action; it was capitalism in action. As
Cronon observes, “The landscape we have created for them [cars] makes no other options
available to us. We have no choice but to love them. . . . The scale of our resulting dependence
on the automobile is so vast that unwinding these dependencies is hard even to imagine.”672
By demonstrating that deliberate choices and specific policies led to automotive
supremacy, this study suggests that similar determination, resources, and sustained legislative
actions will be necessary to alleviate somewhat the catastrophic consequences of Atlanta’s, and
America’s, massive carbon footprints. Popular grassroots campaigns of good will and good
intentions will not suffice against a ubiquitous motordom that has been entrenched in American
life and on the American landscape for more than a century.
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